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Dear Reader:

T

his is Old Dominion University’s 15th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university,
the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. The State of the Region report maintains the goal of
stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region’s many successes, but realize
it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about “where we are” and a sound understanding of the policy

options available to us.
The 2014 report has a strong economic development flavor and is divided into seven parts:
Rebounding, Albeit Slowly: In a nutshell, our regional economy continues to
recover, but still has not regained the jobs lost in the 2008 recession.
Mixed Signals: Migration Data and Regional Economic Vitality:
Between 2010 and 2013, our region experienced net out-migration, after taking
account of births and deaths. We are, however, attracting many new immigrants
from abroad.
Megachurches in Hampton Roads: There are 14 “megachurches” in
Hampton Roads and each enjoys an average attendance in excess of 2,000
weekly. They are redefining organized religion in our region.
Homeless Children in Hampton Roads: Estimating the Costs to
Society: More than 22 percent of homeless people are children under age 18.
We focus on the work of the organization ForKids Inc. as a way to estimate these
costs and benefits of homelessness to society.
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The Impact of Vehicle Tolls on Hampton Roads: Job Mobility,
Residential Living Choices and Regional Cohesion: This was one of
the hottest topics in Hampton Roads this past year and we analyze the probable
effects of those tolls on our region.
Economic Development Incentives: Competing Against Ourselves?
Is the time-honored strategy of providing financial incentives to attract new firms
the most productive way for our region to proceed, or instead should we be
looking at alternatives such as “gardening” existing firms and creating “innovation
districts”?
The Answer Is Always “Yes”: In a related chapter, we point out that our
cities persistently ignore available evidence and choose to provide large financial
subsidies for arenas, stadiums, convention centers and hotels.
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Rebounding, Albeit Slowly

REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY

T

he Great Recession inflicted significant damage upon the citizenry of Hampton Roads. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that our regional rate of
unemployment more than doubled from 3.4 percent in April 2008 to 8.2 percent in January 2010. Meanwhile, between 2007 and 2010, we lost almost
40,000 jobs in Hampton Roads (see Graph 1).

Even so, cushioned by Department of Defense (DOD) spending, our regional
recession turned out to be milder than that of the nation. When the U.S. rate of
unemployment topped out at 9.9 percent in March and April of 2010, this was
considerably higher than our regional 8.2 percent peak.
DOD spending in Hampton Roads was indeed the key to our more sedate
economic decline; it increased in our region by an average of 6.1 percent
annually between 2000 and 2011. Unfortunately, this powerful growth engine
began to sputter in 2012 and as Graph 2 indicates, absolute DOD spending in
Hampton Roads in 2014 likely will barely exceed our 2011 level and actually
be below our 2012 level.
DOD expenditures on military personnel have been a significant driving force in
our regional economy for at least the last decade. One can observe in Table 1
that the average compensation of an active-duty military member in our region
increased by more than 95 percent between 2001 and 2011, while average
federal civilian employees’ compensation increased a bit more than 54 percent,
average state and local government employees’ compensation by 39 percent,
and average private non-farm employees’ compensation by almost 31 percent.
However, the political/economic energy for these DOD compensation increases
is dissipating; it appears that the next wage increase will be 1 percent.
Note that the compensation data reported in Table 1 include the value of all
fringe benefits received by active-duty personnel. Thus, an economic value is
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placed on all food, uniform and housing allowances, etc. Active-duty military
wages did not increase by 95 percent between 2001 and 2011.
Ironically, the deceleration of defense spending has enabled us to achieve a
long-sought regional goal – the diversification of our regional economy. As
Graph 3 reveals, in 2014, we expect that only 42.2 percent of our regional
economic activity will be directly and indirectly attributable to DOD spending;
this would be down from our recent peak of 46.6 percent in 2011. Alas, we
have achieved our economic diversification for the wrong reason – a decline in
DOD spending rather than a spirited increase in our private-sector activity.
In any case, while we have been experiencing economic growth in Hampton
Roads (roughly 1.54 percent over the past year after removing inflation), this has
not translated to significant job growth. A review of Graph 1 demonstrates that
we have yet to recover all the jobs we lost in the Great Recession. Our regional
economic recovery has trailed that of both the Commonwealth and the United
States. As Graph 4 illustrates, the country finally recovered all of the jobs it lost
in the recession in May of this year and Virginia is less than 1 percent away
from doing so. We, however, are sputtering along at almost 4 percent below
our 2007 peak of 776,600 regional jobs.
There are, however, some bright spots in our regional economic picture. In the
next few sections we will examine them and our prospects for the future.

GRAPH
1
GRAPH 1
Total Civilian Employment in Hampton Roads,
1999-2013 (Thousands of Jobs)

TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2013 (THOUSANDS OF JOBS)
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Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Not seasonally adjusted. Revised data March 17, 2014.
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GRAPH 2

GRAPH 2

Estimated Direct DOD Spending in Hampton Roads, 2000-2014
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2014
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2011

2012

2013

2014

TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001, 2011 AND 2012
Earnings in 2001

Earnings in 2011

Earnings in 2012

Percent Increase
2001 to 2011

Percent Increase
2011 to 2012

Military

$47,077

$92,054

$93,346

95.5%

1.4%

Federal Civilian
Government Employees

$63,631

$98,296

$98,166

54.5%

-0.1%

State and Local
Government Employees

$40,251

$55,931

$56,334

39.0%

0.7%

Private Non-farm

$29,155

$38,166

$39,499

30.9%

3.5%

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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49.5%
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REGIONAL
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Gross Regional
Product
Attributable
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1984-2014

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Commerce and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 4

Recession Recovery in the U.S., Virginia and Hampton Roads
MeasuredRECOVERY
by the Percentage
of Total
Jobs Restored,
2007-2014*
RECESSION
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VIRGINIA
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ROADS
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Defense Spending
In light of the data just presented, is it possible to pose DOD
spending as a positive factor in our economic future? Yes,
but primarily because over the next few years we will not
experience the much more substantial reductions in defense
spending that might have occurred.
In order to decipher what DOD spending is likely to be in the future, it is
necessary to distinguish between “discretionary” DOD spending and “overseas
contingency” DOD spending. Discretionary defense spending is best viewed as
constituting the DOD’s base budget. Overseas contingency defense spending
relates to wars and conflicts that are thought to be temporary, for example, U.S.
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY 2015, $85 billion is designated for
such purposes.
There is, however, a third category worthy of note: “support” spending related
to U.S. defense needs that includes certain expenditures in the Department
of State, cyber security in the Department of Justice, nuclear security in the
Department of Energy and the now famous Department of Veterans Affairs. Table
2 summarizes what has been happening to these three classes of defense or
defense-related expenditures since FY 2009. With the exception of FY 2012
and FY 2013, support expenditures have been growing steadily over time and
their growth is not likely to abate. This reflects both the continued growth of
fringe benefit expenditures (including health) for active-duty and retired personnel
and an increased emphasis on nonconventional warfare.
The three lines in Graph 5 illustrate the impact of DOD budget cuts in recent
years. The blue line depicts discretionary DOD spending caps between FY
2012 and FY 2021 approved under the Budget Control Act of 2011. The
red line illustrates the additional spending cap reductions – also known as
sequestration – that were also set in place in the Budget Control Act of 2011.
The green line reflects sequestration relief (increased DOD spending caps) that
was approved in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. The area of the green
trapezoid is equal to $31.5 billion and represents DOD spending caps that
have been restored for FY 2013 and FY 2014.
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TABLE 2
TOTAL DEFENSE-RELATED SPENDING (IN BILLIONS OF $)
IN FISCAL YEARS ENDING ON SEPT. 30 OF EACH YEAR
Fiscal
Year

DOD Base
Budget

Overseas
Contingency

Support

Total

FY 2008

$686.0

$197.5

N.A.

N.A.

FY 2009

$513.5

$145.9

$149.2

$808.7

FY 2010

$530.1

$167.3

$159.5

$852.2

FY 2011

$528.1

$159.4

$165.0

$862.7

FY 2012

$530.4

$126.5

$159.3

$816.2

FY 2013

$495.5

$ 93.0

$163.8

$752.3

FY 2014

$496.0

$ 91.9

$168.6

$756.5

FY 2015

$495.6

$ 85.4

$175.4

$756.4

Source: http://useconomy.about.com/od/usfederalbudget/p/military_budget.htm

The salient point is that we were spared many of the
sequestration cuts that had been scheduled for FY 2013 and
FY 2014. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 also provided a
1 percent pay increase for active-duty personnel and a 4.2
percent hike in housing allowances.
What does all this mean for Hampton Roads? In a nutshell, it’s
not going to be as bad as it might have been. Graph 6, which
shows the region’s median household income, demonstrates
this. We’ve averted the largest DOD cuts, but smaller cuts
remain. Further, Congress has blocked any consideration of
closing military bases, so that potential problem is off the
table, if only for a few years.
Of greater concern to us should be four potentially adverse
trends relating to DOD spending. First, the total number of
active-duty military personnel in our region continues to
decline and is now about 20,000 below our numbers at the
beginning of this century. The decline between FY 2010 and FY 2012
was relatively modest where the U.S. Navy was concerned – 1,133 fewer

active-duty individuals, or about 1.6 percent of its regional complement.
However, we should not forget that active-duty personnel and their dependents
buy homes, purchase automobiles, attend colleges, patronize restaurants, etc.
We will feel the economic effects.
Second, the U.S. Navy continues to grow smaller in terms
of the number of active ships in the fleet. In FY 2010, 72 ships
were homeported in Hampton Roads, but this had fallen to 68 by FY 2012,
continuing a long-term trend. Smaller ship numbers eventually translate into
diminished ship repair and maintenance activity, which is a multibillion-dollar
industry in our region. More than the Norfolk Naval Shipyard will be affected.
Firms such as BAE Systems and Colonna’s Shipyard will experience reduced
business and subsequently find it challenging to refocus their attention toward
non-DOD activities.
Third, the escalating costs of building and producing major
defense assets, such as aircraft carriers and state-of-theart fighter airplanes, mean that the DOD will not be able to
purchase as many in the future. They’re simply too expensive. This will
result in lower levels of activity at firms such as Newport News Shipbuilding. In
the long term, if fewer such assets are being produced, this also will accelerate
the decline in the number of active-duty personnel and civilian counterparts
employed by the DOD.
Fourth, the military challenges and conflicts the United States
has confronted in the 21st century have not always matched
up well with the powerful traditional military assets the
country has the ability to deploy. We clearly have the most powerful
military force on earth and any and all opponents shrink from entering any
battlefield where the U.S. is able to deploy its traditional military assets, such
as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced fighter aircraft. However,
growing in importance are anti-partisan and anti-terrorist operations, the use
of Special Forces, cyber warfare and a variety of policing and prevention
activities. If this trend away from the use of traditional military assets continues,
it is likely to be disadvantageous for Hampton Roads, because we are
substantially (though not totally) a traditional, conventional forces bastion.
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GRAPH 5
GRAPH 5

Caps on Department of Defense Discretionary Spending, FY 2012 to FY 2021

CAPS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, FY 2012 TO FY 2021
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FY20

FY21

GRAPH 6
Comparison of Median Household Income,
GRAPH 6
Hampton Roads and
the U.S., 1998-2014
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2014
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Employment And Job
Markets In Hampton Roads
Even though we have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the Great
Recession, some sectors of our economy have done rather well. Graph 7
reports sectoral winners and losers in Hampton Roads in 2013 in terms of jobs
gained and lost. Continuing a long-term trend that was not altered by recession
(see Graph 8), the health care and social assistance sector exhibited a strong
increase in employment. Reflecting economic recovery, professional and
business services, retail and wholesale trade, and even manufacturing, recorded
significant increases in jobs.
At the other end of the spectrum, government jobs declined across the board
– federal, state and local – within Hampton Roads. This is indicative both of
disappointing tax collections and citizen resistance to expanded governmental
activity. Governments collectively shed approximately 1,600 jobs in our region
in 2013.
Hampton Roads, however, is not a high-wage oasis. Table 3 reports average
weekly wages in various economic sectors at the end of 2003 and at the end
of 2013. Our largest growth in jobs has been occurring in health care and
social assistance, but average weekly wages in this sector grew only 27.4
percent in Hampton Roads over the 2003-2013 period. Unfortunately, during
the same years, the CPI-U (consumer price index for all urban consumers) grew
26.5 percent. Thus, these workers experienced only a scant 1 percent increase
in their real incomes. Following national trends, the big winners regionally in
terms of increased real incomes over this decade were finance and insurance
workers, whose real incomes increased by almost 16 percent. The big losers
were retail trade workers (many of whom are salespeople) – their real incomes
fell by 13.6 percent during this decade.
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE PRIVATE-SECTOR WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED
INDUSTRIES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2003 AND 2013
4th Quarter
2003

4th Quarter
2013

Changes

Construction

$709

$938

$246 (34.7%)

Manufacturing

$908

$1,120

$212 (23.3%)

Wholesale Trade

$947

$1,176

$229 (24.2%)

Retail Trade

$405

$457

$52 (12.8%)

Transportation
and Warehousing

$790*

$1,066

$276 (34.9%)

Information

$795*

$1,044

$249 (31.3%)

Finance and
Insurance

$867

$1,234

$367 (42.3%)

Professional and
Business Services

$1,075

$1,430

$355 (33.0%)

Health Care and
Social Assistance

$696*

$887

$191 (27.4%)

Accommodation
and Food
Services

$242

$303

$61 (27.4%)

Industry

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages in Private Sector and the Old
Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Wage data shown for Transportation and Warehousing
and Information industry are for second quarter 2005. Data for Health Care and Social Assistance are for first
quarter 2007.

Hence, in Hampton Roads, we find ourselves in a good news/bad news
situation with respect to jobs and labor markets.
The good:
•O
 ur regional rate of unemployment (5.8 percent in July 2014) continues to
hover well below the U.S. unemployment rate (6.5 percent in July 2014).
•A
 s Graph 9 reveals, the number of people seeking unemployment insurance
in Hampton Roads continues to decline.
•A
 ll things considered, the private-sector economy in our region has not
performed too badly. There is private-sector economic growth and there has
been some job creation.
The bad:
•W
 e simply aren’t creating enough new jobs; we have yet to replace all of the
jobs we lost in the Great Recession.
• Labor force participation in Hampton Roads (and in the U.S.) continues to
decline, reflecting the reality that an increasing number of people of working
age are not seeking work. Hence, they are not counted as unemployed.
•G
 rowth in real, inflation-adjusted incomes has been minimal overall and in
many job sectors income growth has not kept up with the rise in the Consumer
Price Index over the past decade.
•W
 hile we are doing better than the U.S., our July 2014 unemployment rate
(5.8 percent) was higher than Virginia’s (5.4 percent) and Richmond’s (5.7
percent).
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GRAPH 7
Job Gains and Losses in Hampton Roads, 2012-2013 (in Thousands)
GRAPH 7

JOBS GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2013
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Job Gains and Losses in Hampton Roads, 2007-2013 (in Thousands)
GRAPH 8
JOB GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2007-2013 (IN THOUSANDS)
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GRAPH 9

GRAPH 9

Total Monthly Unemployment Claims for Hampton Roads, January 2004 Through May 2014 (12-Month Moving Average)

TOTAL MONTHLY UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH MAY 2014
(12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)
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Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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The Port
“If you want to know who the players are, you’d better buy a program.” This
baseball park bromide also applies to the Port of Virginia, where both the Port’s
management and the membership of the Virginia Port Authority board have
changed several times in recent years.
Politically, governors Bob McDonnell and Terry McAuliffe are far apart, but both
have gone on the record expressing dissatisfaction with various aspects of the
operation of the Port. During his term, McDonnell considered privatizing the
management of the Port, but this proposal succumbed to a flurry of objections.
More recently, McAuliffe has been vocal in his criticisms of financial losses
sustained by the Port and his administration also appears to be dissatisfied with
the Port’s lease arrangements with APM Maersk in Portsmouth.
Meanwhile, the Port is more active than ever. It recorded an
all-time high in cargo tonnage handled in 2013 and is on track
to set another record in 2014 (see Graph 10). The Port also set a
record in handling the ubiquitous 20-foot equivalent (TEU) containers in 2013
and likely also will exceed that number in 2014 (see Graph 11). Further,
the Port has been grabbing market share away from its major East Coast
competitors – New York/New Jersey, Savannah and Charleston. Graph 12
demonstrates that the Port has decisively reversed the decline in East Coast
market share that it suffered 2007 through 2011 and, counting 2014, will
have increased its market share three years in a row.
One indicator of the Port’s recent success is the increase in the
proportion of containers that have been moving out of the Port
by means of rail rather than trucks (see Graph 13). A significant
proportion of truck cargo leaving the Port is “captive,” that is, it is cargo that
is most likely to be carried by truck from the Port because we are closest to the
customers and have a cost advantage in this method of delivery. One can draw
a radius around the Port of Virginia extending as much as 250 miles in some
directions, and high proportions of the cargo delivered within that radius are
captive because we enjoy a delivery cost advantage compared to more distant
ports such as New York/New Jersey or Savannah.
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The same cannot be said for prospective customers located in metropolitan
areas such as Columbus, Detroit, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati and Cleveland.
Multiple ports can and do compete for this cargo, which typically is delivered
via rail. It is a good sign that the Port of Virginia’s market share is increasing in
this highly competitive arena. We are competing and winning in a very tough
environment for “discretionary” cargo.
The good news does not stop there. Because the Port of Virginia is the largest
deepwater port on the East Coast (and will remain so for several years), we can
handle larger ships than most of our competitors. Graph 14 reports that
there has been a general upward trend in the average number
of TEUs handled by the Port of Virginia per single vessel
call. Not only is this good for business, but also it enables the Port to realize
economies of scale and potentially to exert control on its costs and prices as we
continue to invest in Port infrastructure.
In addition, the Port of Virginia is realizing dividends from Norfolk Southern
Corp.’s Heartland Rail Corridor, which, among other things, allows double
stacking of TEUs headed to the Midwest; from CSX Corp.’s on-dock rail services
at Portsmouth’s APM Terminals; and from more “first-in, last-out” service by ships
coming and going to and from Hampton Roads.
Why, then, the current angst over the Port’s performance? Why did The
Virginian-Pilot’s editorial board choose to label the recent past a “legacy
of chaos?” (June 1, 2014). First, the Port (as outlined in previous State of
the Region reports) has been losing money, if one accepts the precepts
of accountants and economists. Indeed, the Port recently has been in the
unenviable position of losing money on some of the record number of TEUs that
it has been handling, in some cases because it sometimes has offered “sale”
prices for its services. Second, there is growing recognition that there was some
validity to the assertions of those who were competing to manage the Port
privately that they could in fact manage it more efficiently by reorganizing its
operations and instituting new cost controls. Third, and related to reason No.
2, there is agreement that the previous management structure of the Virginia Port
Authority (VPA) and its operating arm, the Virginia International Terminals (VIT),
resulted in overlapping responsibilities, excessive managerial expenditures and
sometimes-laggard reactions to changing circumstances. Fourth, the Port has
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suffered from instability; its operational and board leadership has turned over
several times in just a few years.
Since late February 2014, the Port has been led by an
experienced and respected hand, John Reinhart, who knows
the industry well and understands the range of tasks in front
of him. Visible changes have occurred in cargo handling, and
various efficiency-oriented, cost-containing activities are in
process. The basic outlook for the Port of Virginia is favorable.
Port activity likely will grow much more rapidly than gross
regional product; our Port is well situated geographically;
we are a deepwater port; we benefit from excellent rail
connections; we have the ability to expand; and our labor
relations have generally been good.
The Port of Virginia has been a bright spot, economically speaking, over the
past few years despite the challenges noted above. At a time when defense
spending and tourism are stagnant, we have a special need for the Port to
surmount the challenges facing it and augment its regional leadership role.
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GRAPH 10
GRAPH
General Cargo Tonnage at the
Port of10
Hampton Roads, 1991-2014
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2014
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General cargo tonnage increased by 7.5 percent in 2013
and we forecast a 5.6 percent increase in 2014.
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GRAPH 11
Twenty-Foot Equivalent
Units (TEUs)
GRAPHContainer
11
in the Port of Hampton Roads, 1991-2014
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TEUs increased by 5.6 percent in 2013 and we forecast a
4.3 percent increase in 2014.
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After declining four years in a row, the market share of the Port of Hampton Roads reversed course and
began to increase in 2012. It has continued to increase and is now above its peak in 2007.
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GRAPH13
13
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Percentage of containers moved by rail has steadily increased from 30.0% in 2011 to 31.9% in 2012
and to 33.8% in 2013. Through July 2014, 33.67% of containers have moved by rail.

1.27

1.20
1.21
1.10

Millions of Containers

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

2011

2012

•Rail

Barge & Truck

Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project

24

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2014

2013
Total

GRAPH 14
GRAPH 14

Average TEUs per Container Vessel Call, 2011-2014*

AVERAGE TEUs PER CONTAINER VESSEL CALL, 2011-2014*
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Average TEUs per container vessel call increased by 3.7 percent in 2012; increased by
another 8.9 percent in 2013; and increased further by 9.6 percent through April 2014
compared to TEUs per vessel call through April 2013.
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Tourism
The sluggish recovery of our tourism industry epitomizes the slow recovery of our
regional economy. As one can see in Graph 15, total hotel revenues peaked in
Hampton Roads in 2007 and by 2013 were still $48.6 million (or 6.8 percent)
below the record 2007 level. In real, inflation-adjusted terms, 2013 revenues
were 18.6 percent below those of 2007.
Much the same story holds true for REVPAR – revenue received per available
room. This is the single best indicator of how well a hotel or motel operator is
doing because it is a measure that takes into account both supply and demand
(see Table 4). REVPAR in Hampton Roads fell by 10.7 percent between 2007
and 2013 – and almost 25 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Virginia Beach,
which performed the best in our region, suffered a 0.1 percent decline in
REVPAR in nominal terms over this period, but a more than 14 percent decline
once price inflation is taken into account.
The long-term shift in tourists away from the Historic Triangle
(Williamsburg, Jamestown, Yorktown) moderated in 2013,
but the continuing reality is that the Historic Triangle’s share
of regional tourism revenues declined from 31.5 percent in
1999 to 18.3 percent in 2013 (see Graph 16). The winner in
the market share derby was Virginia Beach, whose share
increased from 33.2 percent in 1999 to 40.8 percent in 2013.
While the Historic Triangle has been reducing its supply of rooms (see Graph
17, which shows a decline in available room nights from 3.45 million in 2005
to 3.11 million in 2013), this also has been accompanied by a slow attrition in
the number of actual hotel nights it has sold. Counteracting this long-term trend
– which appears to reflect a change in the tastes of the public – represents a
major challenge for the Historic Triangle, which is one of our region’s treasures.
We will give considerable additional attention to the evolution of the hotel/
motel market in a succeeding chapter, titled “The Answer Is Always Yes,” which
considers the hotel/motel market in conjunction with the construction of new
convention centers and arenas.
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TABLE 4
REVPAR IN SELECTED MARKETS, 2007 AND 2013
2007

2013

Percentage
Change

U.S.

$65.58

$68.69

+4.7%

Virginia

$61.95

$55.69

-10.1%

Hampton
Roads

$52.90

$47.25

-10.7%

Myrtle Beach

$54.03

$56.40

+ 4.4%

Coastal Carolina

$55.83

$56.26

+ 0.8%

Ocean City

$71.74

$68.81

- 4.1%

Virginia
Beach

$64.73

$64.64

- 0.1%

Hampton

$41.71

$37.45

-10.2%

Newport News

$39.69

$34.29

-13.6%

Norfolk/
Portsmouth

$54.05

$45.35

-16.1%

Norfolk

$54.14

$45.95

-15.1%

Williamsburg

$47.48

$39.08

-17.7%

Chesapeake/
Suffolk

$52.90

$41.11

- 22.3%

Chesapeake

$53.60

$41.18

- 23.2%

Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Feb. 17, 2014, and the Old Dominion University Economic
Forecasting Project

GRAPH 15
Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2014
GRAPH 15

HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2014
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Hotel revenues in 2013 were 6.8 percent below the peak observed in 2007 and are
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GRAPH 16
Estimated City Hotel Market Shares in Hampton Roads
GRAPH 16
as Indicated by Industry Revenues, 1999 and 2013
ESTIMATED CITY HOTEL MARKET SHARES IN HAMPTON ROADS AS INDICATED BY INDUSTRY REVENUES, 1999 AND 2013
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GRAPH 17

GRAPH 17

Hotel Room Nights in the Historic Triangle (Williamsburg) Market,
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Housing

purchase a home in our region. The ratio of that rent-to-house payment increased
from 0.73 in 2007 to 1.45 in 2013.

From the standpoint of sellers, the market for existing residential homes in
Hampton Roads continued to improve. As Graph 18 confirms, the average
number of days that an existing home was on the market before selling
declined for the second year in a row and the total number of existing homes
sold increased for the third consecutive year. While the inventory of such
homes increased slightly, it remains very close to our historical average level
(see Graph 19). Meanwhile, as Table 5 suggests, 2014 should be the third
consecutive year that the median sale price of existing residential homes has
increased, albeit modestly.

At the same time, the average monthly mortgage principal, interest and tax
payment just mentioned now is only 19.4 percent of median household monthly
income (see Graph 22). Thus, if you are employed and can obtain mortgage
financing, this is a splendid time for you to purchase a home.

An important reason why the market for existing homes has changed is that
the number of distressed homes on the market has declined. Graph 20 shows
that the absolute number of residential foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads is
continuing to move toward pre-recession levels, while Graph 21 tells us that
the number of active listings of distressed homes (REO bank-owned homes and
properties up for bid in a short sale) has fallen almost continuously since peaking
at 3,224 in November 2010. In 2014, such sales are expected to account
for roughly one-quarter of all homes sold. This is vitally important to sellers
because, as Table 6 notes, in 2014 sales prices of REO bank-owned
properties have been only 55.7 percent of non-distressed sales
prices, while short sale prices have been only 72.3 percent
of non-distressed sales prices. Plainly put, sales of distressed
homes depress sales prices, and not just by a little bit.
More stringent loan requirements imposed by lenders and our plodding
economic recovery have made it difficult for many prospective homeowners
to obtain financing and actually make a home purchase. At the same time,
the Great Recession put a crimp in the construction of new apartments and
condominiums. The combination of these factors has driven up rents within
Hampton Roads. Relatively speaking, it now is much more attractive for
individuals to purchase a home (instead of renting) than it was five years ago.
Table 7 underlines this point by comparing the median monthly rent for a threebedroom house to the average monthly principal, interest and taxes required to
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TABLE 5
MEDIAN SALE PRICE OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES IN
HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2014*
Year

Median Price

Annual Percent Change

2001

$109,000

9.1%

2002

$116,900

7.3%

2003

$130,000

11.2%

2004

$156,500

20.4%

2005

$192,000

22.7%

2006

$214,900

2007

$223,000

2008

$219,000

-1.8%

2009

$207,000

-5.5%

2010

$203,900

2011

$180,000

2012

$185,000

+2.78%

2013

$190,000

+2.70%

2014*

$183,000

+0.55%

90% Increase
from 2002-07

19% Decrease
from 2007-11

11.9%
3.8%

-1.5%
-11.7%

Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.
*YTD May 2013 median price was $182,000 and YTD May 2014 median price is $183,000.

GRAPH 18
EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD AND AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2013
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GRAPH 19
GRAPH 19

Estimated Inventory of Existing Residential Homes as Measured by Active Listings on May 31 of Each Year

ESTIMATED INVENTORY OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES AS MEASURED BY ACTIVE LISTINGS ON MAY 31 OF EACH YEAR
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GRAPH 20
GRAPH 20

Hampton Roads Residential Foreclosure Filings, 2006-2013
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006-2013
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GRAPH 21
GRAPH 21

Number of Active Listings of Distressed Homes (REO and Short Sales) in Hampton Roads, June
2008AND
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ESTIMATED HOUSE RENTAL AND
PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAXES FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2013

$250,254 $241,666

96.6

$120,817

48.3

2001

$882

$836

1.19

2007

$261,723 $237,897

90.9

$163,421

62.4

2002

$911

$861

1.20

2008

$255,852 $239,110

93.5

$184,462

72.1

2003

$1,037

$890

1.33

2009

$243,902 $239,913

98.4

$164,229

67.3

2004

$1,044

$1,073

1.11

2010

$251,572 $231,211

91.9

$151,612

60.3

2005

$1,087

$1,315

0.83

2011

$236,358 $212,967

90.1

$135,304

57.3

2006

$1,118

$1,533

0.73

2012

$237,215 $187,527

79.1

$134,535

56.7

2007

$1,164

$1,598

0.73

2013

$245,344 $180,001

73.4

$131,644

53.7

2008

$1,247

$1,507

0.83

2014*

$235,755 $170,504

72.3

$131,361

55.7

2009

$1,236

$1,307

0.95

2010

$1,277

$1,233

1.04

2011

$1,319

$1,071

1.23

2012

$1,454

$1,015

1.43

2013

$1,570

$1,080

1.45

Short Sales

2006

Non-distressed
Sales

Year

Year

REO Price%
Non-distressed
Sales

AVERAGE PRICE OF EXISTING SHORT SALE, REOS AND NONDISTRESSED RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD IN HAMPTON ROADS,
JANUARY 2006 - MAY 2014
REO Sales

TABLE 7

Short Sales
Price% Nondistressed Price

TABLE 6

Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.
Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. REOs represent bank-owned homes.
*Data for 2014 are through May 2014.

Median
Monthly Rent
for a Threebedroom
House

PI&T Monthly
for a Medianpriced
Existing
House

Ratio of
Monthly Rent
to Principal,
Interest and
Taxes

Sources: HUD and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Monthly payments are calculated
assuming that the buyer has a 30-year mortgage. It is assumed that real estate tax rate is 1 percent and
the tax reduction received by homeowners would compensate for homeowners insurance and maintenance
expenditures.
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GRAPH 22

GRAPH 22

Housing Affordability: Monthly Payment for a Median Price Resale House as a Percentage of Median Household
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY
PAYMENT
FORinAHampton
MEDIAN Roads
PRICE RESALE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD
Monthly
Income
and the HOUSE
U.S., 1979-2013
MONTHLY INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1979-2013
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Summing It Up And A Quick
Look At The Future
We have reasons to be pleased that our regional economy
is growing modestly despite DOD spending within Hampton
Roads remaining slightly below its 2012 peak. Overall, our tourism
industry has grown at a modest pace since the end of the Great Recession.
Continued growth in the national economy will help accelerate the recovery of
our hotels and motels, but experience demonstrates that their prosperity is rather
sensitive to federal spending levels, including DOD spending. Until federal
spending recovers, our hotels and motels, as a group, are not likely to prosper
as they did pre-recession.
Despite some turmoil and issues, the Port has been expanding both in size and
market share and has become an increasingly important economic engine for
Hampton Roads.
Our regional housing market turned the corner at least a year ago, but it is not
likely to do extremely well until federal spending in general and DOD spending
in particular turn upward.
All of this adds up to an outlook of modest growth that is below our recent
historical norms. Table 8 documents that Hampton Roads grew
at the rate of 1.89 percent in 2013 (after removing price
inflation), but we estimate only a 1.54 percent real rate of
growth in 2014. The 2015 outlook is for more of the same, but international
crises that push DOD spending upward and/or inflate oil prices could easily
alter this projection.
Graph 23 illustrates where we’ve been and where we believe we are going
in terms of real, inflation-adjusted economic growth. Our predicted 1.54
percent regional economic growth rate for 2014 will find us
trailing both Virginia (predicted 1.76 percent) and the U.S.
(predicted 1.94 percent). Unfortunately, the Commonwealth now faces
its own economic challenges, as slumping state tax collections reveal. Three
Northern Virginia counties rank among the top 10 in the U.S. in terms of their

REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY

total loss of jobs in 2014. At the same time, the coal industry in Southwest
Virginia is under environmental siege. Hence, we cannot anticipate much
economic stimulus (for example, that coming from tourists) from the rest of the
Commonwealth.
In the 2013 State of the Region report, we observed that “It could have been
worse.” While hardly satisfying, this assessment remains on target.
TABLE 8
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT
(GRP), NOMINAL AND REAL (PRICE ADJUSTED), 2000-2014
Year

Nominal GRP
Billions of $

Real GRP
(2009=100)
Billions of $

Real GRP
Growth Rate
Percent

2000

50.35

61.49

4.64

2001

52.34

62.49

1.62

2002

55.72

65.51

4.84

2003

59.58

68.67

4.83

2004

63.31

71.02

3.42

2005

67.93

73.84

3.97

2006

72.29

76.25

3.26

2007

75.99

78.07

2.40

2008

77.50

78.10

0.03

2009

78.46

78.46

0.47

2010

80.03

79.07

0.77

2011

81.64

79.11

0.05

2012

84.84

80.79

2.13

2013

87.71

82.31

1.89

2014

90.27

83.58

1.54

Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data incorporate U.S. Department of
Commerce personal income revisions through November 2013. Base year is 2009.
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Mixed Signals:
Migration Data And
Regional Economic Vitality

MIXED SIGNALS: MIGRATION DATA AND REGIONAL
ECONOMIC VITALITY

T

he logic is simple. If more people are leaving a region than are coming into it, this suggests the possibility of economic problems in that region – in essence,
a lack of economic vitality that is causing individuals to vacate. Once one controls for births and deaths, what happens to a region’s population? Is a region a
magnet that attracts others, or does it lack magnetism and watch as individuals depart for other locales?

Hampton Roads receives mixed grades on its report card when viewed in the
light of migration. Between 2010 and 2013, after taking account of
births and deaths, our region experienced net out-migration.
Virtually all of the other comparable mid-Atlantic regions
recorded net in-migration. This is troubling information, though
somewhat less disturbing if one separates domestic migration
(inside the U.S.) from international migration (in and out of the
U.S.). Hampton Roads has proven to be an attractive location
for immigrants to settle and fares better than many of its peer
regions in this regard.
Let’s take a look at the data, which have been extracted from U.S. Census data
by www.governing.com. Data for nearly all metropolitan areas can be found
at www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migrationestimates-2013-data.html.
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Focusing On Migration
Migration occurs for many reasons, not simply because of the availability of
jobs. Quality of life also looms large. Amenities matter. Our oceanfront, the
Chrysler Museum of Art, the Historic Triangle, quality health care, and our
colleges and universities are among the many things that make our region
a great place to live. Publications such as David Savageau’s “Places Rated
Almanac” and Bert Sperling’s “Cities Ranked and Rated” attempt to quantify
such things.
Still other factors matter as well. The quality of our K-12 schools, the viability
of our transportation system, the vitality of our churches, the presence of family
and friends, the nature and quality of our entertainment, and our tax levels all
help determine whether people decide to live here, or somewhere else. Another
factor of obvious importance in Hampton Roads is the presence of the military
and military-related businesses and services. Migration data include the comings
and goings of military personnel and the absolute number of military personnel
located in Hampton Roads has trended downward over the past several
decades.
Clearly, noneconomic factors influence migration. Even so, economic factors
such as the availability of jobs and tax rates are major influences upon
migration. Witness the tens of thousands of people who have left California
in recent years and headed to other states, notably Texas (see the work of the
Manhattan Institute on this subject, www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_71.
htm#.U4VohXy-l5c).

Population Growth
Versus Migration

Migration is only one source of population growth or decline. Population
growth is a broader concept that takes into account not only migration, but also
includes births and deaths. Consider the population of Hampton Roads, which
rose by 30,549, or 1.53 percent, between 2010 and 2013. However, as
we will see, positive population growth that results from the number of births
exceeding the number of deaths can disguise the migration of individuals to and
from a region.
Table 1 demonstrates this point. It reveals that in net terms, 18,879 people
departed from Hampton Roads for other locations in the U.S. between 2010
and 2013. Yes, also during this period some people migrated into our region
from other parts of the country, but the -18,879 number means that even more
left our region for other U.S. locations.
On the other hand, our adverse domestic migration pattern was counteracted
substantially by a net in-migration of 17,179 people from outside the U.S.
This flow of immigrants into Hampton Roads is good economic news because
immigrants as a group tend to comprise highly productive individuals who
are more likely to start businesses and create jobs than other Americans. A
significant segment of today’s immigrants bring with them human and financial
capital that can be productively utilized in the U.S.
TABLE 1
POPULATION CHANGES AND MIGRATION:
HAMPTON ROADS, 2010 TO 2013
Total Population
Change

Natural
Increase

Births

Deaths

30,540

32,240

74,029

41,789

Net Migration
Domestic

International

Total

-18,879

+17,179

-1,700

30,540 = 74,029 - 41,789 - 18,879 + 17,179
Source: www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migration-estimates-2013-data.html

Governing.com, an Internet site that focuses on state and local government
issues, recently published Census data that focus on migration in and out of
cities and regions between 2010 and 2013. We rely upon governing.com’s
data in this chapter.
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Analysis By City And County

TABLE 2
NET MIGRATION NUMBERS, NOT CONSIDERING
BIRTHS AND DEATHS, FOR 16 CITIES AND COUNTIES
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2013

Setting aside new births and deaths, Hampton Roads lost population between
2010 and 2013 – meaning that more people migrated out of our region
than migrated into our region. Graph 1 illustrates the 1,700 individual net outmigration experienced by Hampton Roads during those years.
Table 2 records the net migration flows for our 16 cities and counties and further
subdivides those flows into domestic (inside the U.S.) and international (to and
from the U.S.). In fact, eight of our 16 cities and counties experienced net outmigration from all sources between 2010 and 2013 – led by Newport News
with a net outflow of 4,017, followed by Hampton with 2,939. Chesapeake
recorded the largest net inflow, 4,444, followed by James City County with
3,069.

DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
The results reported in Table 2 are nuanced, however. One can divide
migration into two parts – domestic migration (existing U.S. residents changing
their locations) and international migration (immigrants coming into the U.S.
or emigrants leaving the U.S.). Ten of our 16 cities and counties experienced
negative domestic migration, though only two (both of our North Carolina
counties) experienced negative international migration. Graph 1 illustrates the
overall international versus negative domestic migration for Hampton Roads
between 2010 and 2013.
It is the negative domestic migration numbers that should be
of the greatest concern to us as citizens, elected officials and
regional policymakers. Negative domestic migration numbers
represent people who have left our region, presumably
because our peculiar combination of employment and
amenities was not sufficiently attractive to retain them. The view
of most people is that this is due to inferior employment prospects, though we do
not have any data to confirm this. In essence, this view asserts that these people
could not find a suitable job in Hampton Roads and left to pursue hopefully
better prospects elsewhere.
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Domestic
Migration

International
Migration

Total
Migration

Gates County,
N.C.

-474

-9

-483

Currituck County,
N.C.

740

-6

734

Gloucester
County

-135

73

-62

Isle of Wight
County

351

81

432

2,516

553

3,069

63

6

69

-418

692

274

-56

33

-23

Chesapeake

3,067

1,377

4,444

Hampton

-3,828

889

-2,939

Newport News

-6,597

2,580

-4,017

Norfolk

-6,709

4,097

-2,612

Portsmouth

-1,603

598

-1,005

-338

284

-54

Virginia Beach

-6,248

5,703

-545

Williamsburg

790

228

1,018

-18,879

17,179

-1,700

James City
County
Mathews County
York County
Poquoson

Suffolk

Totals

Source: www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migration-estimates-2013-data.html

GRAPH 1
NET INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS (NOT INCLUDING BIRTHS) TO AND FROM HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2013
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Source: www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migration-estimates-2013-data.html
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However, as pointed out in Graph 1, there are major differences between
domestic and international migration flows. Graphs 2 and 3 separately depict
the domestic and international migration numbers for each of the 16 cities and
counties. It is here one can see that three of our largest cities – Newport News,
Norfolk and Virginia Beach – suffered a net out-migration of people to other
locations inside the United States between 2010 and 2013 (Graph 2). These
are not good-news numbers for these cities, for they appear to reflect torpid
job creation. True, all three cities have won a variety of awards in recent years
for their livability and even for their entrepreneurial climates. Nevertheless, the
bottom line is that these cities lost residents to the rest of the country.
Counteracting these problematic numbers, however, are the impressively positive
international in-migration numbers for all three cities (and for that matter, for our
entire region save our two North Carolina counties) that one can see in Graph
3. Virginia Beach, Norfolk and Newport News (in that order) were magnets
for international immigrants and this has highly positive implications for them
because of the entrepreneurial and job-creating tendencies of immigrants as a
group.1
The contrasts between the domestic and international migration data for
Hampton Roads illustrate the “good news/bad news” character of the
phenomenon of migration for our region. It certainly appears that we are not
creating sufficient new jobs to retain our most mobile workers. Graph 4 confirms
this; one can see that we have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the
Great Recession that began in 2008. On the other hand, we have become a
relatively attractive landing spot for immigrants and this bodes well for future job
creation and economic dynamism.

1

 ee, for example, “Immigration and the Revival of American Cities: From Preserving Manufacturing
S
Jobs to Strengthening the Housing Market,” (September 2013) www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/
ImmigrationUSRevivalReport.pdf. The primary author, Jacob L. Vigdor, is a Duke University economist.
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GRAPH 2
NET INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS (NOT INCLUDING BIRTHS) BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC MIGRATION,
TO AND FROM HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2013
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GRAPH 3
NET INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS (NOT INCLUDING BIRTHS) BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION,
TO AND FROM HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2013
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GRAPH 4

GRAPH 1

TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
HAMPTON
ROADS,in1999-2013
(THOUSANDS OF JOBS)
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Civilian
Employment
Hampton Roads,

1999-2013 (Thousands of Jobs)

800
776.6

775

762.1

768.6

767.6
752.7

751.0

750
731.3

734.8

742.2

738.6

736.7 739.2

745.2

721.0

725
707.3
700
675
650

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Not seasonally adjusted. Revised data March 17, 2014.
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Comparing Hampton Roads
To Other Metropolitan
Regions
The data presented thus far are interesting, but immediately lead to questions
relating to how Hampton Roads compares to other metropolitan regions that
we often view as peers and/or competitors. The best way to compare is to
transform our migration data into migration rates per 1,000 citizens. Having
done so, we can compare metropolitan areas of different population sizes in a
more meaningful fashion.
Graph 5 presents domestic migration rates for Hampton Roads
and eight other mid-Atlantic metropolitan areas. This is another
“bad news” rendition of our data; all eight of our peer and/
or competitor regions posted positive net domestic migration
rates between 2010 and 2013; only Hampton Roads recorded
a negative rate. Why? These other regions recovered much
more vigorously from the Great Recession than we did. Put
simply, they have created more new jobs than we have and
hence have attracted migrants from other U.S. locations.
The “good news” portion of our data is contained in Graph
6, which provides international migration rates for Hampton
Roads and the eight peer/competitor regions. We enjoyed the
third highest international migration rate among this sample of
metropolitan regions. Because immigrants as a group generate
disproportionately large numbers of new entrepreneurial
ventures and are especially productive sources of job creation,2
our leadership position in the area of international migration
bodes well for our future.

2

 nother reputable study supporting these conclusions is “National and State-by-State Economic Benefits of
A
Immigration Reform,” http://americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/05/17/63295/
national-and-state-by-state-economic-benefits-of-immigration-reform/. The study concluded that immigrants create
2,400 new jobs each year in Virginia and pay $670 million in annual taxes.
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Manan Shah, a principal partner of Plaza Resort Management, LLC, in Virginia Beach.

GRAPH 5
DOMESTIC MIGRATION RATES FOR HAMPTON ROADS AND EIGHT COMPARABLE MID-ATLANTIC METROPOLITAN AREAS
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GRAPH 6
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION RATES FOR HAMPTON ROADS AND EIGHT COMPARABLE MID-ATLANTIC METROPOLITAN AREAS
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The Influence Of The Military

evidence, but it also is much less expensive than providing large subsidies to
developers.

The total number of active-duty military stationed in Hampton Roads has been
on a downward trend for well more than a decade. Between FY 2010 and FY
2013, that decline continued, but for U.S. Navy personnel was only 1,133, or
about 1.6 percent of that service’s active-duty force in Hampton Roads.3 Data
for the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Coast Guard were not available.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that even the inclusion of data from those services
would still cause the total decline in active-duty military to be less than 2,000
over this time period. Taking such a number into consideration might wipe
out the 1,700 negative overall migration number for our region, but it would
not cure our last-place migration finish relative to comparable mid-Atlantic
metropolitan areas. Further, several of the other regions (Charleston, Jacksonville,
Savannah and Washington, D.C.) also are military-intensive and their numbers
would have to be adjusted for military personnel movements as well.

Instead, the hitch is that these initiatives may not immediately generate the same
flash and media excitement as an announcement of a new hotel complex or
arena. Such announcements usually are accompanied by promises of new jobs
and augmented tax collections. Unfortunately, these job and tax extrapolations
are dubious because they fail to take into account displaced expenditures – the
new developments often reduce the sales, jobs and tax collections of existing
businesses almost dollar for dollar. Further, any subsidies the developers receive
must eventually be funded by taxpayers.

Policy Implications
The good news is that our region continues to be attractive
to immigrants from other countries. Virginia Beach, Norfolk
and Newport News (in that order) lead the region in terms
of attracting new immigrants. As noted above, there is abundant
evidence that immigrants as a group tend to be ambitious and entrepreneurial.
Somewhat more often than natives, they start their own businesses and end up
generating new jobs. Some immigrants also bring substantial capital with them
to our region. Farsighted, growth-oriented regional policy should build upon this
strength.

Immigrants, however, bring with them new human and
financial capital along with drive and motivation. As a group,
they represent new injections of capital and energy into our
economy. The problem is that the payoffs from assisting them
do not come immediately and hence a degree of patience
is required, especially from voters and elected officials who
may bridle at subsidizing noncitizens. Nevertheless, our
highly favorable international migration numbers suggest
that immigration-friendly policies would generate even
larger benefits for our region. Further, compared to the
large subsidies often provided to developers, it would not be
expensive for us to assemble a package of incentives that
would enable us to attract more immigrants.

A variety of ways exist to make our region even more attractive to immigrants,
including the provision of short-term social services and financial support,
supportive counseling (including financial counseling and connecting immigrants
with those with investment capital), the provision of mentors and secondlanguage instruction in schools, etc. The problem is not that such programs don’t
work. Assisting immigrants not only is good for the economy, supported by the
3

CNRMA Hampton Roads Personnel & Homeported Operating Units, FY 10-13 (July 2, 2014)
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GRAPH
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CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN NONFARM PAYROLLS SINCE THE PEAK IN JANUARY 2008, IN MILLIONS
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The Bottom Line
There is an understandable tendency for our cities and our region to
tout rankings that appear in the media – we’re on the list of the top 10
entrepreneurial cities, or we’re in the top 20 most desirable vacation spots or
we’re a hip place for millennials to live, etc. We probably should puff out our
chests a bit when we receive such rankings.
Even so, the ultimate long-term payoff is jobs and our ability to attract and retain
highly mobile citizens and their valuable human capital. Our regional migration
rate is one of the most important thermometers of the actual “state of our region.”
It tells us more than almost any other variable about how well we are doing,
press clippings aside. The reality is that we have been underachieving.
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Megachurches in
Hampton Roads

MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS

C

hurch attendance is on the decline. The Pew Research Center’s longstanding Religion & Public Life Project indicates that the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated
rose “from just over 15 percent to just under 20 percent of all U.S. adults” between 2007 and 2012. Fully one-third of adults under the age of 30 do not
identify with a particular religion. The decrease in religious participation has been most evident among Protestants, both evangelical and mainline, whose
share of the U.S. population fell from 53 percent to 48 percent in the same five-year period. The Pew Research Center suggests that these trends may

be informed by younger Americans’ distaste for the perceived associations between organized religion and conservative politics, and by their tendency to postpone
marriage and parenthood until later in life. Secularization and a decrease in social engagement of all kinds in the United States today also might play a role.1
There is, however, a standout exception to Americans’ move
away from organized religion – a simultaneous increase
in both the number and size of the largest Protestant
congregations, also known as “megachurches.” To be considered
a megachurch, a church must have an average weekly attendance of at least
2,000 participants, although the attendance at the very largest churches
actually is far greater. Lakewood Church in Houston, led by Pastor Joel Osteen,
is the largest church in the country, with an average weekly attendance of
around 44,000. According to the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, there
are 1,546 megachurches in the U.S. today, including 14 in Hampton Roads
(see Table 1). This represents a nearly five-fold increase in the number of U.S.
megachurches within a generation. In 1990, there were approximately two
megachurches for every 1 million U.S. inhabitants. Today, the ratio is about five
per 1 million people (see Table 2). 1
In this chapter, we’ll take a close look at some of the defining characteristics
of U.S. megachurches. We’ll see how the largest churches in Hampton Roads
reflect these characteristics as well as how our region has provided fertile
ground for very large churches to thrive. Hampton Roads’ megachurches are as
diverse as the region itself, and they have successfully appealed to congregants
of many racial and ethnic backgrounds.

1

“ ‘Nones’ on the Rise,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (Oct. 9, 2012) at:
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/#who-are-the-unaffiliated.
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Bethel Church, 1705 Todds Lane, Hampton

TABLE 1
MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name

Average
Weekly
Attendance

Denomination

Website

Established
1981

1

Atlantic Shores Baptist Church

2,000

Southern Baptist

http://www.asbc.net/

2

Bethel Temple

2,613

Assemblies of God

http://www.betheltemple.com/

3

Calvary Revival Church - Norfolk

8,000

None

http://www.crcglobal.org/

Location(s)
1861 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464

Senior Pastor
Kyle Wall

1705 Todds Lane, Hampton, 23666

Glenn Reynolds

5833 Poplar Hall Drive, Norfolk, 23502

Courtney McBath

CRC-Chesapeake

740 Great Bridge Blvd., Chesapeake, 23320

Carlton McLeod

CRC-Peninsula (South)

119 29th St., Newport News, 23607

CRC-Peninsula (East)

324 Newport News Ave., Hampton, 23669

1990

Ray Johnson

4

Faith Deliverance Christian Center

2,000

None

https://www.faithdeliverance.org/

1986

1010 E. 26th St., Norfolk, 23504

Sharon Riley

5

First Baptist Church of Norfolk

2,462

Southern Baptist

http://www.firstnorfolk.org/

1805

312 Kempsville Road, Norfolk, 23502

Eric Thomas

6

Grove Church

2,363

Baptist

http://www.grovechurchva.com/

1840

5910 W. Norfolk Road, Portsmouth, 23703

Melvin Marriner

7

Kempsville Presbyterian Church

2,200

Evangelical
Presbyterian Church

http://www.kpc.org/

805 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464

Steve Keller (interim)

8

Liberty Baptist Church

3,023

Southern Baptist

http://www.libertylive.com/

1021 Big Bethel Road, Hampton, 23666

Liberty at Harbour View
9

Mount Lebanon Missionary Baptist Church

7025 Harbour View Blvd., Suffolk, 23435
2,300

Baptist

http://themountleads.org/

1902

Kim Brown

The Mount - Cathedral

215 Las Gaviotas Blvd., Chesapeake, 23322

The Mount - Elizabeth City

1021 US Highway 17 S, Elizabeth City, NC, 27909

The Mount - Peninsula

100 Regal Way, Newport News, 23602

The Mount - Chapel

884 Bells Mill Road, Chesapeake, 23322

10 New Life Providence Church

2,500

None

http://newlifeprovidencechurch.com/

2000

Dan Backens

Deep Creek Campus

423 Shell Road, Chesapeake, 23323

Ghent Campus

1420 Colonial Ave., Norfolk, 23517

Kempsville Campus

1244 Thompkins Lane, Virginia Beach, 23464

11 Rock Church International

Grant Ethridge

2,225

None

http://rockchurchinternational.org/

1968

640 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464

Robin and John Blanchard

Sources: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, Database of Megachurches in the U.S., available at: http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html,
church websites and interviews
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TABLE 1
MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Name
12 Waters Edge Church

Average
Weekly
Attendance

Denomination

Website

Established

3,594

Southern Baptist

http://www.watersedgechurch.net/

2003

Location(s)

Stu Hodges

Waters Edge Hampton

2011 Cunningham Drive, Hampton, 23666

Waters Edge Newport News

836 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Newport News, 23601

Waters Edge Williamsburg

4615 Opportunity Way, Williamsburg, 23188

Waters Edge Yorktown

6830 George Washington Memorial Highway,
Yorktown, 23692

13 Wave Church

4,000

None

http://www.wavechurch.com/

1999

Steve Kelly

Great Neck Location

1000 North Great Neck Road, Virginia Beach, 23454

Richmond Location

4036 Cox Road, Glen Allen, 23059

Seaboard Location

2655 Seaboard Road, Virginia Beach, 23456

Norfolk Location

421 Granby St., Norfolk, 23510

Wave Church NC - Wilson Campus

5334 Lamm Road, Wilson, NC, 27893

Wave Church NC - Greenville Campus

4052 Old Tar Road, Winterville, NC, 28590

14 Willliamsburg Community Chapel

2,400

None

http://www.wcchapel.org/

3899 John Tyler Highway, Williamsburg, 23185

Sources: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, Database of Megachurches in the U.S., available at: http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html,
church websites and interviews
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Senior Pastor

Travis Simone (interim)

What Is A Megachurch?

TABLE 2
MEGACHURCHES PER MILLION OF POPULATION BY YEAR
Year

U.S. Population
(millions)

Approximate
Number of
Megachurches

Megachurches
per Million
Population

1900

76

10

0.13

1970

205

50

0.24

1980

227

150

0.70

1990

250

310

1.20

2000

275

600

2.19

2005

300

1,210

4.00

2012

313

1,546

4.94

Sources: Scott Thumma and Dave Travis, “Beyond Megachurch Myths” (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
2007), p. 7, for 1900-2005 and for 2012, the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at:
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html

In the book “Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We Can Learn from America’s
Largest Churches,” Hartford Institute professor Scott Thumma and his co-author,
Dave Travis, emphasize that “the megachurch is more than just an ordinary
church grown large. The size and approach of a megachurch alters its social
dynamics and organizational characteristics, making it bear little resemblance
to smaller, more traditional congregations.”2 In “Beyond Megachurch Myths”
and on the Hartford Institute website, Thumma identifies common features that
tend to distinguish U.S. megachurches, beyond their large size, from “regular”
churches. Many of these features characterize Hampton Roads’ largest churches
as well, although we echo Thumma’s further observation that “there is no
‘typical’ megachurch model.”3 Each of Hampton Roads’ very large churches has
a unique mission and type of organization; not all of the characteristics outlined
below apply to every congregation.

DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP
It would be incorrect to state that all megachurches are personality-driven
enterprises. However, nearly all megachurch pastors are
charismatic individuals who possess broad, impressive skill
sets. They are dynamic preachers, creative and inspirational
leaders, and savvy entrepreneurs. Most megachurches reached their
very large size under the tenure of a single pastor. First Baptist Church of Norfolk
and Portsmouth’s Grove Church have held worship services since the early 19th
century, but their rise to “megachurch” status occurred much more recently. Their
weekly attendance numbers rose from a few hundred to a few thousand per
week under the leadership of Ken Hemphill (1981-1991) at First Baptist, and
Melvin Marriner (1989- present) at Grove Church.
Elsewhere in Hampton Roads, pastors such as Courtney McBath (Calvary Revival
Church, 1990) and Stu Hodges (Waters Edge Church, 2003) established new
churches that quickly took off in size. Rock Church International possesses the
largest sanctuary in Hampton Roads, with a seating capacity of 5,200.
2

Calvary Revival Church, 5833 Poplar Hall Drive, Norfolk
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3

 cott Thumma and Dave Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We Can Learn from America’s Largest
S
Churches (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), p. 2.
Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, xvi.
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Most, though not all, megachurch pastors are men. Norfolk’s
Faith Deliverance Christian Center was founded by Barbara
Amos in 1986, and is currently led by Pastor Sharon Riley.
Anne and John Gimenez founded Rock Church, our region’s
first megachurch, in 1968. Today the Gimenezes’ daughter
and son-in-law, Robin and John Blanchard, are co-pastors of
Rock Church International, and Anne Gimenez serves as bishop
of the Rock Ministerial Fellowship. Megachurches are often
a family affair, with pastors’ spouses and extended family
members assuming prominent leadership roles within their
congregations.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MEGACHURCHES IN NORTH AMERICA BY
DENOMINATION (2012)
Affiliation

The pastors of some of the largest megachurches maintain a public presence
that extends well beyond their church leadership. Nationally, Joel Osteen, T.D.
Jakes and Rick Warren are among the best-known megachurch pastors who
have become successful authors and celebrities in their own right. They are
familiar sights to anyone surfing Sunday morning television.
In our region, Courtney McBath, Anne Gimenez and Steve Kelly (Wave Church)
all preside over self-named ministries in addition to their Hampton Roads church
affiliations. They appear regularly on television, travel widely for missions and
other speaking engagements, and have authored numerous books. They are
entrepreneurs and celebrities in addition to being religious leaders.

MANY HAVE AN INDEPENDENT, DENOMINATION-FREE IDENTITY
The Hartford Institute indicates that 40 percent of all U.S. megachurches are
not affiliated with a particular denomination. Table 3 reveals that Southern
Baptist and other Baptist congregations make up the next 23 percent of U.S.
megachurches; no other denomination accounts for more than 6 percent of the
megachurch population. These patterns are consistent in our region as well.
Among the 14 Hampton Roads megachurches named by the Hartford Institute
in Table 1, six are unaffiliated, and an additional six identify as Baptist or
Southern Baptist. Broadly speaking, megachurches tend toward a conservative/
evangelical interpretation of Christianity, but there is a great deal of diversity in
the theologies and styles of worship that they promote.
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Nondenominational

40

Southern Baptist

16

Baptist, unspecified

7

Assemblies of God

6

Christian

5

Calvary Chapel

2

United Methodist

2

Four Square

2

Evangelical Lutheran Church

1

Vineyard Christian Fellowship

1

Other

18
100

Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at:
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html

Thumma and Travis point out that megachurches tend to be “quite self-sufficient;
they don’t need the resources, guidance, or identity that a national body
can provide.”4 More often, they provide these kinds of benefits to smaller
churches that opt to affiliate with them. Wave Church, for example, provides
leadership to a “Wave Network” of around 55 different churches; Rock Church
International presides over a worldwide fellowship of more than 500 churches.
Megachurches that do belong to a familiar denomination may not necessarily
emphasize this identity. Thus, Mount Lebanon Missionary Baptist Church in
Chesapeake is more commonly called “The Mount,” while Liberty Baptist Church
in Hampton and Suffolk identifies as “Liberty.”
These and other Hampton Roads megachurches have highly developed brand
identities. Many have adopted eye-catching logos and equally distinctive
names. When Pastor Steve Kelly came to our region from Australia in 1999, his
4

62

Percent

Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 27.

church was initially called the Virginia Beach Christian Life Center. He and other
church leaders soon sought a less “parochial,” more broadly appealing name;
they ultimately decided upon Wave Church.

WORSHIP SERVICES ALSO ARE CHOREOGRAPHED PERFORMANCES
Nontraditional names often go hand in hand with nontraditional worship styles.
Beginning with the need to accommodate very large audiences, the physical
appearances of megachurches usually are quite different from their smaller
counterparts. Many megachurches cultivate a self-consciously
contemporary style, without pews, hymnals, a cross-bedecked
altar or other familiar trappings of Christian churches. Hartford
Institute surveys indicate that “the vast majority of megachurch worship
is characterized by contemporary praise music, led by a worship team,
accompanied by orchestra, drums, and electric guitars and augmented by stateof-the-art sound systems and huge projection screens.”5

Church regularly live-stream part or all of their services to worshippers gathered
at different church locations.
These technologies have allowed a few churches to extend their reach well
beyond Hampton Roads. Waters Edge Church Online and The Mount Global
encourage visitors from all over the world to live-stream services and interact
with other users in real time. Bishop Kim Brown has a tablet computer nearby
when he preaches at The Mount in Chesapeake, so that he can immediately
incorporate long-distance prayer requests. The Mount Global holds online
classes for its virtual members and even sends them communion by mail.

MEETING EVERYONE’S NEEDS

Megachurch services usually are impressive, high-quality productions. “If
you’re bored, then we’re doing something wrong” is a sentiment that we heard
from several pastors in our region. Indeed, a tour of Hampton Roads’ largest
churches reveals an array of innovative worship styles that are not bound by
convention. At these churches one may encounter an eclectic range of popular
music (from the Beatles to large gospel choirs to Latin swing), baton twirlers and
impassioned sermons that are accompanied by sophisticated video imagery.

Americans are used to shopping at malls and big-box stores like Walmart and
Target. In a sense, megachurches aspire to be a similar kind of one-stop shop
for their members’ spiritual needs. A typical megachurch has dedicated groups
for children, teens, college students, young adults, retirees and more. Other
ministries might address the specific needs of single parents, recovering addicts,
adults studying for their GEDs or military service personnel and their spouses.
Some megachurches host schools and day care centers; others have counseling
and wellness centers. There are bookstores, coffee shops and even a bowling
alley associated with the largest churches in our region. The offerings can seem
overwhelming; for this reason, megachurches encourage and provide their
members with many opportunities to connect with others in smaller groups.

RELIANCE UPON NEW MEDIA

LARGE-SCALE COMMUNITY SERVICE

Megachurches have not hesitated to embrace new technologies. They maintain
well-designed websites and mobile apps, and they connect with their members
through multiple social media channels. They accept donations online, by text
message and at on-site credit and debit card kiosks. Sermons or entire church
services are available for prospective members (and anyone else) to watch
or listen to online. Live-stream technology has encouraged the expansion of
megachurches to multiple sites, or “campuses,” throughout our region. New Life
Providence Church, Waters Edge Church, Wave Church and Liberty Baptist

Most churches in Hampton Roads engage in different kinds of community
service – preparing meals for the hungry, sheltering the homeless and providing
other kinds of support to at-risk children and adults. Megachurches are no
different, although their initiatives take place on a significantly greater scale.
Some of the largest churches in our region support independent nonprofit
organizations that promote service to the community. Wave City Care and the
Life Enrichment Center of Norfolk (associated with New Life Providence Church)
are two prominent examples. Our region benefits from the kinds of service that
very large churches can coordinate and provide.

5

Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 27.
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Why Megachurches In
Hampton Roads?
The proliferation of megachurches has not occurred evenly throughout the
United States. The Hartford Institute’s numbers indicate that the majority of North
American megachurches are located in the U.S. South. Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida together
account for nearly one-quarter of all U.S. megachurches (see Table 4). Texas
and California are the states with the most megachurches. Virginia is home to
42 megachurches; 18 of these are located in Northern Virginia and 14 are in
Hampton Roads.
Only two Virginia churches – McLean Bible Church (Vienna) and Thomas
Road Baptist Church (Lynchburg), with weekly attendance of 16,500 and
8,350, respectively – rank among the 100 largest U.S. churches, according
to Outreach Magazine.6 Table 1 reports Hartford Institute data indicating that
Hampton Roads’ best-attended churches are Calvary Revival Church, Liberty
Baptist Church, Waters Edge Church and Wave Church, all with average
weekly attendance of more than 3,000.7 Table 5 reports that just over
half (52 percent) of all U.S. megachurches welcome 2,000
to 2,999 congregants each week, compared to 10 of 14 (71
percent) of all Hampton Roads megachurches. Thus, Hampton
Roads’ megachurches are somewhat smaller than the national
average.
Outreach Magazine counts Waters Edge Church, located in Yorktown and
other sites on the Peninsula, among the 100 fastest-growing churches in the
U.S. Waters Edge Church gained 616 new weekly attendees in 2013, a
growth rate of around 21 percent. River Oak Church (Chesapeake) and World
Outreach Worship Center (Newport News) also made the magazine’s list of
fastest-growing churches, suggesting that the ranks of our region’s megachurches
may soon be expanding.8
6
7

8

http://www.outreachmagazine.com/2013-outreach-100-largest-churches-america.html.
The weekly attendance figure of 8,000 for Calvary Revival Church appears to include CRC-Norfolk, CRCChesapeake and CRC-Peninsula, all of which operate autonomously.
http://www.outreachmagazine.com/2013-outreach-100-fastest-growing-churches-america.html.
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The Roman Catholic Church in the Diocese of Richmond
(of which Hampton Roads is a part) does not distribute
attendance numbers. By common agreement, however, the
three largest Roman Catholic parishes in Hampton Roads
are St. Gregory the Great and St. John the Apostle (both
in Virginia Beach) and St. Bede in Williamsburg. It is not
clear if these parishes ever approach the large attendances
recorded at services held at the region’s megachurches, such
as Wave Church.

TABLE 4
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEGACHURCHES
IN NORTH AMERICA (2012)
Regional Division

Percent

New England

1.1

ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI

Mid Atlantic

6.0

NY, PA, NJ

South Atlantic

23.6

MD, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL

East South Central

8.2

West South Central

16.8

AR, LA, OK, TX

East North Central

12.7

WI, IL, IN, MI, OH

West North Central

5.7

ND, SD, NE, KS, MO, IA, MN

Mountain

6.7

MT, ID, WY, CO, UT, NV, AZ, NM

Pacific
Canada

17.9

WV, KY, TN, MS, AL

WA, OR, CA, AK, HI

1.3
100.0

Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at:
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF MEGACHURCHES IN NORTH AMERICA
BY SIZE (2012)
Size Grouping

Percent

2,000 to 2,999

52.3

3,000 to 3,999

17.6

4,000 to 4,999

9.7

5,000 to 9,999

14.6

10,000 or more

5.8
100.0

Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at:
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html

In Hampton Roads and elsewhere, the growth of megachurches has mirrored
the growth of the U.S. population since the 1960s and 1970s. Megachurches
emerged alongside the shopping malls, big-box stores and multiplex theaters
that came to characterize American suburbia in the late 20th century.
Megachurches tend to thrive in fast-growing suburban and exurban locations,
where new churches accommodate the needs of booming populations.
Young cities like Virginia Beach have offered large plots of land with
comparatively few zoning restrictions, ideal for the construction of new
churches (as well as for the auxiliary buildings and generous parking lots that
typically accompany them). In some cases, megachurches have expanded by
repurposing older suburban commercial buildings. Calvary Revival Church’s
current location in Norfolk was once a Brand Distributors store that sold jewelry
and electronics; The Mount’s Cathedral was a former Winn-Dixie supermarket.
Repurposed buildings often are a constituent part of the spirit of renewal that
exists within megachurches.
As a growing metropolitan area generally considered within the country’s Bible
Belt, Hampton Roads has provided fertile ground for very large churches to
thrive. According to Thumma and Travis, suburbanites “are exactly the type of
people most attracted to megachurches: consumer-oriented, willing to commute
great distances, highly mobile and often displaced, middle-class, in middle-

MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS

level management positions, well-educated and with a traditional nuclear family
structure.”9 The average age of those attending megachurches is several years
younger than that of the churchgoing population as a whole. Thus, it seems
likely that our region’s large population of military families has contributed to the
success of Hampton Roads megachurches. These churches’ online offerings may
be particularly appealing to servicemen and women stationed abroad.
Regent University, whose website describes the university as “one of the
nation’s leading academic centers for Christian thought and action,”10 has
had a symbiotic relationship with the region’s megachurches. Founded by Pat
Robertson in 1978, the university now enrolls nearly 6,000 students in a wide
array of undergraduate and graduate programs. Regent students and alumni
have played an active role in Hampton Roads’ largest churches as congregants,
worship leaders, ministers and in a variety of other staff positions. The university
provides a forum for pastors of some of the region’s largest churches to gather
together on a regular basis. It has also invited nationally prominent megachurch
pastors to speak on campus; in the past year, T.D. Jakes and Greg Surratt have
participated in Regent’s weekly chapel service.
Megachurches are not entirely a suburban phenomenon. A
smaller subset of very large churches has prospered within
older urban centers such as Portsmouth and Norfolk. In
our region, these churches (including Grove Church, Faith
Deliverance Christian Center and Calvary Revival Church) most
often serve chiefly African American populations. Intriguingly,
two of our region’s fastest-growing suburban megachurches have recently
established new locations in older Norfolk neighborhoods. Wave Church holds
Sunday morning services at the downtown Granby Theater, and New Life
Providence Church purchased a century-old building from a dissolved Methodist
congregation on Colonial Avenue in Ghent. Calvary Revival Church started
in Norfolk and has since expanded throughout Hampton Roads, aligning with
sister churches in suburban Chesapeake, as well as in older neighborhoods of
Hampton and Newport News.

9

Thumma and Davis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 12.
http://www.regent.edu/about_us

10
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hour in Christian America.”11 Sixty years later, communism has withered on the vine and the
U.S. has elected its first African American president, but U.S. churches remain overwhelmingly
THE STATE OF
THE REGION
| HAMPTON
2014
segregated.
Survey data
indicate thatROADS
85 percent
of all U.S. congregations are composed of at
least 90 percent of one racial group.12

Figure 1 locates our region’s megachurches within Hampton Roads. It is
apparent that their presence extends throughout our region, from Williamsburg
to Elizabeth City, N.C. Several of these institutions maintain campuses in
multiple Hampton Roads localities, both Southside and on the Peninsula. Waters
Edge Church has pursued a decentralized, “multisite” strategy of expansion; no
one of its four well-attended locations accommodates more than around 1,000
congregants. New Life Providence Church seeks to grow by one new campus
per year, with the goal of establishing a presence in every Hampton Roads
locality. Even those megachurches that operate from a single large location
draw their members from a wide geographical area, well beyond the borders
of their city. Megachurches must be counted among Hampton Roads’ most
distinctively regional institutions.

Racial And Ethnic Diversity
In a 1953 sermon on “Communism’s Challenge to Christianity,” the Rev. Martin
Luther King Jr. famously expressed his shame that “Eleven o’clock on Sunday
morning is the most segregated hour in Christian America.”11 Sixty years later,
communism has withered on the vine and the U.S. has elected its first African
American president, but U.S. churches remain overwhelmingly segregated.
Survey data indicate that 85 percent of all U.S. congregations are composed of
at least 90 percent of one racial group.12
Megachurches, too, tend to reflect a significant degree of racial segregation,
although less than in the U.S. church population as a whole. Hartford Institute
research from 2005 “found that 31 percent of megachurches claimed to have
a 20 percent or more minority presence in their congregations,” and that “the
average megachurch had 14 percent of the congregation not representing the
majority race.”13 Megachurches’ enthusiasm for new styles of worship and forms
of church organization may well encourage this kind of diversity. The very notion
of a megachurch is grounded upon broad popular appeal.

11

12

13

 artin Luther King Jr., “Communism’s Challenge to Christianity,” The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., vol. 6
M
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 149.
Michael O. Emerson, “A New Day for Multiracial Congregations,” Reflections, spring 2013, available at:
http://reflections.yale.edu/article/future-race/new-day-multiracial-congregations.
Thumma and Davis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 140.
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Although all of the Hampton Roads pastors with whom we
spoke emphasized their churches’ openness to worshippers
of all races and backgrounds, most very large churches in our
region tend to have a staff and congregation that are either
mostly white or mostly African American. A brief look at these
churches’ self-presentation on their websites seems to confirm this observation.
There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions. Rock Church International’s
distinctive, charismatic style of worship has long attracted a highly diverse group
of followers; Bishop John Gimenez was of Puerto Rican descent and his sonin-law, Pastor John Blanchard, is Korean American. Pastors Dan Backens
and Kevin Turpin founded New Life Providence Church in 1999
with the explicit intent of fostering a multi-ethnic congregation.
According to Backens, New Life Providence’s membership
is now almost evenly represented by whites and blacks (in
addition to a smaller contingent of congregants of other
ethnicities and national backgrounds), a status that has been
carefully cultivated through the integration of diverse worship
styles and traditions. Bethel Temple in Hampton likewise
represents itself as multi-ethnic. Both Bethel Temple and First
Baptist Church of Norfolk sponsor Spanish-language ministries
to serve Hampton Roads’ growing Hispanic population.

Final Observations
The term “megachurch” first entered into widespread usage
in the 1980s, just as both the number and size of very
large U.S. churches had begun to take off. However, not
all pastors of large congregations embrace the term, for a
variety of reasons. Some of the pastors with whom we spoke
cited a media-driven image of the “megachurch” that has
become associated with corruption or scandal, as well as the
implication that megachurches are superior, or pose a threat,
to smaller churches in their communities. Other pastors saw
the label more benignly, as a neutral shorthand for referencing
churches with especially large congregations.
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It does seem clear that the term – like the phenomenon that it describes – has
great staying power, in Hampton Roads and elsewhere around the U.S. The
ongoing consolidation of Christian religious communities into fewer, but larger,
houses of worship has important implications for all residents of our region,
regardless of religious affiliation.

4) H
 ampton Roads charities and other nonprofit organizations should recognize
the potential value of partnering with area megachurches. Megachurches’
considerable human and financial resources, when paired with a passion for
innovation and community engagement, will permit the undertaking of service
projects on an ambitious scale and increase impact.

We can make the following generalizations and observations:

5) M
 egachurches fulfill spiritual needs that attendees feel are not being met
by conventional, denominational churches. Megachurches buck the more
general societal trend toward lower church attendance.

1) S
 cott Thumma estimates that the average U.S. megachurch has an income
of around $6.5 million per year.14 Megachurches in Hampton Roads are
thriving, million-dollar businesses, each with dozens of employees. They have
a substantial and growing economic impact in our region – in most cases,
much larger than conventional, denominational churches.
2) M
 egachurches in Hampton Roads are expanding their regional presence.
A generation ago, fast-growing churches typically constructed ever-greater
sanctuaries. Today, live-streaming and other Internet technologies allow these
churches to adopt a more flexible, multisite approach. “Instead of, ‘How
do we get people to come to the mountain?’ it’s, ‘Let’s bring the mountain to
the people,’” multisite church consultant Jim Tomberlin recently told Outreach
Magazine, further predicting that soon “megachurches will become gigachurches.”15 Multisite expansion seems particularly suited to Hampton Roads,
given the region’s decentralized population and geographic sprawl. A
few successful megachurches may eventually become well-known regional
“brands,” not unlike commercial businesses such as YNot Pizza or Taste
Unlimited.
3) Hampton Roads megachurches draw a large proportion of their members
from new arrivals to the area, as well as from the “unchurched.” Nonetheless,
the growth of megachurches has consequences for smaller congregations that
cannot offer an expansive menu of ministries or other high-profile attractions.
Smaller churches may struggle to survive and may need to clarify or redefine
their missions in order to maintain their appeal. In this, they are not unlike
many small, local businesses that have been confronted by competition from
Amazon or Walmart.
14

15

“Mega churches mean big business,” CNN.com, Jan. 21, 2010, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/americas/01/21/religion.mega.church.christian
Jennifer Kabbany, “Reshaping the American Megachurch,” Outreach Magazine, Nov. 25, 2012, available at:
http://www.outreachmagazine.com/features/5065-reshaping-the-american-megachurch.html
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6) W
 hile megachurches are explicitly religious organizations, they also are
businesses whose leaders simultaneously are businessmen and women who
instinctively appear to have mastered the principles of marketing, advertising,
brand management and vertical integration. Some megachurch leaders
receive criticism for their businesslike approaches to religious life and a
few for their lifestyles. Those who deliver such barbs often point out that
Jesus overturned the tables of the moneychangers in the ancient temple in
Jerusalem (Matthew 21:12-13) and imply that much the same thing should
occur today. Most observers acknowledge that tensions could exist between
the spreading of the Gospel and the focus of megachurches on effective,
businesslike operations. However, megachurch leaders note that they must
be good stewards of the resources with which they have been entrusted
and at least one cited the Parable of the Talents (Matthew 25:14-30) as
support for his ministry. Hence, it would be unbiblical for church leaders not
to utilize the resources entrusted to them in the most effective ways possible.
Following this logic, it also would be foolish for megachurches not to rely
upon modern technologies and presentation techniques to spread the Word.
It is well beyond the scope of The State of the Region report to weigh in on
such matters. It is sufficient to note that on occasion such questions do arise
concerning one of the most fascinating and important religious trends of our
time.

Rock Church International, 640 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach
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Homeless Children In
South Hampton Roads:
Estimating The
Costs To Society

HOMELESS CHILDREN IN SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS:
ESTIMATING THE COSTS TO SOCIETY1

T

he proportion of homeless Americans may have declined in recent years, but homelessness remains an acute problem in Hampton Roads. We know this from
data published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which is required by law to conduct an annual census of homeless people
in the United States. HUD’s census is done at a particular point in time (PIT), that is, on a particular day, and the PIT day typically is in the month of January.

Relying primarily on this data, HUD publishes its Annual Homeless Assessment1
Report,2 which goes to the Congress. The 2013 report revealed that 610,042
people in the United States in January 2013 were homeless on a given night in
that month. Most (65 percent) “were living in emergency shelters or transitional
housing,” while 35 percent were unsheltered.3
Of these homeless individuals, 138,149 (or 23 percent) were children under
age 18. Another 10 percent were age 18 to 24. Nearly 41,000 (40,727)
of the homeless children were “unaccompanied” – on their own – and 23,461
were unsheltered at all.4 These data are depicted in Graph 1, which reveals
that more than 22 percent of homeless people in the United States are children
under age 18.5
Problems of homelessness are especially challenging when they involve children.
Not only are the needs of children different from those of adults, but also a
failure to deal with those problems comes back to haunt society for decades to
come. Ill-housed, ill-fed children typically lag in school academic achievement,
and they are more likely to miss school days. Ultimately, this often leads to
higher dropout levels, lower rates of graduation and sharply diminished job
prospects. In turn, these conditions are highly correlated with increased use of
1

2

3
4
5

T his chapter is based upon work performed by James V. Koch for the ForKids Inc. organization in Hampton
Roads, which is dedicated to breaking the cycle of homelessness and poverty for families and children.
http://forkidsva.org/Main/nivo-slider2.5.1/nivo-slider/index/index.html
The 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, Part 1. www.onecpd.info/resources/documents/
AHAR-2013-Part1.pdf
2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, p. 1.
2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, p. 1.
One CPD Resource Exchange, 2013 AHAR: Part 1 - PIT Estimates of Homelessness (January 2014),
www.onecpd.info/resource/3300/2013-ahar-part-1-pit-estimates-of-homelessness
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social services, higher rates of criminal activity and incarceration, increased
rates of teenage pregnancy, deteriorating health conditions and a variety of
other antisocial behaviors.6
Of course, none of these phenomena is inevitable; they simply represent
increased likelihoods. Nevertheless, left untended, such possibilities often mature
into very expensive outcomes.

6

 umerous studies exist that have documented some or all of these effects. Especially useful studies within the
N
past five years include Dennis P. Culhane, “The Cost of Homelessness: A Perspective from the United States,”
2008, http://works.bepress.com/dennis_culhane/82; Gerard Barber et al., “Cost of Homeless in Metropolitan
Louisville,” Kent School of Social Work, University of Louisville, 2008, http://www.louhomeless.org/coal%20
files/cost-study.pdf; D. Flaming et al., “Where We Sleep: The Costs of Housing and Homelessness in Los
Angeles,” Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, www.economicrtorg; Abt Associates, “Costs Associated
with First-Time Homelessness for Families and Individuals,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 2010; J. Spangler and A.L. Niblett,
“Cost of Homelessness in Oklahoma City, April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010,” Report to the Oklahoma City
Planning Department, 2010, www.okc.gov/planning/homelessness/homelesscosts.pdf; Stephen Gaetz, “The
Real Cost of Homelessness: Can We Save Money by Doing the Right Thing?” The Homeless Hub, 2010,
www.homelesshub.ca; “Estimated Annual Cost of Child Homelessness in Pennsylvania,” Institute for Children,
Poverty and Homelessness, American Almanac, Pennsylvania, 2012, www.icphusa.org/Publications/
AmericanAlmanac/Almanac_state_PA.pdf; D.R. Poulin et al., “Service Use and Costs for Persons Experiencing
Chronic Homelessness in Philadelphia: A Population-Based Study,” Psychiatric Services, November 2010,
61(11): 1093-8; http://works.bepress.com/dennis/culhane_culhane/99; D. Flaming et al., “Getting
Home: Outcomes from Housing High Cost Homeless Hospital Patients,” 2013, www.economicrt.org; and The
Economic Roundtable, “Getting Home: Outcomes from Housing High Cost Homeless Hospital Patients,” 2013,
http://bit.ly/19YEWPR

GRAPH 1

GRAPH
1 CATEGORY BY SHELTERED STATUS, 2013
PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOMELESS PEOPLE IN EACH
AGE
Percentage of All Homeless People in Each Age Category by Sheltered Status, 2013

Unsheltered
People

9.5%

Sheltered People

All Homeless
People

0.0%

10.5%

80.0%

29.8%

22.6%

9.9%

60.3%

10.1%

•Under 18

67.3%

•18-24

25 and older

100.0%

Source: 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, p 1
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Homelessness In South
Hampton Roads
The PIT data provide us with a window on homelessness in South Hampton
Roads, but appear to undercount the actual number of homeless children. More
useful are the homeless data collected by the U.S. Department of Education
(DOE). DOE collects its homeless data from individual school districts and these
figures are both more reliable and more useful because school districts are on
the front line and know firsthand the number of homeless children.
Table 1 contrasts the PIT data from HUD with the DOE data provided by the
school districts in South Hampton Roads. It is evident that the school districts
report serving far more homeless children than the PIT data identify for the same
cities. For example, while the 2013 PIT number of homeless children for Virginia
Beach was 122, the Virginia Beach school district reported serving 771
homeless children in the 2012-13 school year – a 532 percent difference.
How can we explain these disparities?
• T he PIT data represent a count of homeless children on a single day – a point
in time – while the school district data reflect an entire school year. Because
students come and go, the school districts serve a much larger number of
students than might be present on a single day. Thus, the two measures apply
different standards and essentially are non-comparable views of the same
general phenomenon.7
•C
 ities in South Hampton Roads are not uniform in the ways they count
homeless children in their schools.
• T he PIT homeless counts miss some homeless adults and homeless children –
though this is an argument that the National Alliance to End Homelessness
(NAEH) and HUD believe has limited validity. However, the NAEH does
agree that “the PIT counts do miss people, as do most censuses.”8 In fact, if
one is interested in annualized numbers of homeless children, then PIT data
7

8

 ational Alliance to End Homelessness, Media Resource: 5 Myths about PIT Counts (February 2014)
N
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/5-myths-about-pit-counts
National Alliance to End Homelessness, Media Resource: 5 Myths about PIT Counts (February 2014)
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/5-myths-about-pit-counts
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are much less useful because they represent only a single-snapshot look at the
number of homeless.
There is strong reason to conclude that the school district homeless children
counts are closer to the mark than the PIT homeless children numbers, which may
miss highly mobile homeless families whose location may change multiple times
during a single year.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF HOMELESS PEOPLE AND STUDENTS IN
SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS ACCORDING TO 2013 PIT DATA
AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2012-2013
Chesapeake Homeless PIT All Ages

64

Homeless Children PIT

27

School District Reported Homeless Children

89

Norfolk Homeless PIT All Ages

580

Homeless Children PIT

105

School District Reported Homeless Children

499

Portsmouth Homeless PIT All Ages

154

Homeless Children PIT

NA

School District Reported Homeless Children

211

W. Tidewater, incl. Suffolk Homeless PIT All Ages

93

Homeless Children PIT

31

School District Reported Homeless Children

35

Virginia Beach Homeless PIT All Ages

389

Homeless Children PIT

122

School District Reported Homeless Children

771

South Hampton Roads Totals

1,280

PIT Totals

285

School District Totals

1,605

Note: Western Tidewater includes Franklin, Suffolk, Isle of Wight County and Southampton County, but data
typically are available only for Suffolk.

Who is homeless? Section 725 of the McKinney-Vento
Act says:
The term “homeless children and youth” refers to individuals

that lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence,
and this includes:
(1) C
 hildren sharing the housing of other persons due to
loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason;
are living in motels, hotels, trailer parks, or camping
grounds due to the lack of alternative accommodations;
are living in emergency or transitional shelters; are
abandoned in hospitals; or, are awaiting foster care
placement.
(2) Children with a primary nighttime residence in a public
or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as
regular sleeping accommodations for human beings.
(3) Children living in cars, parks, public spaces, abandoned
buildings, substandard housing, bus or train stations, or
similar settings.
(4) Migratory children qualifying as homeless for the
purposes of this subtitle because the children are living
in the circumstances described above.
Note: The number of homeless children identified by McKinney-Vento nearly
always will be larger than those identified by the PIT audit because McKinneyVento takes a yearlong view as opposed to the PIT snapshot view. Many homeless
families live in multiple locations over a year – McKinney-Vento counts them, but
PIT may not.

Direct School District
Costs Associated With
Homeless Children
South Hampton Roads school districts incur two primary costs serving homeless
children: (1) administrative costs, including the expense of a coordinator
responsible for meeting the requirements of the McKinney-Vento Act, and (2)
transportation costs.
With respect to administrative costs, McKinney-Vento requires that every school
district designate a liaison for homeless children. The Act requires the liaisons to
ensure that homeless children actually are identified so that they can be offered
appropriate services and it further charges the liaisons with ensuring that this
occurs. Liaisons refer homeless children to other community support services,
such as medical and dental care and mental health support. School districts
are required to train school personnel on requirements of the McKinney-Vento
Act, and this must be done on a yearly basis. Typically, school district liaisons
meet with the families and some even make visits in order to make accurate
determinations about McKinney-Vento eligibility.
With respect to transportation costs, McKinney-Vento requires that school districts
provide transportation for homeless students to their school of origin, if a parent
or guardian requests them to do so, or in the case of an unaccompanied
child, upon the request of the liaison. That school of origin may be in the same
school district, but it might also be located in another school district in another
city or state. This holds true regardless of any other transportation the school
district provides for any other class of student. Transportation provided homeless
students must be comparable to that provided to housed students. There cannot
be any barriers to the enrollment of homeless students, including those that might
be undocumented immigrants.
McKinney-Vento does not specify any mileage limitation with respect to how far
away a student must be transported to his/her school of origin. Only if the length
or duration of the trip would be harmful to the student’s educational progress may
a school district opt not to supply the requested transportation and the school
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district’s judgment can be appealed. Thus, McKinney-Vento students in Maryland
are transported into Virginia, and vice versa, and at least 669 students were
transported from their Hampton Roads neighborhood school to another school
inside the same city in Hampton Roads, while 172 students were transported
from their neighborhood school to another school outside of their neighborhood
school city. For example, Virginia Beach indicated that in 2012-13, it
transported 165 McKinney-Vento students to schools inside Virginia Beach and
another 60 to schools outside Virginia Beach (see Table 3). The average cost of
transporting a student in South Hampton Roads was $1,434 in 2012-13.
When students leave one school district and are transported to another,
McKinney-Vento specifies that the two districts should share the transportation
costs. In the absence of any agreement, they share those costs equally. It’s not
clear how these matters are settled within South Hampton Roads. Grumbling
from some cities suggests that not all agree with the current division of costs.
Table 3 summarizes the transportation of McKinney-Vento students within
Hampton Roads in terms of numbers and costs.
TABLE 2
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH
MCKINNEY-VENTO STUDENTS, 2012-2013
Coordinators

Other Administrative/
Operational

Chesapeake

$ 7,900

$2,000

Norfolk

$19,929

$108,792

Portsmouth

$61,206

$8,147

City

Suffolk

$ 0

$2,000

Virginia Beach

NA

$274,6069

9

TABLE 3
NUMBER AND COST OF TRANSPORTING MCKINNEY-VENTO
STUDENTS FOR SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS CITIES, 2012-2013
Transportation of
Students Inside
City/Outside City

City
Chesapeake

Annual Cost

39/50

$252,113

416/26

$280,000

Portsmouth

49/18

$247,035

Suffolk

22/18

$135,000

165/60

$458,138

691/172

$1,237,286

Norfolk

Virginia Beach
Totals

Average Cost Per Transported Student = $1,434

Homeless Children And
Academic Performance
The ultimate societal costs of homelessness go far beyond the direct, easily
quantifiable costs that school districts expend when they serve homeless
students. Let’s delve into these spinoff costs that individual cities and counties
must bear, or that require expenditures and action by the states and the federal
government. Several South Hampton Roads cities generously provided extensive
data concerning the academic performance of a variety of their students,
including those that are homeless.

CHESAPEAKE
Chesapeake provided useful anonymous attendance and achievement data for
90 homeless students and 9,272 other students. Table 4 summarizes several
important student performance variables within these two samples.

9

T his includes $50,000 of in-kind gifts and donations from the public. It also includes funds expended for
coordination.
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Families (TANF) are automatically eligible and hence were considered to come
from housed, but lower-income families in Norfolk.

TABLE 4
ATTENDANCE, SOL PERFORMANCE AND GRADE POINT
AVERAGES FOR 90 HOMELESS AND 9,272 OTHER STUDENTS
IN CHESAPEAKE
(N = 90)
Homeless Students
Average Days in
Attendance

150.8

(N = 9,272)
Other Students

(N = 90)

166.2 (N = 9,272)

Passed All

36.7% (N = 24)

41.1% (N = 3,599)

Failed Some

48.5% (N = 32)

42.6% (N = 3,722)

Failed All

15.2% (N = 10)

16.2% (N = 1,418)

2.18

2.40

SOL Performance

Grade Point Average

(N = 24)

(N = 3,340)

Source: City of Chesapeake Public Schools

The data in Table 4 are simultaneously discouraging and encouraging. The
typical homeless student attended school about 10 percent fewer days than the
typical other student. He/she also earned a lower grade point average, and
a smaller percentage of homeless students passed all parts of the Standards of
Learning (SOL) tests. However, a slightly smaller percentage of homeless students
than other students failed all of the SOL tests. Further, the grade point average of
homeless students in Chesapeake (2.18), if maintained, was sufficient for them
to graduate from high school. The small sample of 24 homeless students for
whom grade point averages were available contained one student with a 3.8
GPA and another with a 3.5 GPA.

NORFOLK
Norfolk provided a detailed anonymous sample of 502 students consisting of
161 homeless students, 173 “low socioeconomic status” students and 168
“high socioeconomic status” students. A student was considered to come from a
lower-income family if he/she was eligible for a free or reduced-price meal at
school. Children from households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
(food stamps) or from families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy

The Norfolk sample enables us to infer some of the impact of homelessness on
student performance because it roughly takes account of household income.
Both students in the homeless student group and in the low socioeconomic
status group come from lower-income households, but the first group of students
is homeless, while the second is not. To be sure, nothing else is held constant
between the two groups and hence there are many other unobserved influences
present. Nevertheless, because these subsamples address the vitally important
income factor, these data do provide us with a window on some of the impact
of homelessness on Norfolk students.
Table 5 summarizes the impact of homelessness and economic status on several
measures of academic performance for the Norfolk sample. As was true in
Chesapeake, homeless students do not attend school as many days as other
students, but the difference is not as large as we observed in Chesapeake.
Proportionately, however, Chesapeake has fewer homeless students and
perhaps this has something to do with the willingness and desire of those
students to go to school.
The median grade point average (3.04) of high socioeconomic status students in
Norfolk was more than one full grade point higher than that of homeless students
(2.02). Housed, though low socioeconomic status students in Norfolk recorded
a median grade point average of 2.34. The difference between the median
grade point averages of the latter two groups (homeless and low socioeconomic
status) was 0.32, and this might be interpreted as a rough measure of the impact
of homelessness on student academic performance. “Might” is the operational
word here since other factors also could be in play, such as parental presence,
the number of children in the household, the number of times the household
moved, etc. Still, it is reasonable to assume that homelessness is an important
factor in the observed differences in grade point averages.
The typical high socioeconomic status student passed 73.7 percent of his/
her SOL examinations during 2012-13, while the comparable averages were
only 54.8 percent for low socioeconomic status students and 41.7 percent
for homeless students. It should be borne in mind that students cannot earn a
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regular high school diploma unless they pass the SOL examinations. Thus, the
comparatively low passage rate for homeless students does not bode well for
their future. Note that the median passage rate (the 50th percentile achievement
rate) was 100 percent for high socioeconomic status students, 66.7 percent
for low socioeconomic status students and 33.3 percent for homeless students.
Hence, the typical (50th percentile) student from the “high” group passes all of
his/her SOL exams, while the typical student from the “low” group passes twothirds of his/her SOL exams and the typical student from the “homeless” group
passes one-third of his/her SOL exams.
TABLE 5
HOMELESSNESS, ECONOMIC STATUS AND SEVERAL
MEASURES OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE IN NORFOLK,
2012-2013
(N = 161)
Homeless

(N = 173)
Low
Socioeconomic
Status

(N = 168)
High
Socioeconomic
Status

Attendance (Percentage of Days Eligible)
Mean

87.9%

Median

92.2%

92.8%

95.1%

95.5%

97.2%

2.27

2.86

2.34

3.04

Grade Point Average
Mean

1.98

Median

2.02

SOL Percentage of Exams Passed
Mean

41.7%

54.8%

73.7%

Median

33.3%

66.7%

100.0%

Number of Suspensions from School During Academic Year
Mean

1.18

0.79

0.13

Median

0.00

0.00

0.00

academic year. The comparable averages were 0.79 for low socioeconomic
status students and 0.13 for high socioeconomic status students. Suspensions
usually are symptomatic of a variety of problems afflicting a student and
they have practical consequences – they reduce grade point averages and
graduation rates.

VIRGINIA BEACH
Table 6 describes a very large anonymous sample provided by the city of
Virginia Beach. It compares 772 homeless students to 25,464 anonymous
housed students that the city has identified as coming from low-income
households.10 This provides several very interesting comparisons that enable
us to infer some of the impact of homelessness on student performance. Both
groups of students come from low-income households, but one group of students
is homeless, while the other is not. To be sure, nothing else is held constant
between the two groups and hence there are many other unobserved influences
present. Nevertheless, because they address the vitally important income factor,
these data do provide us with a window on some of the impact of homelessness
on Virginia Beach students.
Performance patterns in Virginia Beach are familiar. Homeless students in
Virginia Beach attend school about 10 percent fewer days than the housed,
low-income students; as a group, they earn a lower grade point average. Both
groups pass all of the SOL tests at virtually the same rate, but the homeless
students are more likely to fail all of the tests. Holding other things constant, there
do appear to be distinct academic costs associated with homelessness, and
this is despite the substantial resources that Virginia Beach uses to address the
challenge of homelessness in that city.
Table 7 discloses what happened to homeless and housed low-income
students in Virginia Beach at the end of the 2012-13 academic year. As noted
here, 91.6 percent of homeless children were promoted or graduated; the
comparable number for housed, but low-income, children was 93.6 percent. A
somewhat larger percentage of homeless children was not enrolled in Virginia

Source: City of Norfolk Public Schools
10

The typical homeless student in Norfolk was suspended from school (either via
an in-school or an out-of-school suspension) 1.18 times during the 2012-13
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 student is considered to come from a low-income family if he/she is eligible for a free or reduced-price meal
A
at school. Children coming from households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (food stamps) or from
families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are automatically eligible and hence are
considered to come from housed, but low-income families in Virginia Beach.

Beach schools at the end of the 2012-13 academic year compared to children
coming from a low-income but housed household.
Table 8 compares the five South Hampton Roads school districts in terms of
on-time high school graduation rates, GED completion rates and high school
dropout rates. However, Table 8 also supplies interesting information concerning
the impact that economic disadvantage and homelessness have upon on-time
high school graduation rates. These data follow cohorts of students from ninth
grade (2009) through 12th grade (2013); their on-time graduation date was
spring 2013. Regionwide in South Hampton Roads, a noticeable decline in
on-time graduation rates is apparent for students classified as coming from an
economically disadvantaged household. A further decline can be seen for
students that were homeless sometime during their high school career.
Graph 2 illustrates the average impact of economically disadvantaged status
and homeless status upon on-time high school graduation rates in South
Hampton Roads. Unfortunate though these relationships are, they cannot be
described as surprising. We saw in Table 6 that economically disadvantaged
and homeless students don’t attend school as often and don’t pass as many SOL
exams. Ultimately, this translates into high dropout rates and lower graduation
rates.

TABLE 6
ATTENDANCE, SOL PERFORMANCE AND GRADE POINT
AVERAGES FOR 772 HOMELESS AND 25,464 LOW-INCOME,
BUT HOUSED STUDENTS IN VIRGINIA BEACH
(N = 772)
Homeless Students
Average Days in
Attendance

136.3 (N = 772)

(N = 25,464)
Low-Income, but
Housed Students
151.1

(N = 25,464)

SOL Performance
Passed All

43.8% (N = 269)

43.9% (N = 7,324)

Failed Some

34.0% (N = 209)

38.4% (N = 6,411)

Failed All

22.1% (N = 136)

17.8% (N = 2,975)

Grade Point Average

2.38 (N = 24)

2.52 (N = 1,061)

Source: City of Virginia Beach Public Schools

TABLE 7
ACADEMIC DISPOSITION OF HOMELESS AND HOUSED,
LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN VIRGINIA BEACH AT THE END OF
THE 2012-13 ACADEMIC YEAR
(N = 728)
Homeless

(N = 24,454)
Housed, But From
a Low-Income
Household

Promoted

552 (75.8%)

21,990 (89.6%)

Graduated

115 (15.8%)

Not Enrolled at the
End of the Year

61 (8.4%)

988

(4.0%)

1,568

(6.4%)

Source: City of Virginia Beach Public Schools
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TABLE 8
PROGRESS AND GRADUATION STATISTICS, SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2012-2013
Chesapeake
Cohort Size,
2012-2013

3,283

Norfolk
2,062

Portsmouth
1,113

Suffolk

Virginia Beach

1,097

5,355

Averages for
South Hampton
Roads

District Student Percentages
On-Time Graduation Rate
All Students

92.0%

77.9%

80.9%

87.2%

88.0%

86.7%

Males

89.3%

72.4%

74.9%

84.5%

84.4%

82.9%

Females

95.0%

82.9%

87.0%

90.3%

91.6%

90.6%

Economically
Disadvantaged
Anytime

83.9%

73.4%

77.7%

79.1%

78.5%

79.0%

Homeless Anytime,
9th to 12th Grade

79.5%

67.1%

76.2%

79.1%

68.9%

72.8%

2.3%

7.6%

5.0%

2.0%

4.0%

4.1%

Males

3.1%

10.2%

3.5%

1.4%

5.0%

4.9%

Females

1.6%

5.2%

1.5%

.6%

3.1%

2.7%

Dropout Rate

3.8%

10.1%

10.4%

8.1%

4.9%

5.7%

5.3%

11.7%

14.3%

8.5%

6.4%

7.8%

8.7%

6.4%

6.6%

3.4%

4.5%

GED Completion

Males
Females

2.3%

Source: Virginia Department of Education, “School, School Division and State Report Cards,” www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/school_report_card. The student cohorts entered four years previously.
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GRAPH 2
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS OF VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS THAT GRADUATED ON TIME IN 2013,
FIVE LARGEST SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS CITIES

90%
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85%
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70%

65%
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Tables 3 through 8 are revealing, but one should resist the urge to reach overly
strong conclusions based upon them. Consider that:
• T here is a lack of consistency among the cities both in terms of their
propensities to count homeless students and their attribution of resource
expenditures (especially transportation) focused on those students. Hampton
Roads needs a single entity that is the initial focal point for
all homeless inquiries and which also collects and audits
homeless children data and information for all of the region’s
cities and counties. It is a challenge to assess either the costs of
homelessness, or the impact of programs designed to combat the effects of
homelessness, when data variously are not available, not standardized or
not reliable. No study, including this one, can be better than the underlying
data upon which it relies. Similarly, public policy makers always will be
handicapped if they do not have an accurate vision of the actual state of
homelessness.
• T he “housed, but low-income” samples provided by several of the cities
appear to contain proportionately smaller numbers of students actually eligible
for graduation.
•W
 e don’t know what happened to most of the students that no longer were in
the various school districts at the end of the academic year. GED high school
equivalency certificates represent one avenue students may take when they
drop out. We know, for example, that 4 percent of the large 5,355 Virginia
Beach high school cohort earned a GED certificate. Beyond this, we do
not know much more. Tracking dropouts across district and even
state lines, and over time, is important if we really want to
know the impact of homelessness on students.
• T he most important reason why we should be prudent in our conclusions,
however, is that there are many unobserved characteristics of homeless
students (and those that are housed) that we would like to know, but don’t.
For example, we would like to know if a homeless student came from a
single-parent home, how many different places he/she lived, the education
and employment characteristics of his/her parents or guardians, his/her
encounters with the justice system, etc.
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Even with these caveats, however, the apparent effects of homelessness upon
student academic performance can be seen in Tables 4 through 8. We know
that homeless students attend class between 5 and 10 percent less often than
other students. In Norfolk, for example, the correlation between student grade
point averages and student daily attendance is +.54. Put in different terms, this
means that we can explain almost 30 percent of the variance in student grade
point averages (the other 70 percent being due to other factors) if we know how
often these students attend school.
This is not a trivial relationship. The percentage of homeless students in a city
is negatively correlated with on-time graduation as one would expect (r = -.86)
and positively correlated as one would expect with each city’s high school
dropout rate (r = +.54).
Homelessness is negatively and strongly related to performance on individual
SOL tests. In Norfolk, for example, the passage rate of students coming from
homeless households is 13.1 percent less than those students coming from low
socioeconomic status households and fully 32 percent less than students coming
from high socioeconomic status households.
These results are entirely consistent with the reputable national and regional
studies noted previously. The bottom line is that homelessness has destructive
effects on student academic performance.

The Impact Of Homelessness
Follows Students Throughout
Their Lives
What difference do these lower levels of academic performance make
to homeless students later in their lives? The most measurable impact of
homelessness is on homeless students’ ability to find jobs and earn income. Put
simply, if homeless children do not graduate from high school, then they will
enter job markets at a tremendous disadvantage. Graph 3, which relies upon

data from the U.S. Census, reveals that the median (50th percentile) income
of individuals with less than a high school education was only $19,404 in
2012. This was almost 40 percent less than the median income of high school
graduates ($27,024). To be sure, some individuals do well even though they
have not acquired a high school diploma, but as the data in Graph 3 record,
they are exceptions to the general rule.
Graph 4 illustrates the unfortunate reality that those individuals that do not
graduate from high school also are burdened by much higher rates of
unemployment. Because homeless students are less likely to graduate from high
school, they are more likely to become unemployed throughout their lives.
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GRAPH 3

GRAPH 3

MEDIAN INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS WITH VARING LEVELS OF EDUCATION, 2012

Graduate Degree
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Some College
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High School Diploma
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$0

$10,000
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Source: “American Fact Finder,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder2.census.gov
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GRAPH 4
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND WEEKLY EARNINGS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 2013

Unemployment Rate in 2013 (%)

Median Weekly Earnings in 2013 ($)

2.2

Doctoral degree

2.3

Professional degree

3.4
4.0

A

Master’s degree
Bachelor’s degree

- - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - ~1.,QJ
...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,_1,,714
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1,329

- - - - - - - ~ -1,108

Associate degree

I
7.0
7.S

Some college,
no degree

651
High school diploma - - - - - Less than a high
school diploma

11.0

All workers~6.1%

472
All

orkers: $827

Source: www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm.

Note: Data are for persons age 25 and over. Earnings are for full-time wage and salary workers.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm
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Summing It Up For The
Major Cities Of South
Hampton Roads
Table 9 provides estimates of many of the societal costs associated with
homeless children in the context of the five major cities of South Hampton Roads.
Some of these costs already have been identified and include administrative
costs connected to the McKinney-Vento obligations of school districts (for
example, the salary of the district’s coordinator) and the costs of transporting
homeless students to their “school of origin.”
Administrative and transportation costs, however, constitute only a small slice
(perhaps 5 percent) of the total additional costs associated with homeless
children. Far more important are additional medical and social services costs
that homeless children impose on the cities in which they live. It is undeniable
that such costs exist. Homeless children appear in hospital emergency rooms
more often and are more likely to suffer from chronic health problems, such as
obesity and diabetes, even while some are undernourished.
There is abundant evidence that homeless families and their children require
emergency and transitional housing at a higher rate than the housed population
and that on a per capita basis, homeless people utilize larger than usual
amounts of social services, including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) and food stamps (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). These
general types of costs are included in the social services variable in Table 9.
What is not clear, however, is the best way to allocate those costs to specific
homeless children because many of the costs are incurred jointly with other
members of a family. Consider social safety net services such as food stamps.
Suppose a single mother of a homeless family of four applies for and receives
food stamps. Should three-quarters of that expense be attributed to the homeless
children, or a different proportion? What proportion of a family’s emergency
or transitional housing costs should be apportioned to a homeless child? The
national and regional studies cited in footnote 5 do not always answer such
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questions identically. In such cases, this report has adopted their average
conclusions or assessments.
Some social costs associated with homeless children are more easily measured
on an individual child basis, for example, hospital emergency room use and
prison/incarceration expenses. However, these costs are not identical across
the United States and so we have relied on their average values. Emergency
medical and hospital room use provides a useful example. We have used a
$772 per homeless student per year estimate of the total cost to society of
emergency room use by homeless students. This estimate may be too high, or
too low, for South Hampton Roads. Therefore, no one should impute precision
to the estimates contained in Table 9. These estimates are, however, reasonable
approximations of the total additional costs that society incurs when certain
events occur.
School districts also must devote extra resources to homeless children. We have
attempted to capture these at the K-8 level and also to estimate special education
costs (which apply to homeless children more often than other students). We
have not computed “in-school” high school costs attributable to homeless
children. Clearly, such costs exist, but we could not find a reputable, rigorous
source to backstop any estimates, and so we have not included them in Table 9.
With these caveats in mind, note that the largest cost incurred
by society from homeless students is the cost of emergency and
transitional housing, which accounts for more than 29 percent
of the total cost. When other housing-related costs are added
to emergency and transitional housing, together they account
for slightly more than 48 percent of all of the costs incurred
by society because of homeless children. This underlines
once again the conclusion of informed observers concerning
homelessness, namely, that finding housing for homeless
individuals quickly is vitally important. However, paying to
house homeless individuals actually is cost-efficient relative
to more expensive alternatives. This is a counterintuitive
conclusion for citizens not familiar with the data found in Table
9, but an induction that is quickly grasped by those who have
taken the time to dive into the numbers.

TABLE 9
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ADDITIONAL TOTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 1,548 REPORTED HOMELESS SCHOOLCHILDREN,
SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS, 2012-2013, BASED ON NATIONAL STUDIES
N = 89)
Chesapeake

(N = 442)
Norfolk

(N = 211)
Portsmouth

(N = 35)
Suffolk

(N = 771)
Virginia Beach

Totals

$68,708

$341,224

$162,892

$27,020

$595,212

$1,195,056

Recurring Health Problems

$283,020

$1,157,146

$670,980

$111,300

$2,451,780

$4,674,226

Mental Health Care

$122,909

$610,402

$291,391

$48,335

$1,064,751

$2,137,788

Foster Care

$233,568

$1,159,967

$530,032

$87,920

$1,936,752

$3,948,239

Emergency and Transitional Housing

$518,425

$2,547,650

$1,229,075

$203,875

$4,491,075

$8,990,100

Other Social Service Use

$109,025

$541,450

$258,475

$42,875

$944,475

$1,896,300

Preschool and Elementary

$163,493

$881,954

$387,607

$64,295

$1,416,327

$2,843,676

Special Education Programs

$154,682

$768,196

$366,718

$60,830

$1,338,998

$2,689,424

Administrative

$9,900

$128,721

$69,353

$2,000

$274,606

$ 652,696

Transportation

$252,113

$280,000

$247,035

$

0

$458,138

$1,237,286

$12,638

$62,764

$29,962

$4,970

$109,482

$ 219,816

$38,337

$190,392

$90,899

$15,076

$332,112

$ 666,816

$1,966,818

$8,599,866

$4,334,419

$668,496

$15,413,708

$30,983,307

$22,099

$19,457

$20,542

$19,100

$19,992

$20,015

Medical and Health
Emergency Room Use

Social Services and Housing

Education

Administrative and Transportation

Penal System and Incarceration

Failure to Graduate from High School
Average Present Value of Annual Lost Income
(2013 Incomes and Prices)
Totals
Average Cost Per Homeless Student

Notes: The estimates rely upon: (1) the number of homeless children in each school district; (2) each school district’s graduation rate; (3) the assumption that the costs of homelessness per student found in national studies
apply to South Hampton Roads; (4) U.S. Census income data that were used to project future incomes and these incomes were discounted to present value so that future income dollars are equivalent to those in 2013; (5)
a 3.724 percent rate of discount, the 30-year U.S. government bond rate on March 9, 2014. The present value (PV) estimate is for a single year, not for all the years of a student’s work life. The present value estimates
also assume that many homeless students will leave their original school district and live elsewhere. While all of the estimates above must be understood to be approximations, they do provide useful information about the
relative magnitude of these costs if South Hampton Roads mirrors national trends. The individual city averages are bunched together because identical costs per student are assumed for a majority of the services identified
above. Hence, the most meaningful per-student statistic is the regional average, $20,015 per student.

HOMELESS CHILDREN IN SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS: ESTIMATING THE COSTS TO SOCIETY

87

Housing-related costs are followed in importance by recurring health problems,
at 15 percent. Recurring health problems include conditions ranging from the
common flu to obesity and diabetes. Together, medical- and health-related
challenges account for slightly more than $8 million in annual costs.

cities do not always appear to interpret and apply the laws
and accompanying regulations in the same fashion. Perhaps
the observed disparities in application represent unofficial city
policies pursued by administrators, or instead, simply tradition.

Among the cities of South Hampton Roads, Virginia Beach bears the most
annual additional costs ($15.4 million), primarily because it reports the largest
total population of homeless students (N = 771). Portsmouth, however, identifies
the most homeless students on a per capita basis. Chesapeake and Suffolk
identify the smallest per capita proportions of their populations as homeless
students. Norfolk and Virginia Beach are roughly similar on a per capita basis.

Finally, while we have computed per-child costs for homeless children, most
homeless children are part of some kind of larger family unit. How does the
approximate $20,000 per homeless child computation relate to the cost for an
entire family unit? Other studies suggest a 2.5X to 3X multiplier for those costs,
that is, something in the range of $50,000 to $60,000 as the cost to society
of an entire “typical” homeless family. Reality is, however, that homeless families
differ substantially in size and character and therefore family cost estimates are
less precise than those for individuals. One of the most important variables, for
example, relates to whether or not both parents are present. We would need
to know such things if we were going to make a reliable estimate of the family
costs connected to homelessness.

A portion of the city-to-city per capita homeless children disparities in Table 9
reflects well-known demographic and economic differences among the cities.
After all, they are not clones of each other. Nevertheless, while the same
laws (especially McKinney-Vento) apply to all of the cities, the
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The Impact of Vehicle Tolls
on Hampton Roads

THE IMPACT OF VEHICLE TOLLS ON HAMPTON ROADS:
JOB MOBILITY, RESIDENTIAL LIVING CHOICES AND
REGIONAL COHESION

V

ehicle tolls are nothing new in Hampton Roads. Both the Downtown Tunnel (DTT), which opened in 1952, and the Midtown Tunnel (MTT), which opened
in 1962, extracted 25-cent tolls from drivers of vehicles passing through them until 1986. The Virginia Beach Expressway (now I-264) opened in 1967
and was funded with tolls as high as 25 cents for passenger cars and a bit higher on a per axle basis for trucks. These tolls were removed in 1996.

The Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) extracted a $1.25 toll from
automobiles between 1957 and 1976.
The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT) has been tolled since it opened in
1964. Currently, that toll is $13 for passenger cars for a single trip, $26 for a
three-axle truck and $47 for a six-axle truck. Repeat travelers qualify for much
lower tolls.

even the widening of I-64 to Richmond, by means of tolls. Finally, this project
has caused both members of the public and legislators to take a closer look at
the Public-Private Partnership Act of 1995, which enabled the current project
and its surrounding financial arrangements.

Now, we have a new set of tolls – this time on the DTT, MTT and the Martin
Luther King Freeway (MLK). The tolls are designed to help pay for a $2.16
billion transportation improvement project negotiated by the Commonwealth
of Virginia under the aegis of the Public/Private Partnership Act of 1995. The
centerpiece of the project is a new tunnel tube for the MTT that will improve
traffic flow between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as well as to points west and
south. The new tube will increase the MTT to four lanes and presumably
expedite traffic going to and from the Sentara/Eastern Virginia Medical School
health complex, Old Dominion University, the port and Naval Base Norfolk.

What are the new DTT, MTT and MLK tolls? While

More than a little controversy has accompanied this project because at least
one study has suggested that the adverse impact of new vehicle tolls would be
especially large for the city of Portsmouth.1 The new tolling arrangement also has
pushed to the forefront questions about the viability of any regional strategy that
would pay for a new (third) crossing over the James River estuary, and perhaps

E-ZPass transponder will pay triple these amounts.

1

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014. The report may be
accessed at www.jamesvkoch.com under the “Consulting Reports” icon.
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lower initially, beginning in 2016, drivers of passenger cars
going through either the DTT or MTT tunnel will pay
$1.84 during peak hours, while drivers of trucks will pay
$7.36. During off-peak hours, they will pay $1.59 and $4.77,
respectively. MLK tolls will be 50 cents for tunnel users
and $1 for non-tunnel users. However, these are E-ZPass
(electronic) rates and drivers of vehicles without an

The Public-Private
Partnership Act Of 1995
The tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK are one product of a 58-year
“Comprehensive Agreement” between the Commonwealth of Virginia and
Elizabeth River Crossing OpCo (ERCO),2 made possible under provisions of the
1995 Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA).3 This particular agreement took
effect in 2012 and has been amended since then.
The Comprehensive Agreement with ERCO included the construction of a
second MTT tunnel tube (increasing it to four lanes), extending the MLK Freeway
from High Street to I-264, and rehabilitating the existing DTT and MTT tunnels.
The advertised total cost of these projects was $2.16 billion.
The primary impetus for the PPTA was the apparent inability of the
Commonwealth to finance most of the large transportation infrastructure
projects that legislators and citizens wished to pursue. Hence, in the PPTA, the
Commonwealth turned to the private sector for help. It is not clear that, at the
time, all concerned understood that private-sector investors/operators would
demand a rate of return on their invested capital that would be competitive in
the milieu of large, private-sector corporations. This would not be a world of
3 percent interest rates on 10-year U.S. government bonds.

to earn 13.5 percent on its invested capital. If that rate of return does not
materialize because competing facilities have been constructed by the
Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth must compensate ERCO for the
shortfall. However, if ERCO’s revenues exceed forecasts (implicitly, the 13.5
percent rate of return), then ERCO will share a portion of the excess with the
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). The percentage share of excess
gross revenues increases as the amount of gross revenues earned by ERCO
increases.4 VDOT is required by law to use the shared revenue on transportation
improvements in the corridor.
The Comprehensive Agreement gives ERCO the authority to raise tolls 3.5
percent annually if it wishes to do so, beginning in 2016. However, if the
annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) in the preceding 12
months was higher than 3.5 percent, then ERCO may choose to increase its tolls
by that percentage. Assuming that ERCO takes advantage of these provisions,
this means, at a minimum, that the peak hours and non-peak
hours tolls for passenger vehicles would rise to at least $11.79
and $8.71, respectively, by 2070. (Peak hours are defined as
5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.) Comparable truck
tolls would rise to at least $47.17 and $30.57, respectively, by
2070. As we will soon see, because of the CPI provision, tolls
actually are likely to rise much more than these amounts.

The PPTA delegates responsibility for developing and approving public-private
transportation partnerships to the governor, who in turn may delegate that
responsibility to another individual, such as the secretary of transportation.
As of this writing, approval of the Virginia General Assembly is not required,
regardless of the size of the project.
ERCO is responsible for collecting tolls and for achieving the traffic volumes
outlined in its forecasts, which may be a bit optimistic. While there is no
guaranteed rate of return for ERCO on its investment, ERCO is authorized
2

3

 RCO’s lead firms are Skanska Infrastructure Development and Macquarie Group, both of which are publicE
private partnership (PPP) developers and infrastructure investors as well as operators throughout the world. For
more information about ERCO, see www.erc-info.com.
Among completed Virginia PPP projects are: the Pocahontas Parkway (Route 895) across the James River, south
of Richmond; a 17.5-mile stretch of Route 288 west of Richmond; and the Route 199 partial loops around
Williamsburg.
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4

If gross revenues exceed baseline forecasts from 5% to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30% and in excess of 30%,
then VDOT will share 5%, 15%, 30% and 60%, respectively. ERCO may earn gross revenues up to 5% in excess
of baseline forecasts before VDOT shares in profits.
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The Positive Overall
Economic Impact Of The
Newly Tolled Project
There is a tendency for the supporters of toll-financed projects to neglect the
costs associated with those projects and for the opponents of toll-financed
projects to neglect the benefits of the same projects. Reality is that both benefits
and costs are generated by toll-financed projects such as the DTT/MTT/MLK
undertaking in Hampton Roads.
Let’s focus for a moment on the primary benefits typically associated with a new
toll project:
• Reduced travel times
• Increased trip and travel reliability
• Reduced traffic congestion
• Increased fuel economy
• Reduced vehicle operating costs
• Reduced carbon emissions and diminished environmental harm
•A
 s many as 1,500 additional jobs and associated increased incomes
connected to construction.
At least five reputable studies have documented that some or all of these benefits
will be associated with the DTT/MTT/MLK tolling project. For example, The
Hartgen Group estimates that after completion, the project will increase the
gross regional product of Hampton Roads by an incremental $365 million to
$390 million annually and in the process create 4,401 additional jobs.5 “West
Side” benefits that will accrue are estimated by Hartgen to range between
$144 million and $148 million, along with 1,736 jobs. The Hartgen Group

also estimated that the increased reliability of travel time across the Elizabeth
River will have a median value of $63 million to the region.6
Reputable analysts attribute significant financial benefits to the completion of the
DTT/MTT/MLK project. It also is fair to say that the analytic consensus is that the
project will yield significant benefits to the region and the Commonwealth. This,
however, is not the same as saying that the benefits and costs of the project will
be spread evenly (or equitably) across the region, or even that the benefits and
costs will be spread evenly (or equitably) among the residents and businesses
inside a specific city.

We Live In An Economically
Interdependent Region
Both the benefits and the costs of the DTT/MTT/MLK accruing to any city
depend substantially on how many people in those cities will use these venues
and end up paying tolls, either because they leave a city (perhaps Suffolk) to
work in another, or because people in other cities leave those cities to come
work in this city (Suffolk). Table 1 reports U.S. Census data describing where
people live and where they work in Hampton Roads.
Reading down the columns, one can see to whom each city or county is
supplying workers. Taking Newport News as an example, one can see that
this city supplies 13,744 people who work in Hampton; 40,661 workers
in Newport News remain there for their jobs; 5,236 go to work in Norfolk;
3,724 travel to work in Virginia Beach; and 15,062 workers are employed
outside of Hampton Roads.
Reading across the rows, one can discover where a city or county’s workers
come from. Virginia Beach, for example, receives 23,138 workers from
Norfolk; 6,925 from Portsmouth; 10,727 from Hampton Roads locations north
of the James River;7 and 29,576 workers from outside Hampton Roads.
6

5

“ Impacts of Mid-Town Tunnel Improvements on Regional Productivity and Job Mobility,” The Hartgen Group
(2009), p. 3, www.hartgengroup.net
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7

“Value of Improvements in the Reliability of Travel Time Resulting from MTT Improvements,” The Hartgen Group
(2009), p. 2, www.hartgengroup.net
These workers travel to Virginia Beach from Gloucester County, James City County, Mathews County, York
County, Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson and Williamsburg.

TABLE 1
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2011

Currituck County,
N.C.

Franklin

Gloucester County

Isle of Wight
County

James City County

Mathews County

Southampton
County

Surry County

York County

Chesapeake

Hampton

Newport News

Norfolk

Poquoson

Portsmouth

Suffolk

Virginia Beach

Williamsburg

Outside Hampton
Roads

Workers Live Here

Currituck County, N.C.

7,482

2,693

12

-

12

1

1

1

-

7

385

11

11

54

1

47

52

335

3

3,856

Franklin

13,545

20

2,847

30

860

57

20

3,329

90

47

345

60

204

194

13

355

1,372

281

-

3,422

Gloucester County

13,206

3

5

5,550

61

428

665

28

2

489

116

317

972

127

75

116

99

280

54

3,819

Isle of Wight County

14,025

36

184

20

4,265

183

38

441

320

164

547

807

1,381

285

36

731

1,836

293

20

2,435

James City County

37,618

16

38

1,363

310

12,055

286

82

329

2,869

418

1,269

4,827

347

234

356

401

757

1,130

10,532

Mathews County

2,045

4

4

267

4

28

711

-

2

37

22

37

66

13

9

7

9

17

2

808

Southampton County

3,543

4

327

4

153

4

-

1,554

40

8

46

12

20

32

1

58

120

43

1

1,116

Surry County

3,113

3

5

48

258

115

11

41

726

89

117

79

171

35

16

50

83

138

11

1,115

York County

28,992

8

28

1,695

417

3,388

208

63

74

6,067

446

2,380

5,347

428

613

428

391

828

526

5,656

Chesapeake

132,806

1,777

97

478

1,441

701

104

178

70

15

41,070

3,162

3,288

13,226

137

9,498

6,504

30,394

129

20,535

Hampton

76,504

43

40

1,130

1,717

1,833

189

70

30

5,047

3,469

23,816

13,744

3,910

1,634

1,956

2,103

5,088

213

10,471

Job Located In

Number
of Jobs

Newport News

134,154

116

127

4,822

4,837

4,463

662

246

102

10,072

4,819

21,508

40,661

3,973

2,193

3,518

4,659

6,376

463

20,537

Norfolk

192,051

1,086

63

106

1,742

1,334

183

163

65

1,432

27,297

6,484

5,236

50,825

285

10,249

6,909

52,164

228

26,201

Poquoson

2,410

1

50

35

40

5

4

291

50

297

344

37

875

32

33

80

3

232

Portsmouth

61,237

392

50

131

1,312

255

34

92

38

304

11,722

1,721

1,881

6,044

44

16,620

5,065

8,466

38

7,027

-

-

Suffolk

37,179

155

447

222

2,074

333

40

825

101

368

4,341

885

1,355

1,710

76

3,015

12,107

2,905

29

6,193

Virginia Beach

229,365

1,621

-

612

1,329

1,130

137

179

-

1,082

25,843

3,631

3,724

23,138

196

6,925

4,790

125,237

215

29,576

Williamsburg

19,123

5

13

921

145

5,679

105

41

174

2,078

205

686

3,162

212

125

196

184

348

1,407

3,437

5,045

2,163

2,151

320

1,935

1948.4

5,314

1,794

11,600

15,274

11,424

15,062

16,090

2,201

477

16,026

32,761

2,591

-

13,027

6,451

19,600

21,293

33,962

5,347

12,652

3,958

42,067

136,532

78,584

101,456

120,681

8,765

54,634

62,745

266,790

7,062

Outside Hampton
Roads
1,008,398

-

156,968

Sources: U
 .S. Census Bureau, 2013: OnTheMap Application. Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program. http://onthemap.ces.census.gov
http://lehd.ces.census.gov/applications/help/onthemap.html#!what_is_onthemap
Jobs are “primary jobs,” and include military personnel and self-employed.
Primary jobs: Public- and private-sector jobs, one job per worker. A primary job is the highest-paying job for an individual worker.
Source of jobs data: “Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by Census Region and Division, Seasonally Adjusted,” www.bea.gov
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The import of the numbers in Table 1 is inescapable:
•E
 conomically speaking, we are a highly interdependent region – most of our
workers live in one city or county, but work in another. Fully 64.9 percent of
our workers leave their home city or county when they go to their jobs.
•E
 ven Norfolk, bolstered by its traditional role as a headquarters site and job
magnet, finds that 57.9 percent of its employed residents work in a different
city or county.
•M
 any of our workers “cross the water” in north-south directions. An estimated
71,000 people holding jobs in Hampton Roads cross the James River estuary
every day to and from Hampton and Newport News to go to work.8 They
account for approximately 120,000 daily trips.
• Business and delivery trucks crossing the James River to and from Hampton
and Newport News add approximately 70,000 daily trips to this number on
a typical day.
• Many of our workers also “cross the water” in east-west directions. Roughly
85,000 people (8.5 percent) move between eastern Hampton Roads and
western Hampton Roads as they travel to work. About two-thirds of them
utilize the DTT and/or MTT when they do so. This activity accounts for
approximately 140,000 daily trips.
• Business and delivery trucks (for example, those emanating from the port) add
an approximate additional 75,000 trips to this east-west number.9
Some important deductions spring from these data. Approximately 25
percent of all workers in the region are tied to jobs that
require them to commute over bridges and tunnels to their
jobs, or whose jobs require them to make business and
delivery trips that utilize the same crossings. To the extent that
drivers must pay high tolls when they utilize these venues,
we risk dividing our region into three parts: Eastern Hampton
Roads (Norfolk and Virginia Beach), Western Hampton Roads
Approximately 20 percent of individuals utilize car pools or public transportation, or telecommute, thus reducing
the actual number of trips undertaken.
The business and delivery trip estimates are based upon the Koch study cited in footnote 1 and are based upon,
inter alia, an actual physical count of the types of vehicles entering the DTT and MTT.

8 

9
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(Portsmouth, Suffolk and points west) and the Peninsula. Only
Chesapeake would appear to be situated in such a way that its drivers would
not have to access the DTT and MTT with any frequency. However, Chesapeake
drivers, like all others Southside, would have to pay to get to the Peninsula if
those crossings were to become tolled.
Nearly two and a half centuries ago, in 1776, Adam Smith, in his “An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” noted how the division
and specialization of labor and general economic prosperity were tied to the
size of available markets. This is among the reasons Smith was a free trader.
He objected to tariffs and taxes that prevented consumers and businesses from
making mutually profitable connections. A toll may be viewed as a tariff (tax)
on movement. Were he alive today, Smith likely would eschew tolls in favor of
other means of funding road, bridge and tunnel improvements.
If we impose high tolls on bridges and tunnels in Hampton Roads and separate
our regional market into three distinct and perhaps competing parts, then there
will be consequences. The size of our labor pool will shrink as
workers decline to pay the tolls necessary to commute over
bridges and tunnels. This will mean some employees will have
to settle for lower wages and some employers won’t be able
to hire the best possible employees. Businesses will find that
the number of customers to whom they have easy access will
decline. Customers will have an incentive to find alternate, less
expensive suppliers, perhaps using the Internet to fuel their
searches. This is a recipe for economic decline.

How high is “high” when we are talking about tolls? In
2016, drivers of passenger cars will pay $1.84 during peak
hours to drive through either the DTT or MTT. Workers/
drivers that do so twice a day, 250 days per year (and
perhaps throw in a couple of more passages per month
for other purposes) will spend about $1,000 per year on
these tolls. This is approximately 2.2 percent of the median
household income in the cities of Portsmouth and Norfolk
and, based upon studies in other metropolitan areas, it is
sufficient to change behavior. Tolls that extract 1 percent
or less of median household income annually appear to be
regarded by most drivers as a nuisance, but do not often
change decisions about where they choose to work, live or
spend leisure time.

The Relative Burden Of
The Tolls
Only a brief glance at the Table 1 commuting matrix is needed to see that the
imposition of tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK will not have much impact on the
Peninsula. It’s true that 1,721 Hampton residents commute to Portsmouth for
their jobs and 1,956 Portsmouth residents commute to Hampton for their work.
Some of these 3,677 people may have to pay the tolls, though many of them
may choose the “back side” commuting path of some combination of I-664,
I-264, State Route 164 and U.S. Route 17 to travel to their jobs. Virtually all
who reside in Newport News or to the north will be able to exercise the same,
toll-free option.
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Not surprisingly, the primary burden of the tolls will fall upon four Southside
cities: Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. Of these cities, easily the
largest burden will fall upon those who live or work in Portsmouth and must travel
back and forth through the DTT or MTT to get to their jobs and return home.
Table 1 illustrates Portsmouth’s exposed situation. Fully 10,249 people live in
Portsmouth and work in Norfolk; 6,044 do the reverse. Another 6,925 people
live in Portsmouth and work in Virginia Beach, while 8,466 reverse that flow.
When one adds the very few individuals that live or work in Chesapeake or
Currituck County, but nevertheless use the DTT and MTT, a total of 32,279
people likely will use the DTT and MTT to go to work in and out of Portsmouth.
Portsmouth’s job base of 61,237 is an approximate measure of the size of
its economy. A rough-and-ready measure of the impact of the new tolls on
Portsmouth is the percentage (52.7 percent) of the city’s “in and out” commuters
among its job base.
How does this compare to the other Southside cities that primarily will be
affected by the tolls? Graph 1 indexes the impact the tolls will have on Norfolk,
Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach as the percentage of each city’s job
base consisting of “in and out” commuters that must use the DTT and MTT to go
back and forth to work. The impact is least on Virginia Beach. While Table 1
discloses that an estimated 6,925 + 8,466 = 15,391 people will be “in and
out” commuters to and from Virginia Beach and Portsmouth, Suffolk and points
west (and hence probably must use the DTT and MTT), this is only 6.7 percent
of Virginia Beach’s substantial job base of 229,365.
Graph 1 indexes Virginia Beach’s percentage at 1.00. Norfolk slides in
above Virginia Beach with an index of 1.15, followed by Suffolk at 3.45 and
Portsmouth at 4.12. In relative terms, the impact of the tolls will be more than
four times greater upon Portsmouth than on Virginia Beach. The relative impact
of the DTT and MTT tolls upon Chesapeake and the cities and counties on the
Peninsula is minuscule by comparison.
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Graph 1
GRAPH 1

Relative Burden of the New Tolls
RELATIVE BURDEN OF THE NEW TOLLS UPON SOUTHSIDE HAMPTON ROADS CITIES
Upon Southside Hampton Roads Cities
4.50
4.00
Relative Burden of the New Tolls

Relative
Burden
of the
New
Tolls

4.12

3.50

3.45

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00

1.00

1.15

0.50
0.00

Virginia Beach

Norfolk

Suffolk

Graph 2
Growth of Passenger Vehicle Tolls, 2016 Through 2070
(Assuming Annual Increases of 3.5 Percent or the CPI, Whichever Is Greater)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014

2

98

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2014

Portsmouth

Future Increases In Tolls For
The DTT And MTT
The Commonwealth’s agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings permits ERCO to
increase tolls by 3.5 percent annually, or the growth in the consumer price index
over the trailing 12 months, if that is higher. As Graph 2 illustrates, this means
that the $1.84 peak-time toll for passenger cars would increase to $11.79 in
2070 if tolls increased at only 3.5 percent annually, but would jump to $21.56
if the growth in the CPI between now and 2070 matched what was true
between 1956 and 2014. During that 58-year time period, the annual growth
in the CPI was higher than 3.5 percent on 24 occasions.
Specifically, past CPI growth suggests that tolls will increase at an average of
4.66 percent per year, not 3.5 percent. Thanks to the miracle of compound
growth, this would increase ERCO’s total revenue by slightly more than 82
percent over the 3.5 percent scenario.10
Graph 3 reveals that the $7.36 peak-hour toll that trucks will pay in 2016
will grow to $47.17 if tolls increase at only 3.5 percent annually, but to a
stupendous $86.24 if they grow at the aforementioned 4.66 percent annually.
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which such tolls inhibit economic
activity in Hampton Roads.

10

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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GRAPH 2
GROWTH OF PASSENGER VEHICLE TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)

$25
$21.56
2070

$20

Growing
at 3.5%
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Annually,
Whichever
is Greater

$15
$11.79
2070

$10

Growing
at 3.5%
$5
$1.84
$0

2016
Tolling Year and Index

Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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GRAPH 3
GROWTH OF TRUCK TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)
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Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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The Key Role Of
Discretionary Drivers
Table 2 reveals that 32,279 people potentially will go “in and out” of
Portsmouth daily because of their jobs. If they make round trips, this means there
are 64,558 potential trips made daily through the tunnels by workers. Some,
however, will carpool; others will use mass public transportation. Still others
may telecommute. Based upon the experience of other metropolitan areas, 20
percent is an approximate estimate of the number of people that will utilize these
alternatives.
An estimated 25,000 vehicle trips through the tunnels reflect trucks and business
vehicles plying their trades on a daily basis. Since the average number of total
trips through the two tunnels is approximately 125,000 (about 70 percent
through the DTT), this leaves approximately 50,000 “discretionary” trips daily
that do not relate to job commuting or the activities of businesses.11 It is these
individuals who are most likely to be negatively influenced by the new tolls.
They are people who drive through the tunnels for sundry purposes – shopping,
recreation, excursions to restaurants and churches, visits to friends and transit to
other locales.
Discretionary drivers are more likely to utilize the tunnels
during non-peak hours because they have no need to drive
during the most congested and more expensive peak hours
(5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Preliminary evidence
on tunnel traffic immediately after the imposition of tolls on Feb. 1, 2014,
revealed that the decline in traffic was much larger during non-peak hours than
peak hours (Dave Forster, “Traffic Surges to Gilmerton, High-Rise After Tunnel
Tolls,” The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 14, 2014). This is precisely the reaction one
would expect. Those that don’t really need to pay the tolls are the ones most
likely to decide to stay home, or to relocate their activities closer to their home
bases.

11

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY COMMUTING MATRIX FOR PORTSMOUTH, 2011
Downtown and Midtown Only
From Portsmouth

Into Portsmouth

95

117

10,249

6,044

6,925

8,466

Currituck County, N.C.

24

196

Outside Hampton Roads

24

351

17,317

15,174

Chesapeake
Norfolk
Virginia Beach

Totals

“In and Out” total is 32,491, which is 53.1 percent of Portsmouth’s
job base of 61,237.
All Tolled: DTT, MTT, HRBT, MMMBT, RT17
From Portsmouth

Into Portsmouth

95

117

10,249

6,044

6,925

8,466

24

196

116

131

7

34

428

304

Hampton

1,956

1,721

Newport News

3,518

1,881

32

44

196

38

95

1,405

23,641

20,381

Chesapeake
Norfolk
Virginia Beach
Currituck County
Gloucester County
Mathews County
York County

Poquoson
Williamsburg
Outside Hampton Roads
Totals

“In and Out” total is 44,022, which is 71.9 percent of Portsmouth’s
job base of 61,237.
Note: Downtown Tunnel (DTT), Midtown Tunnel (MTT), Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT), Monitor-Merrimac
Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (MMMBT) and James River Bridge (RT17)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014

To the extent that discretionary drivers avoid the tolled tunnels, this will inflict
financial injury upon Southside businesses that have regional rather than local
clienteles. Consider a restaurant in Olde Towne Portsmouth, an area that
attracts a significant portion of its guests from outside of the city. Suppose the
average tab paid by a diner is $35 (counting both lunch and dinner). Then, in
2016, the $1.84 x 2 = $3.68 tolls paid by the diner would be equivalent to
a 10.5 percent tax on that dining experience. This is not a recipe for success.
Contemporary estimates of “price elasticity of demand” (the sensitivity of
consumers to price changes) suggest that such a 10.5 percent increase in price
because of the tolls would result in an 8 percent to 12 percent decline in sales
revenue (holding everything else, such as Department of Defense expenditures
and general prosperity, constant).

Future Traffic Volumes
Through The DTT And MTT

The financial injury does not end there. Let’s once again focus on Portsmouth.
Each 1 percent decline in sales tax collections will cost the city of Portsmouth
$6 million annually. Further, declining sales and profits eventually will reduce the
value of the city’s businesses and the properties where they are located. Each
1 percent decline in the assessed valuation of properties in the city of Portsmouth
will reduce its tax collections by about $900,000. Of course, Portsmouth’s loss
could become another city’s gain.

Steer, Davies and Gleave opined that a 24 percent to 48 percent immediate
decline in tunnel traffic might occur because of a “shock effect.” The actual
declines in tunnel traffic that occurred in February 2014, while substantial, were
not this large. The consulting firm predicts slow, gradual growth in traffic once
drivers adjust to tolls.

While Portsmouth is the Southside city most vulnerable to
the tolls, other cities such as Norfolk also attract many of
the discretionary drivers that utilize the tunnels to travel to
businesses and restaurants in Norfolk, patronize regional
attractions such as the Chrysler Museum of Art, the Norfolk
Tides and the Norfolk Admirals, or drive to educational
institutions such as Tidewater Community College, Norfolk
State University and Old Dominion University. Indeed, because
of its long-standing status as a cultural, legal, financial and
educational center for Hampton Roads, Norfolk appears to
attract a higher proportion of discretionary travelers than any
other city in the region. Hence, it will not escape the burden of
the tolls.
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Estimation of traffic volumes when new tolls are imposed upon a travel venue
is somewhat speculative simply because the tolls represent something entirely
new as opposed to an increase in price of something that already exists. The
Commonwealth commissioned several consultants and agencies to provide
traffic estimates through the DTT and MTT. Among them was Steer, Davies and
Gleave, whose 2010 report and final report in March 2012 estimated traffic
flows through 2070: “Downtown Tunnel/Midtown Tunnel/Martin Luther King
Freeway (MLK) Extension: Traffic and Revenue Forecasts.”

“Drop in Traffic Takes Toll on Investors in Private Roads,”
reported The Wall Street Journal on Nov. 20, 2013. The
WSJ’s Ryan Dezember and Emily Glazer noted that traffic
volume projections often have been overly optimistic on
privately owned or operated toll projects.
Straightforward economic analysis suggests that the typical
passenger car driver eventually will decide to pay the tolls.
Suppose the value of a driver’s time is $10 per hour and that
avoiding the tunnels adds 30 minutes to the length of a trip
across the Elizabeth River. The value of those extra 30 minutes
to this typical driver is .5($10) = $5, which is substantially
higher than either the $1 toll in 2014, or the $1.84 toll in
2016. Hence, an armchair prediction is that the typical driver
will grumble and perhaps attempt to minimize his/her trips,
but ultimately will decide that driving through the tunnels
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(and paying the tolls) is cost efficient after all. Still, this will be
less true for discretionary drivers than for job commuters and
businesses.

Nightmare On Elm Street:
Tolling The James River
Crossings
“My recommendation would be to toll all 4 crossings with
electronic toll collection, with dynamic pricing (congestion
pricing, with all the revenues utilized only on the 4 crossings)
based on time-of-day and day-of-week, designed to optimize
the usage of all 4 crossings, with a price structure that would
pay for the entire total cost (debt service on toll revenue bonds)
of the Third Hampton Roads Crossing project, justifying the
re-tolling of the JRB and HRBT on the basis that the Third
Crossing would provide them traffic relief as well as revenues for
maintenance, and for providing an adjustable optimal traffic
balance over all 4 crossings.” Scott M. Kozel, “Roads to the

quite simply neither the Commonwealth nor the region possessed such a revenue
source.
Refer back to the commuting matrix data found in Table 1. Let’s use Hampton
as an instructive example. As Table 3 reveals, a total of 15,883 people live
in Hampton, but are employed in the five major Southside cities: Chesapeake,
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. It would be nearly impossible
for these commuters to avoid paying tolls unless they carpool, use mass
transportation or telecommute. There also is a reverse flow: 16,526 people
live in one of the five Southside cities, but are employed in Hampton. Hence, a
total of 32,409 people with connections to Hampton would be affected by tolls
on RT17, MMMBT and HRBT. The comparable number for Newport News is
38,829. The total for the two Peninsula cities is 71,238.
Thus, 71,238 is the average daily number of people who
live in either Hampton or Newport News, but are employed
Southside plus those people that live Southside, but are
employed in either Hampton or Newport News.12 Most of these
people would pay a toll – twice a day – if RT17, the MMMBT
and the HRBT were tolled in order to pay for a third crossing.
If approximately 20 percent of these commuters carpool, use mass transportation
or telecommute, then we still are left with about 57,000 vehicles that cross
the James River each day because of their employment. Add to this perhaps
25,000 daily business trips and about the same number of discretionary trips,
and the total average estimated trips nears 110,000.

Future,” April 10, 2005, http://www.roadstothefuture.com/
HR_Crossing_Study.html#PPP-2001
If placing tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK has generated problematic results, then
consider what would happen if all vehicles using the three major un-tolled James
River crossings (the Route 17 Bridge, the Monitor-Merrimac Memorial BridgeTunnel and the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel) were subjected to tolls. These
three James River crossings (which we abbreviate as RT17, MMMBT and HRBT,
respectively) likely would be tolled if a third crossing over the James River were
constructed. A third crossing would have cost $2.7 billion a decade ago and
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12

 ote that there are other people who live or work in locations such as Poquoson, James City County and
N
Williamsburg that also commute across the James River.

TABLE 3
WORKERS CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER ON A DAILY BASIS:
THE FLOW OF MAJOR CITY WORKERS OVER THE RT17
BRIDGE, MMMBT AND HRBT
Hampton to
Chesapeake

3,162

Chesapeake to
Hampton

3,469

Hampton to Norfolk

6,484

Norfolk to Hampton

3,910

Hampton to
Portsmouth

1,721

Portsmouth to
Hampton

1,956

Suffolk to Hampton

2,103

Virginia Beach to
Hampton

5,088

Hampton to Suffolk

885

Hampton to Virginia
Beach

3,631

Totals

15,883

16,526

Hampton Total: 32,409
Newport News to
Chesapeake

3,288

Chesapeake to
Newport News

4,819

Newport News to
Norfolk

5,236

Norfolk to Newport
News

3,973

Newport News to
Portsmouth

1,881

Portsmouth to Newport
News

3,518

Newport News to
Suffolk

1,355

Suffolk to Newport
News

4,659

3,724

Virginia Beach to
Newport News

6,376

Newport News to
Virginia Beach
Totals

15,484

23,345

Newport News Total: 38,829
To the Southside Total 31,367

To the Peninsula Total

39,871

Grand Total, “to and from”: 71,238
Source: James V. Koch, “The Different Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014

One can quibble with the precise nature of these estimates; they are
approximations. Even so, the broad lessons of these numbers can
be grasped easily. The cities and counties of our region are highly
interdependent. Anything that reduces or frustrates this economic
interdependence will make us worse off. Significant tolls on
the three currently non-tolled James River crossings would fall
into that category because they would increase costs, diminish
the size of our market, reduce labor mobility and cause our
incomes to stagnate or decline. Viewed from a national perch,
significant James River tolls would do much to make our
region noncompetitive.

Summing It Up
A variety of independent studies have predicted that the overall economic
impact of the DTT/MTT/MLK project on Hampton Roads will be positive. These
studies rely upon “present value” estimates that collapse future revenues and
costs into current dollars so that, for example, costs and revenues in 2040 can
be compared to costs and revenues in 2016. This is conventional practice in
economics and finance, and the studies cannot be faulted for their methodology.
The conclusion, however, is that this project, when completed, will be good for
our region.
However, a finding that discounted benefits of the project
exceed its discounted costs for Hampton Roads as a region
does not guarantee that all cities and counties in our region
will experience the same proportionate benefits and costs.
Indeed, perhaps the most important lesson here is that the
benefits and costs of the project are unequally distributed
across Hampton Roads. Much depends upon the locations where people
actually live and work, which businesses and institutions attract out-of-town
customers and guests, and the behavior of discretionary drivers.
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk are the cities most affected by the tolls.
Portsmouth in particular appealed to the Commonwealth for relief, and Gov.
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Terry McAuliffe delayed the full onset of the tolls until 2016 by providing the
project with what has been advertised as $82 million in toll revenue subsidies.
Prospects for significant long-term financial assistance to the cities are not good,
however.
Accordingly, the cities should consider:
•S
 ubsidizing or rebating portions of tolls paid by citizens or
employees. Moffatt and Nichols’ useful 2012 report to Portsmouth focused
on ways that this city itself might subsidize or rebate toll payments.13 The cities
should consider jointly advocating a state income tax credit for cumulative
tolls paid by an individual above a certain level, say, $250 annually. This tax
credit easily could be tied to the size of someone’s taxable income in order to
focus it upon lower-income individuals and households. This would constitute
a drain on the Commonwealth’s treasury, but the drain would be much smaller
and more distributed over time than, say, a request for an additional $100
million in cash or debt contribution by the Commonwealth to the project. This
might appeal to toll payers elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The cities also
could rebate their own property taxes and the like on much the same basis.
• Additional tolling time periods. Daily vehicle traffic through the DTT
and MTT varies up to 30 percent during a typical week and much more than
this during a single day. ERCO has responded to these data by developing a
two-time period model – peak hours and non-peak hours – in terms of the tolls
it will charge. Experience at other toll sites nationally suggests that as many as
four distinct tolling time periods may be optimal.
• Additional tolling time periods would not cost ERCO revenue if the demand
for tolled travel were “unit elastic” or better. Practically, this means that a 10
percent reduction in tolls must result in a more than 10 percent increase in
toll customers, or a 20 percent reduction in tolls must cause a more than 20
percent increase in toll customers.
• The cities should request that ERCO experiment with additional tolling time
periods to determine the reaction of drivers. The aim would be to attract

13

“ City of Portsmouth Policy and Legislative Recommendations: Midtown and Downtown Tunnel Toll
Implementation,” Moffatt and Nichols, Aug. 27, 2012.
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more discretionary drivers (for example, those who might patronize a store or
restaurant, attend church or visit friends).
•E
 nhanced public transportation. The cities should do their utmost to
publicize Hampton Roads Transit’s Traffix website, www.gohrt.com/services/
traffix, where prospective car poolers can make contact with each other.
A three-person car pool slices two-thirds of the cost from the tolls paid by a
single passenger vehicle. Further, the cities should explore additional Elizabeth
River bus and ferry service with HRT.
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Economic Development
Incentives: Competing
Against Ourselves?

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES:
COMPETING AGAINST OURSELVES?
As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price
– Louise Story, The New York Times (Dec. 1, 2012)

A

ided and abetted by the media, nearly all of us have done it. We count the number of new firms attracted to our area in a given year and then use that
number as a thermometer of the economic health and vitality of the region. To be sure, we know that other things such as national economic conditions
and, in the case of Hampton Roads, defense spending, are so important that they can overwhelm the efforts of even the most energetic and successful
economic developers to attract new firms. Nevertheless, the number of new firms attracted to an area remains one of the most popular measures of

economic health.
Counting new businesses is easy, but often is deceptive for some of the reasons
just noted. Fundamentally, however, the single-minded focus of economic
developers on attracting new firms may be misguided. Spending an equivalent
number of dollars on helping existing firms expand, or incubating startup firms
or commercializing basic research usually is a more productive strategy in
terms of generating jobs and expanding the tax base. Further, as we will see,
attempts to attract new firms not only can be expensive, but also can result in
counterproductive bidding of one governmental unit against another. Finally, the
rationale for government choosing favorites and providing financial assistance to
one firm, but not another, in a roughly equivalent situation is shaky.

go out and attract new firms in order to bolster the economy”
– now is being challenged by those who argue that it is more
productive to: (1) “garden” and expand existing firms; (2)
incubate startup firms; and (3) commercialize and bring to
market the basic research emanating from the Jefferson
Laboratory, NASA Langley, Eastern Virginia Medical School
and Old Dominion University. In this new, emerging view, the efforts
of organizations such as the Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance
(HREDA) either should be refocused, or a new hybrid organization capable of
these broader mandates should be created.

In this chapter, we look at our regional economic development programs at
the policy level. We attempt to assess the overall productivity of our local and
regional efforts (which often cooperate with those of the Commonwealth of
Virginia) and then ask the obvious questions: Do these programs represent a
sound investment of scarce public and private funds? Are they worth it? And,
what are the alternatives?

Nationally, the most economically dynamic regions tend to do all of these
things well. They cultivate existing firms and incubate new firms even while
attempting to attract new firms. They simultaneously stimulate and encourage
the commercialization of basic research being undertaken at their academic
institutions. They may also utilize economic development incentives as a part of
their growth strategy, but this is not the centerpiece of their overall approach to
economic development.

The longstanding premise that has motivated most local,
regional and state economic development programs – “Let’s
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What is meant when one talks about the “gardening” of
existing firms? The notion originated in Littleton, Colo., in
the 1980s and was popularized by MIT’s David Birch (“The

Beach along Princess Anne Road because of the burgeoning medical complex
and the Virginia Beach Higher Education Center. Cultivation and promotion of
these developments, rather than attempting to attract a large corporation, would
require a reorientation of our regional economic development efforts.

Job Generation Process,” 1979), who argued that most new
jobs in any community are generated by a small cadre of
local businesses, which he later termed “gazelles.” Littleton
and other “gardening communities” made life easier for
their small businesses by giving them access to information
and high-speed Internet connections, arranging sessions
for them with financial institutions and venture capital
firms, connecting them to academic, engineering, computer,
Internet and accounting expertise, and providing them with
very short-term tax incentives. A frequent example involves
raising the visibility of a small firm on the Internet by
optimizing its presence in Internet search engine activities.
The focus is on second-stage firms that have demonstrated
solid possibilities for growth, but now could benefit from
assistance. Today, the Edward Lowe Foundation is a
particularly energetic supporter of economic gardening
and states that it is “an entrepreneur-oriented approach to
economic prosperity.” www.edwardlowe.org
A current hot concept in economic development is the “innovation district,”
which Fortune magazine describes as the clustering of “cutting-edge research
institutions and R&D-intensive companies with start-ups and business incubators.
They are physically compact, transit-accessible, and offer mixed-use housing,
office, and retail.” (Katz and Wagner in Fortune, June 13, 2014). The only
area of Hampton Roads that even approaches this description currently is the
Old Dominion University/Eastern Virginia Medical School/Granby Street
corridor, though some of these building blocks exist on the Peninsula because of
the existence of NASA Langley Research Center, the Thomas Jefferson National
Accelerator Facility and the incipient Virginia Tech development; and in Virginia

A Quick Scan Of Our
Economic Development
Efforts
Virginia, along with its cities, counties and regions, works aggressively to lure
new businesses and in 2012 spent an estimated $1.89 billion on such efforts.
Even so, the Commonwealth has eschewed very large economic incentives such
as those that assisted South Carolina in attracting a BMW production facility
and Alabama in attracting a Mercedes production plant.
Media campaigns, recruiting trips, worldwide offices, conventions and a variety
of incentives all are utilized by the Commonwealth and Hampton Roads to
attract new business activity. Nevertheless, even though the 50 states
are spending an estimated $50 billion per year on economic
development incentives, and regional and local governments
an estimated $30 billion more, there is surprisingly little
agreement as to what works best, or even what works at all,
in attracting new businesses from other locations.1 Indeed, the
academic consensus on the subject is that economic development incentives
seldom determine company locational decisions.
Virginia typically has not chosen to play in the “let’s pay out large incentives to
attract a new firm” arena. The actual financial grants awarded for economic
development purposes by the Commonwealth usually have not been sizable.
1

Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, “Tax Incentives: Costly for States, Drag on the Nation,” http://itep.
org/itep_reports/2013/08/tax-incentives-costly-for-states-drag-on-the-nation.php#.U4XKpXy-l5cl, for the $50
million figure, and Louise Story, The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2012, for the remaining regional and local $30
billion. For additional evidence on the questionable productivity of economic development financial incentives,
see Yoonsoo Lee, “Geographical Redistribution of U.S. Manufacturing and the Role of State Development
Policy,” Journal of Urban Economics, 64 (2008); Terry F. Buss, “The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic
Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature,” Economic Development Quarterly, 15
(2001); and Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, “U.S. and E.U. Experiences of Tax Incentives,” Area 186 (2007).
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A November 2012 study by the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission (JLARC) found that most of the 3,372 financial grants for economic
development awarded in the Commonwealth by state government between
fiscal years 2002 to 2011 averaged only a bit more than $200,000.2 While
seven recipients received more than $20 million each, most received less than
$100,000. Table 1 lists the 50 businesses in Hampton Roads that received
incentive grants from the beginning of 2009 to the end of 2013.
The Commonwealth and local governmental units operate
21 primary economic development programs (see Table 2). A
host of state agencies exist to administer these programs. Any
city, county or region worthy of the name has an economic
development agency and one or more programs designed
to attract and retain businesses to that jurisdiction. Table 3
summarizes the state, regional and local agencies and groups that profess
economic development to be one of their significant aims.
This veritable blizzard of programs and agencies naturally provokes the
question: Are we getting our money’s worth? Do these programs work? Do they
invest money wisely? Can they demonstrate results?
To be sure, we are not the first to ask these questions, nor are these questions
unique either to Hampton Roads or to the Commonwealth of Virginia. However,
given the only “so-so” performance of our regional economy, it is appropriate
once again to raise these questions and to summarize the evidence.

2

R eview of State Economic Development Grants (Richmond, Virginia: JLARC, November 2012, http://jlarc.
virginia.gov/reports/Rpt431.pdf).
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013
Location

Mfg

Type

Employment

Investment
(millions)

Date
Announced

Jobs
Saved

Amount of
Incentive
(millions)

Source

AMAC Leasing LLC

Southampton
County

M

N

26

$5.60

02/2013

0

$0.300

Rail

Atomized Products Group Inc.

Chesapeake

M

N

26

$4.30

07/2013

0

$0.100

GOF

Norfolk

M

E

130

$15.00

03/2013

0

$0.100

EZ

Newport News

M

E

0

$27.00

06/2013

12

$3.000

VIP

DESMI*

Chesapeake

M

E

34

$1.90

10/2013

0

$0.031

VJIP

Eska Graphic Board*

Chesapeake

M

E

18

$0.55

03/2013

0

$0.015

VJIP

Franklin Lumber LLC

Isle of Wight
County

M

N

72

$14.80

06/2013

0

$0.000

James City County

M

E

34

$1.50

06/2013

0

$0.025

VJIP

Hamilton Consulting Corp.

Chesapeake

N

E

58

$0.50

06/2013

0

$0.058

VJIP

Hampton Farms/Severn Peanut Co.

Southampton
County

M

N

60

$5.50

08/2013

0

$0.200

GOF

High Liner Foods Inc.*

Newport News

M

E

57

$6.60

05/2013

0

$0.501

GOF/VJIP/EZ

Liebherr Mining Equipment Newport
News Co.*

Newport News

M

E

174

$45.43

02/2013

0

$1.300

GOF/VIP

Lipton*

Suffolk

M

E

0

$96.20

03/2013

0

$1.000

VIP

Mills Marine & Ship Repair, LLC

Suffolk

M

E

142

$3.00

04/2013

0

$0.156

VJIP

Oceaneering International Inc.

Chesapeake

M

E

67

$32.90

11/2013

463

$3.090

GOF/VIP/Road

Virginia Beach

M

N

60

$7.33

07/2013

0

$0.200

GOF/VJIP

Chesapeake

N

E

275

$6.87

01/2013

0

$0.193

VJIP

1,233

$274.98

2013 Totals

Bauer Compressors Inc.*
Canon Virginia Inc.*

Greystone Inc.

PRUFREX Innovative Power Products
GmbH*
Sutherland Global Services
17

$10.269

Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation

GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund

MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit

Type: New or Expansion

VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant

EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant

Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing

VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant

Road - Economic Development Access Program

2013 announcements are preliminary.

VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program

All announcements are subject to revision.

Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program

Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013

Faneuil Inc.

Location

Mfg

Type

Employment

Investment
(millions)

Date
Announced

Jobs
Saved

Amount of
Incentive
(millions)

Portsmouth

N

N

50

$1.00

08/2012

0

$0.000

Norfolk

N

E

20

$3.35

12/2012

0

$0.016

VJIP

James City County

N

E

32

$0.17

12/2012

0

$0.023

VJIP

Chesapeake

M

E

21

$1.80

12/2012

0

$0.018

VJIP

Hobbs & Associates
La Tienda
Manufacturing & Design Technology
Inc.
Mosquito Joe

Source

Virginia Beach

N

E

16

$0.21

12/2012

0

$0.014

VJIP

Sumitomo Machinery Corp. of
America*

Chesapeake

M

E

96

$13.25

01/2012

0

$0.152

VJIP

Tak Investments Inc. (ST Tissue)

Isle of Wight
County

M

N

85

$60.00

07/2012

0

$0.889

GOF/VJIP/EZ

James City County

M

E

18

$0.12

12/2012

0

$0.013

VJIP

Virginia Beach

N

E

52

$0.13

12/2012

0

$0.037

VJIP

390

$80.03

2012 Totals

Suffolk

N

E

75

$14.00

09/2011

0

$0.224

GOF/VJIP

James City County

N

E

30

$0.35

05/2011

0

$0.030

VJIP

Chesapeake

N

E

18

$1.00

04/2011

0

$0.018

VJIP

Suffolk

N

N

75

$12.50

08/2011

0

$0.056

VJIP

Chesapeake

N

E

88

$0.10

04/2011

0

$0.071

VJIP

Hampton

M

E

30

$0.10

09/2011

0

$0.030

VJIP

Southampton
County

M

N

72

$91.00

11/2011

0

$0.989

GOF/MBFJTC/
Road

Virginia Beach

M

E

80

$35.50

12/2011

0

$0.500

GOF/VIP

Virginia Packing LLC
Virginia Toy and Novelty Co.
9
Ace Hardware Corp.
Applied Process Technology
International, LLC*
Bay Diesel & Generator
California Cartage Co., LLC
CDYNE Corp.
Eagle Aviation Technologies Inc.
Enviva LP
IMS:GEAR Virginia Inc.*

$1.161

Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation

GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund

MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit

Type: New or Expansion

VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant

EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant

Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing

VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant

Road - Economic Development Access Program

2013 announcements are preliminary.

VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program

All announcements are subject to revision.

Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program

Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013

International Paper

Location

Mfg

Type

Employment

Investment
(millions)

Date
Announced

Jobs
Saved

Amount of
Incentive
(millions)

Source

Isle of Wight
County

M

N

213

$83.00

05/2011

0

$0.563

GOF/VJIP

Katoen Natie*
Keurig Green Mountain Inc.
KITCO Fiber Optics
Scientific Research Corp.

Norfolk

N

N

225

$12.00

03/2011

0

$0.466

VJIP/EZ

Isle of Wight
County

M

N

800

$180.00

10/2011

0

$6.640

GOF/VJIP/EZ

Virginia Beach

M

E

128

$0.10

04/2011

0

$0.103

VJIP

Chesapeake

N

E

89

$2.20

03/2011

0

$0.082

VJIP

1,923

$431.85

2011 Totals

Virginia Beach

N

E

275

$0.25

09/2010

0

$0.399

VJIP/MBFJTC

Accomack County

M

E

9

$5.25

09/2010

0

$0.102

Rail

13
InMotion Hosting Inc.
KmX USA*
MYMIC LLC
Orion Air Group
Solutionz Conferencing Inc.

Portsmouth

N

E

90

$0.30

06/2010

0

$0.090

VJIP

Newport News

N

E

51

$4.00

05/2010

57

$0.051

VJIP

Williamsburg

N

E

19

$2.00

12/2010

0

$0.030

VJIP

444

$11.80

2010 Totals

Hampton

M

E

25

$25.00

06/2009

0

$0.519

VIP/VJIP

Virginia Beach

N

E

70

$0.60

03/2009

0

$0.036

VJIP

5
Alcoa Howmet
Avis Budget Group Inc.
Cobham Composite Products*
Greenwood RRST, LLC
Owens-Illinois Inc.
Southampton Terminal, LLC

$9.772

$0.671

Suffolk

M

N

198

$13.20

03/2009

0

$0.839

GOF/VJIP/EZ

Southampton
County

N

N

10

$2.20

12/2009

0

$0.047

Rail

James City County

M

E

0

$20.00

04/2009

180

$0.054

VJIP

Southampton
County

N

E

35

$3.20

05/2009

0

$0.000

338

$64.20

2009 Totals

$1.494

4,328

$862.86

Grand Totals

$23.367

6
50
Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation

GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund

MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit

Type: New or Expansion

VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant

EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant

Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing

VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant

Road - Economic Development Access Program

2013 announcements are preliminary.

VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program

All announcements are subject to revision.

Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program

Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 2
INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS LOCATION AND EXPANSION
Governor’s Opportunity Fund

The Governor’s Opportunity Fund (GOF) is a discretionary incentive available to the governor to secure a
business location or expansion project for Virginia. Grants are awarded to localities on a local matching basis
with the expectation that the grant will result in a favorable location decision for the Commonwealth.

Governor’s Agriculture and Forestry
Industries Development Fund

The Governor’s Agriculture and Forestry Industries Development Fund (AFID) offers strategic grants made to
businesses that add value to Virginia-grown agricultural and forest products. AFID grants are made at the
discretion of the governor with the expectation that a grant awarded to a political subdivision will result in a
new or expanded processing/value-added facility for Virginia-grown agricultural or forest products, and with
the expectation that the grant will be critical to the success of the project.

Virginia Investment Partnership Act

The Virginia Investment Partnership (VIP) Grant and the Major Eligible Employer Grant (MEE) are discretionary
performance incentives designed to encourage continued capital investment by Virginia companies, resulting
in added capacity, modernization, increased productivity or the creation, development and utilization of
advanced technology.

Virginia Economic Development Incentive
Grant

The Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant (VEDIG) is a discretionary performance incentive,
designed to assist and encourage companies to invest and create new employment opportunities by locating
significant headquarters, administrative or service-sector operations in Virginia.

Clean Energy Manufacturing Incentive
Grant

The Clean Energy Manufacturing Incentive Grant (CEMIG) is a discretionary performance incentive, designed
to encourage clean-energy manufacturers to grow in Virginia.

Virginia Jobs Investment Program

The Virginia Jobs Investment Program (VJIP) offers customized recruiting and training assistance to companies
that are creating new jobs or experiencing technological change. The program is designed to reduce the
human resource development cost of new and expanding companies.

Corporate Income Tax Credits

Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit

Recycling Equipment Tax Credit

Day Care Facility Investment Tax Credit

Worker Retraining Tax Credit

Virginia Port Tax Credit Programs

Research and Development Tax Credit

Green Job Creation Tax Credit
Sales and Use Tax Exemptions

Virginia offers some of the broadest sales and use tax exemptions in the United States.

Property Tax Exemptions

Virginia does not tax intangible property, manufacturers’ inventory and manufacturers’ furniture, fixtures and
corporate aircraft.

Economic Development Access Program

Administered by the Virginia Department of Transportation, this program assists localities in providing adequate
road access to new and expanding basic employers.

Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership (VEDP) and the Joint Legislative Audit Review Commission (JLARC). Additional information is available at www.yesvirginia.org.
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TABLE 2
INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS LOCATION AND EXPANSION
Rail Industrial Access Program

This program provides funds to construct railroad tracks to new or substantially expanded industrial and
commercial projects.

Transportation Partnership Opportunity
Fund

TPOF is a discretionary grant available for transportation issues related to unique economic development
projects.

Virginia Small Business Financing
Authority

VSBFA offers programs to provide businesses with access to capital needed for growth and expansion.

Enterprise Zones

Virginia’s Enterprise Zone program provides state and local incentives to businesses that invest and create jobs
within Virginia’s enterprise zones, which are located throughout the state.

Technology Zones

Virginia authorizes its communities to establish technology zones to encourage growth in targeted industries.
Currently, 30 cities and counties and six towns have created zones throughout the state.

Foreign Trade Zones

Virginia offers six foreign trade zones designed to encourage businesses to participate in international trade by
effectively eliminating or reducing customs duties. Also, numerous subzones are provided and additional ones
can be designated to enhance the trade capabilities of specific companies.

Defense Production Zones

Virginia authorizes its communities to establish local defense production zones to benefit businesses engaged
in the design, development or production of materials, components or equipment required to meet the needs of
national defense. Companies deemed ancillary to or in support of the aforementioned categories would also
apply.

Tobacco Indemnification and Community
Revitalization Commission

Tobacco Region Opportunity Fund

Virginia Film Office

Governor’s Motion Picture Opportunity Fund

Virginia Coalfield Economic Development
Authority

Coalfield Regional Opportunity Fund
Port Volume Increase Tax Credit available to companies that increase port cargo through public or private
facilities in Virginia by a minimum of 5 percent in a single year.
Barge and Rail Usage Tax Credit for companies that move cargo by barge or rail.

Virginia Port Tax Credits

International Trade Facility Tax Credit for new job creation or capital investment in an international trade facility
as a result of moving 10 percent more cargo through a Virginia Port Authority facility.
Port of Virginia Economic and Infrastructure Development Grant Program for companies that locate in the port
zone and create at least 25 new jobs involved in maritime commerce.

Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership (VEDP) and the Joint Legislative Audit Review Commission (JLARC). Additional information is available at www.yesvirginia.org.
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TABLE 3
MAJOR AGENCIES INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS
Virginia Economic Development Partnership
Department of Business Assistance
Department of Housing and Community Development
State Level

Department of Rail and Public Transportation
Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission
Virginia Coalfield Economic Development Authority
Virginia Film Office
Center for Innovative Technology
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce

Regional Level

Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
Port of Virginia

Local Level

Local Chambers of Commerce

City of Virginia Beach Economic Development

City of Chesapeake Economic Development

City of Williamsburg Economic Development Authority

City of Hampton Economic Development

County of Gloucester Economic Development

City of Newport News Economic Development
Authority

County of Isle of Wight Economic Development

City of Norfolk Economic Development

County of James City Economic Development

City of Poquoson Economic Development

County of Surry Economic Development

City of Portsmouth Economic Development

County of York Economic Development

City of Suffolk Economic Development

Franklin Southampton Economic Development

Future of Hampton Roads Inc.
Other Organizations

Hampton Roads Community Foundation and constituent committees
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
Technology Council of Hampton Roads
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The Economic Development
Incentive Scorecard for
Hampton Roads
A logical place for us to start our analysis is with the Hampton Roads Economic
Development Alliance (HREDA), which describes itself as “the recruitment
organization tasked with attracting new opportunities for the entire Hampton
Roads region.” HREDA’s future is uncertain for three reasons. First, the Great
Recession that began in 2008 understandably diminished the Alliance’s ability
to “score” in terms of attracting new firms to the region. Second, and not
unrelated, HREDA’s financial viability depends substantially upon a per citizen
assessment paid by each of the region’s cities; it seems likely that several cities
will reduce or eliminate their payments to HREDA. Third, as noted above, some
observers believe that HREDA’s focus on attracting new firms to the region is off
target and that either HREDA or a successor organization instead should place
emphasis on the “gardening” of existing firms, incubation of new firms and
commercialization of research.
This past year (2013) was a more active one for the Alliance, however. Staff
report they met with 342 corporate decision makers and 140 site selection
consultants in 12 countries and 16 states.
Many recruitment efforts take years to reach fruition and
therefore one should not place undue emphasis on the
performance of an economic development authority in any
single year. In 2013, HREDA (which has a proposed budget of
$2.59 million for 2014) announced six significant successful
firms with whom it had worked to convince them to locate
in Hampton Roads. In addition, 47 other announcements were made by
the Commonwealth of new or expanded businesses for the region. Table 4
traces the number of announcements and resulting expected job growth and
investment for the region for the past five years. There has been a consistency
in the number of new companies attracted to the region, but the number of new
employees and the capital investment have varied over the years without any
apparent trend.

TABLE 4
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF JOB
CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS,
CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013
Year

Companies

Employment

Investment

2009

61

3,023

$467.14 million

2010

51

2,430

$129.10 million

2011

56

3,125

$599.33 million

2012

57

1,852

$176.14 million

2013

53

2,075

$525.33 million

Totals

278

12,505

$1,897.04 million

Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership

Table 5 summarizes the general types of economic development incentives that
were offered to firms that chose to locate in Hampton Roads between 2009
and 2013. Note that some of the incentives involved road and transportation
improvements, including railway improvements. The deals made in Hampton
Roads involved an estimated $863 million of new investment in plant,
equipment and improvements. An estimated 4,328 new jobs were generated
by these projects.
These are positive results, but it’s also worth noting that according to JLARC, no
more than 15 percent of corporate expansion or relocation deals over the last
10 years in Virginia have included tax incentive programs. These deals were
developed primarily with larger companies that JLARC estimated have created
40 percent of all new jobs in Virginia.
Table 6 provides us with a flavor of job creation results for
Hampton Roads. Total “new job” announcements were
made by Virginia involving 12,505 new jobs in our region.
As just noted, 4,328 of these jobs (or about 35 percent)
involved economic development incentives being granted to
the firms creating the jobs. The remaining did not. Where
new investment in plant, equipment and improvements was
concerned, economic development incentives were attached
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to about 45 percent of the investments announced by the
Commonwealth. Only 18 percent of the companies involved
in these job announcements actually received economic
development incentives from state or local authorities. The total
value of incentives provided from all sources during this time
period was $23.367 million, or about $5,400 per job.3

3

The results in Table 5 reflect the definition of Hampton Roads utilized by the Virginia Economic Development
Partnership, which includes in its Region 8 (Hampton Roads) the jurisdictions of Accomack County, Chesapeake,
Franklin, Gloucester County, Hampton, Isle of Wight County, James City County, Newport News, Norfolk,
Northampton County, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Southampton County, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Williamsburg and
York County. This is not the same as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) definition utilized by the U.S. Census.
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TABLE 5
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF NEW JOB CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT INVOLVING HAMPTON ROADS, 2009-2013
VEDIG
Funding
(millions)

VJIP
Funding
(millions)

Rail Funding
(millions)

MBFJTC
Funding
(millions)

EZ Funding
(millions)

Road
Funding
(millions)

TROF
Funding
(millions)

Year
Announced

Companies

Employment

Investment
(millions)

GOF Funding VIP Funding
(millions)
(millions)

2013

17

1,233

$274.98

$1.920

$5.550

$0.000

$1.534

$0.300

$0.000

$0.315

$0.650

$0.000

2012

9

390

$80.03

$0.200

$0.000

$0.000

$0.437

$0.000

$0.000

$0.524

$0.000

$0.000

2011

13

1,923

$431.85

$4.950

$0.300

$0.000

$1.847

$0.000

$0.039

$1.986

$0.650

$0.000

2010

5

444

$11.80

$0.000

$0.000

$0.000

$0.345

$0.102

$0.225

$0.000

$0.000

$0.000

2009

6

338

$64.20

$0.300

$0.500

$0.000

$0.349

$0.047

$0.000

$0.299

$0.000

$0.000

Grand
Total

50

4,328

$862.86

$7.370

$6.350

$0.000

$4.512

$0.448

$0.264

$3.123

$1.300

$0.000

Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
Note:

2013 announcements are preliminary.

GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund

MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit

VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant

EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant

VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant

Road - Economic Development Access Program

VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program

TROF - Tobacco Region Opportunity Fund

TABLE 6
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT,
HAMPTON ROADS PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013
Total Projects

Projects with Incentives

Percentages

Year

Companies

Employment Investment

Companies

Employment Investment

Companies

Employment Investment

2013

53

2,075

$525.33

17

1,233

$274.98

32%

59%

52%

2012

57

1,852

$176.14

9

390

$80.03

16%

21%

45%

2011

56

3,125

$599.33

13

1,923

$431.85

23%

62%

72%

2010

51

2,430

$129.10

5

444

$11.80

10%

18%

9%

2009

61

3,023

$467.14

6

338

$64.20

10%

11%

14%

Total

278

12,505

$1,897.04

50

4,328

$862.86

18%

35%

45%

Note: Investments in millions
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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Mixed Evidence Where
Incentives Are Concerned
Virginia periodically appears on the Forbes magazine list of the Best States for
Business and currently is ranked No. 1. Forbes has developed an index that
looks at six factors influencing the business climate: (1) costs, (2) labor supply,
(3) regulatory environment, (4) current economic climate, (5) growth prospects
and (6) quality of life.4 This past year, Virginia was the only state to rank in
the top five in at least four of the six areas – the Commonwealth missed only
on costs and growth prospects. Hence, it is not a difficult case for Hampton
Roads economic developers to argue that the region is an attractive place to
do business. In its 2013 list of 200 best places in the country for business and
careers, Forbes ranked the Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News SMA as
No. 77. The Richmond SMA was ranked 56th and the Roanoke SMA 99th.
In many ways Hampton Roads, broadly defined, has an attractive story to tell:
• The Port of Virginia is the largest natural deepwater harbor on earth.
• The region is within a day’s drive of 97 million consumers.
• Eight universities and four community colleges serve more than 100,000
students in the region.
• The growth rate of federally funded research and development expenditures in
the region is high.
• The region has a high concentration of federal laboratories and installations.
• The labor force includes many military veterans, who are viewed as talented,
reliable and disciplined.
• The region is rich with cultural opportunities.
In the end, are these strengths of Hampton Roads what really
count, or do the economic incentives that are proffered to firms
matter more? Virtually every review of existing studies that

focus on economic development incentives points to factors
such as those listed above as being the critical determinants
of why firms choose to locate one place or another. While firms
pondering a new location value incentives and often negotiate vigorously to
receive them, relatively few mention incentives as being critical to their final
decision. In January 2014, the Pew Research Center issued a fact sheet titled
“Evaluating State Tax Incentives: How to Measure Economic Impact” (The Pew
Charitable Trusts, Feb. 7, 2014) about tax incentive programs in Minnesota,
Louisiana and Massachusetts, which are regarded as “models for other states to
follow when measuring the results of their own incentives.”5 Pew noted:
• In Minnesota, evaluators estimated that 79 percent of the jobs created at
companies receiving incentives were likely to have been generated without
the incentives. Jobs created cost the state more than $26,000, or about five
times more than originally estimated, according to the analysts.
• Louisiana’s evaluation of its Enterprise Zone program found that in certain
economic sectors, 90 percent of new jobs created in the program were
displacing jobs with other employers. Evaluators concluded that the program
had created about 3,000 jobs instead of the more than 9,000 jobs that
participating businesses had reported.
• An analysis of the Massachusetts film industry tax credit reported by the Pew
Research Center found that the more than 5,900 jobs created from 2006
through 2011 cost the state $326 million, which had to be offset by cuts
elsewhere in the budget. The evaluation estimated that these cuts cost the state
more than 3,700 jobs, leaving Massachusetts with a net gain of 2,200 jobs
for its investment, making each job gain much more costly than had been
estimated earlier.
There are other skeptical assessments of the effectiveness of economic incentives
as well. An Aug. 14, 2013, report by the Institute on Taxation and Economic
Policy, titled “Tax Incentives: Costly for States, Drag on the Nation,” estimated
that $50 billion is spent annually on tax incentives, but “the evidence suggests
that tax incentives are of little benefit to the state and localities that offer them
and are actually a drag on national economic growth.”
5

4

www.forbes.com/best-states-for-business
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 ww.pewstates.org/research/fact-sheets/evaluating-state-tax-incentives-how-to-measure-economicw
impact-85899539342

In 2012, New York Times reporters spent 10 months compiling data on state
and local incentives provided to business. The Times found that there is little
knowledge of whether the money is worth it because rarely is there tracking of
how many jobs are created, and even with tracking “it is impossible to know
whether the jobs would have been created without the aid.” (The New York
Times, Dec. 1, 2012)
Professor Richard Florida (head of the Martin Prosperity
Institute at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of
Management) analyzed the data gathered by The New
York Times. In a Dec. 7, 2012, issue of The Atlantic Cities, he
concluded, in an article titled “The Uselessness of Economic
Development Incentives,” that “there is virtually no association
between economic development incentives and any measure
of economic performance.” Florida went on to say “companies typically
select locations based on factors such as workforce, proximity to markets, and
access to qualified suppliers, and then pit jurisdictions against one another to
extract tax benefits and other incentives.”
The Tax Foundation publishes annually a State Business Tax Climate Index that
ranks the states on more than 100 different variables in five areas of taxation
(major business taxes, individual income taxes, sales taxes, unemployment
insurance taxes and property taxes).6 The Foundation maintains that states with
more competitive tax systems score well in the Index because they are best
suited to generate economic growth. The Tax Foundation is critical of
states that attempt to lure business with tax incentives and
subsidies rather than broad-based tax reform that lowers
rates overall and eliminates special tax breaks that suggest
crony capitalism. It cites North Carolina, which agreed to $240 million
worth of tax incentives to lure Dell to the state, only to have Dell close its plant
after only four years. According to the Tax Foundation, “lawmakers create these
deals under the banner of job creation and economic development, but the truth
is that if a state needs to offer such packages, it is most likely covering for a
woeful business tax climate. A far more effective approach is to systematically
improve the business tax climate for the long term so as to improve the state’s
competitiveness.”
6

With respect to the general tax climate in Virginia, the Tax Foundation ranks
Virginia 26th among the 50 states. Only a brief look at the Tax Foundation map
(Figure 1) is needed for one to conclude that low taxes, per se, are not sufficient
to generate high levels of economic growth. An attractive tax climate is exactly
that – attractive – but many other factors also determine where people choose
to live and where firms decide to locate. Table 7 records the attempts of several
reputable organizations to take these other factors into account.
The Virginia Joint Legislative and Audit Review Commission undertook a review
of the effectiveness of economic development incentive grants available in
Virginia at the direction of the General Assembly and issued a report, “Review
of State Economic Development Incentive Grants,” in November 2012. The
researchers found the plethora of economic development programs, agencies
and incentives in Virginia to be both overlapping and confusing. At least
eight state agencies are involved as well as regional and local officials, as
documented in this chapter.
JLARC researchers looked at several meta-reviews of 80 or
more econometric studies published since 1979 and found
these reviews concluded that incentive grants might sway, on
average, 10 percent of the site location decisions of businesses
that receive an award. While this is not the last word on a still hotly
debated subject, JLARC staff concluded there is no empirical evidence to
suggest “most or even the majority of business location decisions are swayed by
incentive grants.”
While the report concluded “incentive grants appear to have a positive, but
small impact on the site selection decisions of businesses relative to other
considerations such as transportation and labor costs,” there is not a uniformity
of data or practices among the many agencies involved to make a strong case
for the importance of incentives to attract businesses.

taxfoundation.org/article/2014-state-business-tax-climate-index
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FIGURE 1
TAX FOUNDATION 2014 STATE BUSINESS TAX CLIMATE INDEX

NH D
#8

MT

ND

#7

# 28

SD
#2

WY
#I

NE

# 34

MA L

#25

co

# 19

KS

RI .
#46

# 20

CT .

#42

OK
# 36

NM

# 38

AR

NJ .

# 35

#49

DE
# 13

TX

# II

MD .
#4 1

°'-=
HI
0

# 30

~

\)

IO best business tax climates

IO worst business tax climates •

Source: The Tax Foundation

Source: The Tax Foundation

124

D

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2014

TABLE 7
ALTERNATIVE RANKINGS OF THE STATES ON THEIR BUSINESS CLIMATES
Forbes Best States for
Business - 2013

Pollina Top 10 Pro-Business
States - 2013

Tax Foundation Business Tax
Climate - 2014

1

Virginia

Utah

Wyoming

2

North Dakota

Nebraska

South Dakota

3

Utah

North Dakota

Nevada

4

North Carolina

Virginia

Alaska

5

Colorado

Wyoming

Florida

6

Nebraska

Kansas

Washington

7

Texas

Indiana

Montana

8

Minnesota

South Dakota

New Hampshire

9

Washington

Missouri

Utah

Georgia

Alabama

Indiana

Ranking

10
26

Virginia

Notes: F orbes says it measures costs, labor supply, regulatory environment, current economic climate, growth prospects and quality of life by examining 35 different variables. www.forbes.com/best-states-for-business
Pollina Corp. specializes in business location. It says its ranking is based on 32 factors. http://www.pollina.com
The Tax Foundation considers five different business taxes. http://taxfoundation.org/article/2014-state-business-tax-climate-index
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Lessons Learned?
CURTAIL THE USE OF TAX INCENTIVES
As we have seen, the weight of empirical evidence suggests
that improving a state or region’s overall business climate is
a more important spur to economic development than tax
incentives. What are the alternatives? The old standbys surge back to the
fore. We should think long term and improve K-12 schools, stimulate workforce
development in community colleges and universities, promote research and
development activities, enhance our transportation infrastructure, stimulate the
development of cultural amenities and reduce crime, even while we ensure
that our tax structure remains competitive. In essence, we need to
improve the quality of our overall environment because, in
the long term, this is what most effectively attracts and retains
businesses.
Reality intrudes on a persistent basis, however. Despite their apparent
ineffectiveness, cutting back on the use of governmental tax and financial
incentives could be politically risky to a governor or to members of the General
Assembly if this lends the impression that they are not doing everything in their
power to help their regional or state economies expand. Former Gov. Bob
McDonnell’s “Bob’s for Jobs” slogan resonated well in the voting public even
though there is general agreement that a one-term governor actually cannot
do very much to influence the state’s economic climate during his/her term.
Ironically, it usually is the next governor who either benefits from or is hurt by the
previous governor’s economic development actions.
A statement by any elected official that jobs and economic development
are his/her highest priority is likely to be well received, and most economic
incentive programs, despite their questionable impacts, give the appearance
that the elected official is serious. Successful elected officials understand
that impatient constituents want action and they want it now. Investments
in education, transportation, and research and development may have the
greatest long-term effect, but don’t necessarily put food on the table today or
pay mortgages. Therefore, pressures from supporters are likely to preserve and
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protect economic incentive payments far into the future. Economist John Maynard
Keynes understood this demand for short-term action when he caustically noted,
“In the long run, we are all dead.”

THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA AND COOPERATION
There is, however, yet another reason why the use of economic incentives
oftentimes turns out to be unproductive. It is contained in the phenomenon that
has become known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and afflicts governments at
all levels when they rush to offer financial incentives in order to attract specific
businesses. When many cities, regions or states simultaneously
romance prospective businesses and offer such incentives,
they compete themselves into a situation in which the eventual
price of such incentives is well above what would have
occurred without that competition. This is an argument in
favor of the existence of organizations such as the Hampton
Roads Economic Development Alliance because they have the
potential to diminish the equivalent of “auction fever” on eBay,
whereby cities and counties compete against each other to
attract a business.
Coordination and cooperation can occur. Business leaders in the bi-state Kansas
City community have made great progress in achieving cooperation in their
economic development activities.
This State of the Region report (page 95) contains a statistical matrix
demonstrating that almost 65 percent of all job holders live in one city or county,
but commute to another for their jobs. For example, 21,508 people holding
jobs in Newport News live in Hampton, while 13,714 people holding jobs in
Hampton live in Newport News. The bottom line is that one city or county’s job
prosperity nearly always is shared with other cities and counties.
Further, those who insist that all jobs be located in their city or county should
remember that hosting certain kinds of jobs could be very expensive in terms
of the infrastructure, policing and social services they require compared to the
taxes they generate. The strenuous competition among the cities and counties
that we sometimes now observe for jobs often turns out to impose losses on

everyone involved. Cooperative economic development activities make more
financial sense because they increase the probability that there will be many
winners within Hampton Roads when a new firm decides to locate here or an
existing firm expands.

IMPROVE THE DESIGN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
All economic development incentives should include “claw
back” provisions, or money-back guarantees, whereby the
governmental unit can recoup the incentive payments if the
businesses in question fail to live up to their job creation or
investment promises. Further, following the interesting example of the city
of St. Louis with respect to the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team, economic
development incentives can be accompanied by “shared appreciation”
agreements. If the recipient firm prospers, and later sells a major asset (such as
a stadium) that the government has subsidized, then the governmental donor
should share in that prosperity in the form of receiving a proportion of the sales
price when those assets eventually change hands. Cities and counties also can
negotiate specific requirements to accompany their investments, for example,
that a certain amount of low-income housing be constructed, or even that a
specific percentage of any operating profits be devoted to designated charities.

Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Oklahoma and Tennessee), to “reform
economic development incentive reporting policies and practices.”
The news release announcing Virginia’s involvement stated that “teams of
economic development policymakers and practitioners from seven states
will improve those states’ ability to collect and report results from incentive
investments and, as a result, develop national standards and best practices
that can become road maps for other states.” Eleven different state agencies
are listed as participants. If this comes to fruition, it will be an important step
forward.
Cities and counties in Hampton Roads should take to heart
this commitment to transparency. Whether it is the convention
center in Newport News, the prospective new arena in Virginia
Beach or the conference/hotel complex in Norfolk, cities and
counties should require recipients of their financial largesse to
open their books to public inspection. Only then will citizens be
able to ascertain if their tax dollars are being spent wisely.

MONITOR WHAT THE RECIPIENTS DO WITH THEIR INCENTIVES
Given the many potential pitfalls connected to tax incentives, even a
comparatively well-designed incentive program may yield disappointing
results. Because of this, it is important to monitor the effects of all incentives on
an ongoing basis. The city of Newport News provides an example of how not
to do it when it gave the developers of the convention facility attached to the
Marriott at City Center $26 million in support, but amazingly did not require
any public accounting of the subsequent operation and use of that facility.
Public funds must not be invested without subsequent public
inspection.
In April 2014, Gov. McAuliffe announced that Virginia would participate in the
Business Incentives Initiative, a joint project of The Pew Charitable Trusts, the
Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness and six other states (Indiana,
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Final Words
In another chapter in this report, “The Answer Is Always Yes,” we note the
perilous tendency of cities and counties to fund large, flashy convention center/
arena/hotel facilities in their communities even though there is abundant
evidence both that these investments typically don’t pay off and that this is
an especially bad time to move in this direction. Cities and counties do so,
however, because they believe this is a sound economic development strategy
(despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
In this chapter, we cast substantial doubt on another cornerstone of city and
county economic developers – the dispensing of economic development
incentive payments to businesses. While the evidence on the effectiveness of
such payments is not as negative as is true for public funding of convention
centers/arenas/hotels, it is nonetheless mixed at best and frankly discouraging
for those who mistakenly view this as the royal road to economic development.
What, then, is the appropriate approach for us to take in
terms of economic development? We must take a longterm approach and improve our overall economic and
social environment. This means improving our K-12 schools,
stimulating workforce development in community colleges
and universities, promoting research and development
activities at our medical school and universities, enhancing our
transportation infrastructure, stimulating the development of
cultural amenities and reducing crime, even while we ensure
that our tax structure remains competitive.
Too often, our economic development agencies and elected
officials persist in looking for quick fixes that somehow will
catapult our region forward to fame and fortune. Absent the
next Microsoft fortuitously being invented by an enterprising
student in the Frank Batten College of Engineering at Old
Dominion University, it isn’t going to happen. Instead, we must
develop and implement a plan for the long run – one that may not begin to yield
benefits until the next decade, but will slowly transform our region and enable it
to realize its potential.
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The Answer Is Always “Yes”

How Our Cities Repeatedly Ignore The
Evidence And Choose To Construct
Unprofitable And Unneeded New Convention
And Hotel Capacity

THE ANSWER IS ALWAYS “YES”: HOW OUR CITIES
REPEATEDLY IGNORE THE EVIDENCE AND CHOOSE
TO CONSTRUCT UNPROFITABLE AND UNNEEDED NEW
CONVENTION AND HOTEL FACILITIES
– “The Answer Is Always Yes” description comes from Forbes magazine, Feb. 28, 2005

A

las, the 2005 Forbes magazine observation remains largely on target in 2014. Virtually every one of Hampton Roads’ major cities and tourist
destinations either has constructed, or is planning to construct, new convention space, usually to be accompanied by increased hotel capacity. This
is despite the reality that: (1) both nationally and regionally, convention business has been struggling with declining attendance for well more than a
decade;1 and (2) by nearly every measure, our region’s hotel/motel sector prosperity and performance stand below where they were in 2007.

Whether serious analysis of these issues comes from the political right
(Manhattan Institute), or the political left (Brookings Institution), they are
unanimous in concluding that investments in additional convention/conference/
hotel capacity hardly ever break even, much less generate a respectable,
positive rate of return on the funds the public invests.1
Here is a sample of their conclusions:
• “ The overall convention marketplace is declining in a manner that suggests
that a recovery or turnaround is unlikely to yield much increased business for
any given community, contrary to industry projections.” (Brookings Institution,
2005)2
• “ Many of these expansions appear to have been based on feasibility
studies that failed to present rigorous reviews and examinations regarding

alleged claims of positive impacts and over-optimistic operational pro-forma
statements.” (Gerald Kock, University of Central Florida, 2007)3
• “The whole thing is a racket.” (Boston Globe, 2011)4
• “ Convention Center Expansion: Build It and They Won’t Come.” (Baltimore
Sun, 2011)5
• “ From Boston to Austin, politicians spend money on fancy white elephants.”
(Manhattan Institute, 2011)6
• “The Dubious Economics of Convention Centers” (ThinkProgress, 2011)7

3

4

5

1

2

 onvention center attendance nationally fell by almost 32 percent from 126 million to 86 million between 2000
C
and 2010. Joe Lawlor, “City officials suffer from conference center Fever,” Daily Press (April 11, 2013),
www.dailypress.com.
Heywood Sanders, “Space Available: The Realities of Convention Centers as Economic Development Strategy,”
Brookings Institution (January 2005).
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6

7

 erald Kock, “Proposing an Alternative Framework for Feasibility Studies for Large Public Tourism Investments:
G
A Quantitative Analysis of the Orange County Convention Center,” Master of Science thesis, Rosen College of
Hospitality Management, University of Central Florida, 2007.
Steven Malanga, “Have We Got a Convention Center to Sell You!,” The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204720204577126603702369654
Marta H. Mossberg, “Convention Center Expansion: Build It and They Won’t Come.” Baltimore Sun (June 7,
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-07/news/bs-ed-mossburg-20110607_1_heywood-sandersattendance-hilton-baltimore
Steven Malanga, “Have We Got a Convention Center to Sell You!,” Manhattan Institute (Dec. 31, 2011),
www.manhattan-institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=7759
Matthew Yglesias, “The Dubious Economics of Convention Centers,” ThinkProgress (March 18, 2011),
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesisas/2011/03/18/200256/the-dubious-economics-of-convention-centers

• “ Yet they have continued to pour money into the convention business, even in
the face of a national glut of meeting space and Charlotte’s inability to fill its
building.” (Charlotte Observer, 2012)8

ways to sell its goods and services to those outside that city or region; or (2) it
has become a more powerful magnet that keeps increasingly large proportions
of its citizens’ expenditures within its boundaries.

• “City officials suffer from conference center fever.” (Daily Press, 2013)9

FINDING WAYS TO SELL TO OR ATTRACT OUTSIDERS

• “ The heyday of conventions is over. More meetings are being held online.”
(The Daily Page, 2013)10

With respect to (1), unless we unexpectedly discover oil in Pungo or Poquoson,
smart, well-educated, ambitious, entrepreneurial citizens are the key to our
being able to sell more goods and services to those outside the region. Such
individuals are an important part of what economists refer to as our “human
capital.” Non-economists shorthand this by saying “great schools” and they
should be referring to kindergarten through Ph.D.

The truth is that it is difficult to generate any reliable evidence in favor of the
public subsidization of the construction of new convention/conference/hotel/
motel facilities in Hampton Roads (or hardly anywhere else in the United States).
As the foremost national expert on the economics of convention centers has
put it, the studies that cities have presented in favor of their convention centers
“have been consistently flawed and misleading.”11 We’ll present persuasive
data in this chapter that clearly call into question any publicly financed project
that would add to what already is a glut of convention/conference/hotel/
motel space in Hampton Roads. Such investments constitute a distinctly inferior
economic development strategy either for individual cities, or for the region as a
whole.

Where Does Real Economic
Development Come From?
Barring the discovery of a huge vein of gold during the construction of a new
highway or building, or a wildly successful, but unexpected, new invention or
business, reality is that economic growth is a very long-term process. A city or
region grows faster than its neighbors either because: (1) it has found attractive
Steve Harrison, “Selling Charlotte: Convention Business Requires Millions From Taxpayers,” The Charlotte
Observer (Aug. 20, 2012), www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/08/20/v-print/3464298/cost-of-convention.
html
9
Joe Lawlor, “City officials suffer from conference center fever,” Daily Press (April 11, 2013), www.dailypress.com
10
Joe Tarr, “Convention Center Researcher Heywood Sanders Warns Against Building New Monona Terrace
Hotel,” The Daily Page (Nov. 15, 2013), www.thedailypage.com/daily/article.php?article=41421
11
Heywood T. Sanders, “Convention Myths and Markets: A Critical Review of Convention Center Feasibility
Studies,” Economic Development Quarterly, 16 (2002), 195-209, p. 195. Sanders also noted, “The errors
and failings of these studies are not limited to the case of convention centers. Other equally flawed market
analyses and forecasts have been employed to support light rail projects, stadiums, arenas, cultural attractions,
and aquariums.” p. 208.

Our experience in Hampton Roads is mixed. We have pockets of excellence
in our schools and colleges, but if we pay attention to measures such as SOL
performance and school rankings, we must acknowledge that we often fall
short of the nation’s leadership regions. In the business sector, we’ve prospered
from more than a few firms in our region that have met the market test and
have found ways to sell their attractive wares outside of Hampton Roads. These
firms range in size from large, highly visible enterprises, such as Amerigroup,
Ferguson Enterprises, Newport News Shipbuilding and Sentara, to small and
medium-sized firms, such as Measurement Specialties, Paramount Sleep and
Stihl.
Real economic growth – the kind that does not involve transferring money from
one pocket to another inside our region – also can be generated by universities
and medical schools. These institutions not only can draw students from outside
our region, but also can attract significant research grant money. When they
succeed in doing so, they provide us with a readily understandable model of
selling goods and services to outsiders: we produce something that others want
to use or purchase.

8
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Some Virginians may take umbrage when the College of William & Mary grants
admission to out-of-state residents, but this is a positive source of economic
development that must not be forgotten. Analogously, when Old Dominion
University logs approximately $100 million in annual research and development
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Paramount Sleep, headquartered in Norfolk, provides an excellent example of real economic development in action. In
2008, Paramount, which manufactures and sells mattresses
to a wide variety of customers, including the government,
sold more than 52 percent of its mattresses inside Virginia
on annual sales of about $18 million. By 2014, the company
had expanded its revenues to more than $30 million through
four manufacturing/licensing partnerships with out-of-state
firms. Paramount’s out-of-Virginia sales constitute about 70
percent of its business. Paramount now sells in U.S. Navy
Exchange stores around the world, and its products appear
in Bloomingdale’s and Costco stores throughout the country.
This is genuine economic growth that did not come at the
expense of other companies in our region.
funding, this too fuels the engine of economic development because the great
proportion of these dollars comes to the university from outside Hampton Roads.
Contrast the examples of Paramount Sleep and Old Dominion University to the
“economic development” that allegedly occurs when a city chooses to subsidize
a local business that is not capable of attracting outside expenditures because
it has little or no magnetic power. A quintessential illustration is an approximate
$250,000 subsidy that one Hampton Roads city once provided a fast food
outlet. The city claimed additional jobs and tax revenues would be generated
from the expanded/renovated business. However, this dubious claim evaded
the critical question: Where are the customers for this fast food outlet going to
come from? Are customers going to drive in from Richmond to patronize it? Not
likely. Will local customers stay in Hampton Roads to spend their food money
because of this restaurant? Again, it’s not likely.
Virtually all additional sales, jobs and tax revenues emanating from the fast food
restaurant will come from existing fast food restaurants. One restaurant’s gain is
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another’s loss. This illustrates the economic phenomenon known
as displacement – one restaurant’s increasing sales come from
another restaurant’s decreasing sales. In net terms, there is no
new economic development from such “investments.”
Those interested in actual rather than imaginary economic development must
be wary of the displacement of existing expenditures, which does not constitute
net, new economic development. Instead, such redistribution disappointingly
often also involves crony capitalism, whereby a few favored businesses are
subsidized at the expense of all the others. In fairness, however, we must note
that expenditure displacement certainly is not limited to fast food restaurants. It
also often afflicts new or expanded arenas, convention centers and hotels.
Consider the case of a new or renovated hotel. If a new hotel or motel can only
be made viable by means of a public subsidy, then one should ask whether
that new hotel or motel actually will add to total hotel/motel patronage in our
region, or instead simply redistribute expenditures, jobs and tax collections from
one place to another. Will it effectively impoverish existing hotels and motels?
To be sure, existing hotels must be renovated or improved periodically (and we
are pleased when this occurs), but it is not clear why other hotels and businesses
should be asked to pay for such improvements.
All too often, elected officials and regional economic development personnel
ignore displaced expenditures. They revel in trumpeting the additional jobs and
tax payments connected to a subsidized project without acknowledging that
some or all of those jobs and tax payments will be realized only because the
subsidized business will take those jobs and tax payments away from existing
competitors.

INCREASING REGIONAL MAGNETISM
But, it is legitimate to ask: Shouldn’t we endeavor to improve our region and
make it more attractive to ourselves and to others? And, doesn’t that take
investment? The answer to both questions is “yes,” but we must be careful
how we go about this. We are capable of making our region more attractive
– increasing its magnetism – by well-chosen investments in infrastructure and
amenities. Attractions such as the Norfolk Tides, The Mariners’ Museum and
the Virginia Aquarium not only entice outside guests, but also keep our own

expenditures within Hampton Roads. The entire Virginia Beach oceanfront acts
as a magnet that attracts visitors and retains expenditures inside the region.

golf courses also should be in our purview. In each case, we need to ask
three critical questions:

A well-devised, efficient transportation system pays dividends by reducing
travel costs even while it pleases guests and makes our region a more
attractive place to live. We improve our quality of life and reduce travel costs
when we make cost-efficient investments in our transportation system. (Route
460, however, was the opposite kind of public investment -- one in which the
costs exceeded the benefits.)

 ill this public investment attract incremental new visitors and customers
(1) W
from outside our region and, if so, how many will come and how much
money will they spend?

If, however, the only customers that a conventional business or attraction ever
attracts are local and regional citizens, then even though we should praise
those businesses and attractions for serving local citizens well, it is difficult to
fashion a respectable economic argument why either should be subsidized by
the public. This is particularly true when displaced expenditures are involved
– for example, when the construction of a new hotel would simply take
patronage away from existing local hotels.
Even so, let’s be clear – public policy should not discourage the construction
of a new, nonsubsidized hotel (or any other business) unless doing so would
unleash noticeable spinoff costs on other citizens. Entrepreneurs sensing
opportunities and taking advantage of them is intrinsic to a market-based
economy. We usually end up better off when entrepreneurs leap to meet
our needs. Only a brief look at the massive oppression of consumers in the
former Soviet Union is necessary to understand this principle. Nevertheless,
providing entrepreneurs with the freedom to innovate and invest does not
justify subsidizing such ventures with public funds.
It’s not clear why taxpayers should subsidize a new hotel or conference
center at the expense of existing hotels and centers unless the new hotel
demonstrably would be able to attract incremental new visitors from outside
the region. Or, alternatively, perhaps the new hotel would provide the
critical amenities and capacity that would complement existing facilities and
amenities and complete a package capable of attracting incremental new
visitors and customers. (Unfortunately, while decision makers often make the
argument, it seldom holds water.)
We should not limit our analysis to hotels. Athletic facilities, convention
centers, fine and performing arts venues and recreational facilities such as
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(2) W
 ill this public investment act as a magnet and induce local and regional
citizens to spend their time and money in Hampton Roads rather than
somewhere else? And, if so, in how many cases will this be true and how
much money is involved?
(3) W
 hen we add up the benefits we have calculated in (1) and (2) – most of
which will spread out over future years and therefore must be discounted
appropriately12 – are they at least as large as the cost of the public
investment?
The problem is that numerous studies of public investments
in hotel and convention center complexes reveal that the
answer to question (3) often is not simply “no,” but a
resounding “NO!” Put simply, the benefits often do not
exceed the costs despite the rosy forecasts of those investing
the public funds. While those advocating such investments usually point
to increased tax revenues and incremental jobs, they consistently ignore
displacement in their calculations. It does our region no good if a public
investment adds $10 million of tax revenues from a new source, even while
it reduces tax revenues from existing sources by $10 million. This is not
economic development; it is an exercise in crony capitalism.
None of this should be taken to mean that our region should not invest in
new buildings, new plants and equipment, new roads, new and improved
homes, etc. Such investments can improve the quality of our lives and some
will make us more productive. Nevertheless, such investments do not generate
the economic development jolt we receive from regional economic activities that
enable us to sell to those outside our region.
12

T his means we must find the “present value” of the future benefits and requires us to “discount” the future benefits
in order to reduce them to current dollars so that we can compare these future benefits to the current investment
costs. Present value is an absolutely fundamental concept in economics and finance and underpins analysis and
decision making both on Wall Street and Main Street.
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Convention Facilities In
Hampton Roads
Let’s take a look at the convention/conference/meeting facilities (hereafter
shortened to “convention facilities”) currently available in Hampton Roads.

THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE MARKET
Table 1 reports the major convention and meeting facilities in Hampton Roads
along with the number of guest rooms attached to these locations. It is important
to note that these facilities differ significantly in terms of their characteristics. The
largest facility in our region is the Virginia Beach Convention Center, which
provides 516,000 square feet of potential space for conventions or meetings,
followed by the Hampton Roads Convention Center in Hampton (344,000
square feet) and the Boo Williams Sportsplex in Hampton, a successful,
specialized, sports-oriented venue (135,000 square feet).
The Virginia Beach Convention Center also is capable of hosting the largest
banquets (2,000 capacity), followed by the Hampton Roads Convention Center
(1,800), and the Norfolk Waterside Marriott (1,000) and Norfolk Sheraton
(1,000). While many national conventions involve banquets much larger than
these capacity limits, it is not clear that our region is capable of attracting such
events because of hotel room and transportation constraints.
Where hotel rooms are concerned, our largest regional facility is Kingsmill
Resort in Williamsburg (605 rooms), but several cities are capable of exceeding
this number by combining the room capacities of existing, nearby facilities.
In the case of Norfolk, for example, the Waterside Marriott and Sheraton
Waterside together field 873 hotel rooms. Similarly, both Virginia Beach and
Williamsburg are capable of fielding much larger combinations of hotel rooms
by piggybacking multiple hotel locations, but these possibilities usually involve
transporting some guests from hotels to meeting facilities.
All things considered, Hampton Roads fields a rather wide, though often
duplicative, variety of convention, meeting and hotel facilities. The region is
capable of hosting many different types of conventions and meetings, though
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not the largest meetings, which often are trade and business shows, political
conventions and some academic meetings. The 2012 Consumer Electronics
Show in Las Vegas, for example, reportedly attracted 156,000 visitors. Even if
this number is exaggerated by a factor of five, such numbers vastly exceed the
hosting abilities of Hampton Roads.13

UTILIZATION OF OUR CURRENT SUPPLY
“If they don’t want to tell you how often their facilities are being used, then
that usually means that the numbers are bad,” a well-placed national meetings
official told us. If this observation holds water with respect to Hampton Roads,
then the underlying event and attendance data for our region’s convention
and hotel facilities must be sour indeed. Even public convention and tourism
agencies routinely decline to supply data on events hosted and attendance,
though they have a legal obligation to do so.
Only six of the 24 facilities listed in Table 1 were willing to supply information
that would allow one to infer how intensively these facilities are used.
Nevertheless, one can sneak a peek at reality by inspecting city budgets (though
convention center numbers often are well disguised) and by listening to the
periodic debates that occur in city councils when a council member discovers
or rediscovers the fact that their convention center is losing money. For example,
the $106 million Hampton Roads Convention Center in Hampton, which
opened in 2005, has been losing millions of dollars every year, but city officials
nevertheless argue that the facility attracts sufficient business from the outside that
it overcomes these losses.14 This evidence, however, has not been shared with
anyone.
Hampton, however, is more forthcoming than Newport News, which supplied
$26 million of public funds to construct the Conference Center at the Marriott
Hotel in City Center. The investment dollars may have been public, but the
financial books of the conference center are not. Newport News signed an
agreement with the Marriott that does not require the Marriott to make public
any financial information concerning the taxpayer-subsidized conference center.
This is an unusual arrangement.
13
14

www.vegasinc.com/business/public-record/2013/jan/07/list-2012-largest-conventions.
Joe Lawlor and Robert Brauchle, “Taxpayer Money for Conference/Convention Centers Scrutinized,” Daily Press
(June 25, 2012), www.dailypress.com

TABLE 1
HAMPTON ROADS CONVENTION/CONFERENCE FACILITIES AND RELATED HOTELS: MARCH 2014
City

Total Meeting
Space: Sq. Ft.

Largest Meeting
Room: Sq. Ft.

Largest Banquet
Capacity

Guest
Rooms

Hampton

135,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

Virginia Beach

50,000

16,320

1,500

400

Chesapeake Conference Center

Chesapeake

22,700

20,000

1,100

N/A

Doubletree
(now The Williamsburg Hotel & Conference Center)

Williamsburg

45,000

13,303

1,030

281

Fort Magruder Hotel & Conference Center

Williamsburg

26,000

5,680

500

303

Founders Inn and Spa

Virginia Beach

25,000

12,876

1,000

240

Great Wolf Lodge

Williamsburg

14,500

4,524

350

406

Hampton Coliseum

Hampton

88,599

26,263

500

N/A

Hampton Roads Convention Center

Hampton

344,000
101,000 **arena space

14,000
4,000 **

1,800

N/A

Hampton University

Hampton

14, 916

14,000

N/A

N/A

Suffolk

14,000

7,260

500

150

Hilton Virginia Beach Oceanfront

Virginia Beach

12,196

7,100

1,000

289

Holiday Inn Virginia Beach/Norfolk Hotel

Virginia Beach

22,000

5,220

450

307

Holiday Inn & Suites North Beach

Virginia Beach

8,000

2,100

350

321

Kingsmill Resort

Williamsburg

17,101

6,050

500

605

Newport News

25,000

12,032

880

250

Norfolk

60,000

14,400

1,400

405

Portsmouth

24,355

11,858

1,000*

249

Norfolk

35,000

12,685

1,000

468

Virginia Beach

13,138

5,700

500

214

Smithfield

16,000

8,000

340

N/A

Virginia Beach Convention Center

Virginia Beach

516,000

31,029

1,800

N/A

Williamsburg Lodge

Williamsburg

45,000

11,190

1,000

323

Wyndham Hotel Oceanfront

Virginia Beach

16,000

5,218

550

244

Name
Boo Williams Sportsplex
Cavalier Hotel

Hilton Garden Inn Suffolk Riverfront

Newport News Marriott at City Center
Norfolk Waterside Marriott
Renaissance Hotel and Conference Center
Sheraton Norfolk Waterside
Sheraton Virginia Beach Oceanfront Hotel
Smithfield Center

*Per Sales and Service - Renaissance
**Arena space can be configured for banquets. The 14,000 square foot space is considered the largest meeting space other than arena.
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In 2012, when Virginia Beach rejected a proposal to supply $67 million in
taxpayer funds to spur the construction of a $109 million four-star Hyatt Regency
hotel near its $207 million convention center (which opened in 2007), some
council members and many taxpayers grumbled that the convention center had
yet to fulfill its promise. Instead, the convention center appeared to specialize in
local and regional events rather than attracting larger, national events.
The relevant point of these examples is that convention/conference centers
virtually never make money; they nearly always require subsidies. In an
attempt to make them profitable, elected officials frequently propose public
investments in complementary facilities, such as hotels. One losing proposition
frequently leads to another for taxpayers. Virginia Beach is one of the few cities
that has resisted what one external industry observer termed “second-stage
developments.”
The Founders Inn and Spa (at Regent University) did tell us that it hosted more
than 500 events in 2013, while the Smithfield Center, a public endeavor,
indicated it hosted 480. The Chesapeake Conference Center, while losing
money, reported hosting 440 events between June 2012 and July 2013. The
Wyndham Hotel in Virginia Beach reported that it hosted more than 300 events
in 2013. Nearly every other facility declined to supply any data concerning
events, usage or profitability.

NATIONAL UTILIZATION DATA
While those that operate our region’s convention facilities are very close to
the vest with their data, we do have access to national data on convention
attendance, convention revenues and space utilization. Graph 1, which is
derived from Center for Exhibition Industry Research (CEIR) data, reveals that
times have been very tough for conventions, meetings and exhibitions since
2000. We’ll refer to these collectively as “events.” Graph 1 discloses that:
• T otal attendance at events in 2013 remained below that in 2007 and was
only about 2 percent higher than in 2000.
• R evenues derived from these events were about 15 percent below those in
2007 and about 2 percent below those in 2000.
• T he number of exhibitors at events was about 8 percent below that in 2007
and about 7 percent below that in 2000.
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• Space utilization at events was about 8 percent below that in 2007, but
about 2 percent higher than that in 2000.
At the very least, the data and trends illustrated in Graph 1
are very discouraging to any city contemplating the subsidized
construction of additional convention space. The problem is
exacerbated by the new event-hosting capacity that has been coming on line.
Graph 2 reveals that event-hosting capacity has grown by about one-third since
2000, even while attendance has barely budged above 2000 levels.
Further, as Graphs 3 and 4 demonstrate, the adverse trends observed in Graph
2 apply both to large and small venues. The convention market is in the
midst of a long-term slump that applies to virtually all types of
venues.
Optimists blame the Great Recession that began in 2008 for the demise of the
convention market. While there is no doubt that the recession has contributed
to the attendance and revenue challenges facing convention venues, it would
be a mistake to assume that convention problems will disappear if economic
conditions improve. First, the industry suffers from overcapacity. The blunt truth
is there are far too many convention venues available relative to even the most
generous estimates of future demand. Graph 2 drives this point home.
Second, the funk into which the convention market has descended already
preceded the Great Recession. Convention attendance and revenues have been
stagnant or falling since the end of the 1990s. An increasingly important reason
for this is the ability that individuals now have to see and talk with each other
in high definition over the Internet. This has put a serious dent in the need for
employees and individuals to attend a convention in a distant city.
Even Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss (in “Candide”) would have difficulty pulling an
optimistic interpretation from the data and trends found in Graphs 1 through 4.
Is it possible that Hampton Roads could constitute an exception to these adverse
national trends? This is unlikely. Our region is highly dependent upon federal
expenditures (especially those involving defense) and there is little prospect that
federal expenditures on travel and meetings are going to climb.
In fact, our region has been unable to make headway in the face of the strong
national winds that have buffeted convention venues and hotels. The next section
provides data that demonstrate this point.

GRAPH 1
GRAPH 1
HISTORIC AND FORECAST CONDITIONS INDEX — MEETINGS AND EXHIBITION INDUSTRY
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GRAPH 2
CEIR ATTENDANCE INDEX AND EXHIBIT SPACE SUPPLY BY YEAR
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GRAPH 3

GRAPH 3
PWC LARGE CONVENTION CENTERS AVERAGE CONV/TS ATTENDANCE BY YEAR
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GRAPH 4
PWC SMALL CONVENTION CENTERS AVERAGE CONV/TS ATTENDANCE BY YEAR
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Hotel Facilities In
Hampton Roads
While our region’s cities jealously guard data concerning the utilization of their
convention centers, a variety of trade groups collect data concerning hotel/
motel (we’ll henceforth abbreviate this to “hotel”) utilization and prosperity.
Simply put, the Hampton Roads hotel industry is smaller now than it was in 2007
and room utilization fell during that time as well. One can see in Graph
5 that total hotel revenues in our region peaked in 2007 and
still are expected to be 4.6 percent below that level in 2014. In
real, inflation-adjusted terms, total hotel revenues in Hampton
Roads in 2013 were 18.1 percent below those in 2007.
The coin of the realm in the hotel business is REVPAR – revenue per available
room – because REVPAR takes into account how many rooms are being utilized
to generate revenue. Implicitly, it reflects the costs attached to generating
revenue. One can see in Table 2 that REVPAR in 2013 lagged the 2007 highwater mark by 10.7 percent.

Both Norfolk’s new downtown project and the renovation of
Virginia Beach’s historic Cavalier Hotel are being spearheaded
by Bruce Thompson, an experienced and savvy developer. According to Inside Business (May 12-18, 2014), Mr. Thompson
will receive an $18 million subsidy from Virginia Beach in
addition to an approximate $90 million subsidy from Norfolk. Inside Business quotes Mr. Thompson: “Another hotel
in downtown Norfolk would be a disaster.” Mr. Thompson
will earn the title of wizard if he can simultaneously: (1) buck
the adverse patronage trends that have afflicted national and
regional hotels and conference centers for many years; (2)
successfully position the new Norfolk development so that it
is not regarded as just “another hotel;” and, (3) not harm the
existing Marriott and Sheraton hotels as he does so.

The most easily understood statistic for those not closely connected to the hotel
industry is the hotel vacancy rate – the average percentage of rooms that are
occupied by guests. Vacancy rates in 2013 also were below those in 2007
and, in contrast to the hopes of some, continued to decline in 2013. Graph 6
reveals that the Historic Triangle (Williamsburg) was the sole exception to this
trend.

premium at a new, upscale hotel made more attractive by high-quality dining
opportunities; (2) the project will attract new conferences and meetings that
heretofore have skipped by Norfolk and therefore will not diminish the number
of guests served by nearby hotels, such as the Waterside Marriott and Sheraton
Waterside; and (3) combined with other downtown improvements, the project
will enable Norfolk to assemble a highly attractive overall package that would
make the city competitive for many additional conventions and meetings.

In May 2014, Norfolk announced an approximate $90 million public
investment in a conference center/hotel/parking complex on Main Street.
Norfolk decision makers say they are aware of the seriously adverse market
conditions they will confront as they move ahead with this project, but for public
consumption have argued that: (1) the “conference center” they contemplate
differs from a typical convention center and therefore will attract upscale,
technologically savvy guests capable of paying perhaps a $30 per night

These are strong assertions that are inconsistent with the national and regional
trends delineated in Graphs 1 through 7 and therefore are an uncertain basis
for an investment of $90 million of public funds. This is especially true since
during the project’s development the city declined to share any relevant data
that would illuminate why it believes this particular project constitutes the best
available use of its scarce funds.

“Providing more hotel space to attract more convention business has been the philosophy behind cities across the country that
have publicly financed and built convention center hotels. But too often, the convention groups and visitors that are supposed
to fill those new rooms never show.” Baltimore Business Journal (March 1-7, 2013), www.baltimorebusinessjournal.com
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Figure 17
GRAPH 5
Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2013
(millions of $$)
TOTAL ANNUAL HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2013
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Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, January 7, 2014 and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.
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TABLE 2
REVPAR IN SELECTED MARKETS, 2007-2013
2007

2013

Percentage Change

U.S.

$65.58

$68.69

+4.7%

Virginia

$61.95

$55.69

-10.1%

Hampton Roads

$52.90

$47.25

-10.7%

Myrtle Beach

$54.03

$56.40

+4.4%

Coastal Carolina

$55.83

$56.26

+0.8%

Ocean City

$71.74

$68.81

-4.1%

Virginia Beach

$64.73

$64.64

-0.1%

Newport News/Hampton

$41.49

$36.12

-12.9%

Norfolk/Portsmouth

$54.05

$45.35

-16.1%

Williamsburg

$47.48

$39.08

-17.7%

Chesapeake/Suffolk

$52.90

$41.11

-22.3%
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GRAPH 6
PERCENT CHANGE IN OCCUPANCY RATES FOR REGIONAL CITIES, 2012-2013
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Final Thoughts
There is real economic development and then there is alleged economic
development. Real economic development occurs when a city or region
becomes increasingly capable of producing goods and services that those
outside the region want to purchase, or when it becomes increasingly capable
of retaining the expenditures of its own citizens rather than watching those
expenditures go elsewhere.
“Smarter, better” is the time-honored way cities and regions increase their
external sales capabilities, or enhance their own magnetism. This requires
well-devised, cost-efficient investments in education and health, strategic
infrastructure, well-chosen amenities, and both basic and applied research and
development.
Antithetical to real economic development are activities that merely redistribute
sales within a city or region, or that blatantly redistribute income by favoring
one firm or organization over another without any sound economic rationale for
doing so. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that this is a form of crony
capitalism and in the long run this actually discourages real economic growth.
Unfortunately, most (though not all) investments governments
make in convention venues, arenas and attached hotel
capacity fall into this latter, suspect category. Such investments
usually do little more than redistribute existing sales and do
not actually produce any incremental tax revenue. Further,
they favor some firms and entrepreneurs over others, and
therefore often do not pass the proverbial smell test.
All of this occurs in city after city, year after year, despite
the accumulated negative empirical evidence. Some elected
officials in our region appear to be seduced by their own
flashy announcements of large projects that falsely promise
economic growth. “Our city is on the move!” Unfortunately, in
the wrong direction.

THE ANSWER IS ALWAYS “YES”
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